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Abstract
Two different themes, both within Macroeconomics, are tackled in this work. The first and second
chapters study how enterprises access financial resources to finance their investment. The third
chapter relates to international macroeconomics, analysing the effect of foreign exchange interven-
tions on the exchange rate level.
How do Chinese small- and medium-sized enterprises manage to bypass financial constraints and
invest, despite their limited access to formal bank loans? What is the impact of the recent banking
sector reforms in China? In my first chapter, I show evidence of the crucial role played by alternative
sources of funding - namely family, friends, non-listed equity and further informal institutions - in
supplementing usual financing sources like bank loans and reinvested profits. I conclude that
liberalizing the banking sector significantly increases steady-state aggregate production and capital
levels. Tightening the regulation of the alternative finance sector remains detrimental to small,
young enterprises, even if simultaneous to liberalizing the banking sector.
The second chapter suggests a theoretical mechanism driving fluctuations in the ability of newcomer
enterprises to obtain financial resources for their investment projects. I examine the differentiated
impact of a shock in commercial banks’ refinancing cost on loan distribution, distinguishing among
borrowers according to their previous loan history with the bank. Since loan officers have more
information on incumbent borrowers than on newcomers, they may prioritize loans to incumbents
against loans to newcomers, as a response to the shock.
The last chapter (joint with G. Adler and R. C. Mano) studies the impact of foreign exchange
intervention for a large panel of countries. We find robust evidence that foreign exchange interven-
tion affects the level of the exchange rate in an economically meaningful way: a country purchasing
(selling) its own domestic currency appreciates (depreciates) it. In addition, these effects are found
to be quite persistent.
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1 Alternative Finance and Credit Sector
Reforms: the Case of China
Abstract
This paper studies firms’ optimal investment decisions and their choice of financing sources in
a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous firms. Besides retained earnings and bank
loans, I focus on the crucial role played by alternative sources of funding, including family, friends,
non-listed equity and informal banking institutions. While small young enterprises face important
difficulties to finance their investment, these alternative financing sources allow them to partially
bypass credit constraints. The model I develop can account for the financing patterns observed in
Chinese data. In this framework, I quantify the impact of various reforms of the credit distribu-
tion sector on the aggregate economy and enterprise trajectories. Liberalizing the banking sector
increases the steady-state aggregate level of capital by 10%, and the steady-state aggregate produc-
tion by 5%. In addition, the short-term production growth of small, new-born firms increases by
up to 7 percentage points on average. Tightening the regulation of the alternative finance sector,
even if simultaneous to a bank liberalization, remains detrimental to small, young enterprises.
1
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Introduction
Over recent decades, emerging market economies have seen a tremendous economic growth: China’s
GDP has increased by 9.6% per year on average since 1995, India’s GDP by 6.8% over the same
period. Since the institutional environment in these countries is relatively poor, this fact tends to
contradict the relationship between legal environment, financial institutions and economic growth
highlighted by, among others, Levine (1999) and Demirguc¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). How can
we account for these flourishing economies, given the fundamental uncertainties on property rights,
access to financing and law enforcement? How would reforms towards a more competitive credit
distribution impact the economy both in terms of aggregate situation and enterprise trajectories?
Answering these questions requires to fully understand the patterns of investment financing. To be
able to invest and grow, enterprises must find ways to bypass the limitations of financial institutions.
As suggested by Allen et al. (2005), when facing important obstacles in obtaining bank loans or
issuing equity, enterprises may resort to alternative sources of funding, like family, friends, or other
external sources. In China, the well-known example of the prosperous city Wenzhou shows how
a clan-like social organisation and strong mercantile traditions spurred the creation and growth
of enterprises. For the (mostly small) firms that face difficulties accessing the credit market, the
presence of alternative financing sources through family or friends, trade credit, non-listed equity
and moneylenders is crucial to bypass credit constraints and finance investment.
The role of such alternative sources of funding in alleviating financial constraints and the influence of
credit sector reforms are at the center of this paper. I propose modelling alternative funding sources
and quantifying the impact of a banking liberalization for firms’ investment, with a specific focus
on the Chinese case. Misallocations are indeed well-rooted in the history of Chinese formal credit
markets, which renders the study of alternative financing and banking reforms especially interesting
in this country. Retail banking interest rates have long been set by the government, while banks
were advised to direct loans towards large state-owned enterprises.1 Reforming the banking sector
towards a more market-based functioning is an on-going process in China, and interest rates are not
fully liberalized yet. To model this situation, I first set up a general equilibrium framework where
heterogeneous firms choose how much to invest and how to finance it, between retained earnings,
official bank loans and alternative funding. This model focuses on credit markets as one specific
cause for capital misallocation. I then calibrate the model’s parameters according to stylized facts
for China. In this framework, I investigate how a liberalization of banks’ interest rates, coupled
or not with a tighter regulation of alternative finance, impacts firms’ investment opportunities and
the aggregate economy.
1As will be detailed in section 1.1.1, loan applications from private enterprises have long been disregarded by Chinese
state-owned banks – who control the bulk of the credit distributed in China. This is one of the main reasons why
small private firms still face significant obstacles when looking for financing.
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The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, while the current literature considers only equity,
bonds and retained earnings, I add the possibility for firms to access alternative sources of funding,
including family and friends, non-listed equity, and informal sources in the model. In my set-up,
firms have unequal access to this additional funding source, to reflect the randomness of contacts
and networks. Many papers have dealt with resource misallocation and its impact on the aggregate
economy (see, for instance, Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008 and Hsieh and Klenow, 2009); however
they tend not to study alleviation mechanisms carefully. Second, for the case of China, I evaluate
quantitatively the impact of reforming the credit sector on the aggregate economy and enterprises
development, accounting for this alternative funding source. Such an evaluation has not been
done before, as studies on investment financing in China have either been only qualitative, or have
focused on financial constraints faced by firms rather than on how to bypass those constraints and
potential reforms.
I compare four scenarios of reforms where the bank interest rates are fully liberalized and set
competitively: (i) while alternative funding is never allowed; (ii) while alternative funding is always
allowed; (iii) while access to alternative funding is shut down; and (iv) while access to alternative
funding is more tightly regulated (partially shut down). The results show that the presence of
alternative financing sources increase aggregate production and consumption by 6.6% and 6.2%
respectively, and that a liberalization of the banking sector increases aggregate production and
consumption by 5.5% and 3.1% respectively. In terms of development of small young firms over
the first 6 years of their activity, the liberalization implies an average production growth from 2
percentage points slower to 7 percentage points faster (depending on their initial productivity), and
an average capital growth from 1 percentage points slower to 13 percentage points higher. It also
improves resource allocation, as more productive new-born firms grow faster in terms of production
and capital after the liberalization, whereas their less productive peers grow slower. By alleviating
financial constraints before the reforms, the presence of alternative financing sources dampens the
reforms impact on the Chinese aggregate consumption. Furthermore, I show that liberalizing the
banking sector can compensate for a tighter regulation of the alternative finance sector, but only
partially. On the one hand, liberalizing the banking sector while shutting down all alternative
funding increases aggregate production and consumption by respectively 5.61% and 3.05%; on the
other hand, such a combined reform lowers the average growth of small young firms by up to 14
percentage points in terms of production, and up to 23 percentage point in terms of capital.
As highlighted by the above results, alternative funding renders small young firms more dynamic
in terms of production and capital growth, and contributes to a higher long-run level of aggregate
production and capital. This partly explains the surprising coexistence of a tremendous economic
growth and malfunctioning formal credit institutions in emerging countries. In the case of China,
liberalizing the banking sector has a clear positive impact, although possibly not as high as expected
3
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due to the presence of alternative financing. Tightening the regulation standards of non-bank
lending institutions could be detrimental to this economic dynamism, and should go hand in hand
with a liberalization of the banking sector and a more efficiently allocated bank credit, in order to
prevent regulation from having a biased impact on young private firms.
The remainder of this section reviews related literature. Section 1.1 presents the data and some
important stylized facts. Section 1.2 describes the program of the heterogeneous enterprises at the
core of the theoretical model. Section 1.3 closes the model by inserting the firms’ program into a
general equilibrium framework. Section 2.4 turns to the calibration of the model and section 1.5
presents the results.
Related literature
This study is connected to three strands of literature. The first relates to theoretical and struc-
tural papers that tackle resource allocation, development of firms and economic growth. Second,
many qualitative studies examine the link between institutions’ general quality and development.
Third, numerous papers focusing on China provide empirical evaluations of the presence of financial
constraints faced by local enterprises, and of its alleviating factors.
First, focusing on resource allocation, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
look at the impact of misallocations that can be triggered by political preferences, regulation or
credit constraints. They model misallocation by imposing heterogeneous tax rates on output, cap-
ital and labor in a macroeconomic set-up. Greenwood et al. (2013) further provide a microfounded
framework based on incomplete information and costly monitoring technology. In their set-up, all
funding for capital investment is obtained through financial intermediaries, within a single compet-
itive sector for financial intermediation. The allocation of financial resources is also tackled by Song
et al. (2011), who model the Chinese economic transition through a reallocation of resources from fi-
nancially integrated (i.e. state-owned) firms to entrepreneurial (i.e. private and credit constrained)
ones. Song et al. (2014) further take into account the government’s action through capital controls,
government bond rate, deposit rate and exchange rate policies. They conclude among others that
liberalizing the deposit rate relaxes firms’ credit constraints and fastens the economic transition.
The model I present here emphasizes a different aspect of capital misallocation and fund-raising
decision: it includes alternative funding sources accessible by credit constrained firms, and studies
firms’ constrained choice of funding source. My objective is to quantify not the impact of capital
misallocation, but to what extent a bank liberalization could alleviate this misallocation, account-
ing for the presence of alternative sources of funding. In this regard, my study is closer to Moll
(2014) and Song et al. (2011), although entrepreneurs in my model use access to alternative funding
sources on top of self-financing to bypass financial constraints. I focus here on investment financing
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sources and credit sector reforms in the pre-crisis context, until 2007. More recently, Cong and
Ponticelli (2016) study the impact of the “Chinese Economic Stimulus Plan” on credit distribution
across firms after the start of the global financial crisis. They show evidence that the stimulus
favors state-owned firms against private ones, thus partially counteracting the effects of previous
financial reforms shown in this paper.
Other theoretical papers provide abundant literature related to heterogeneous agent models. The
theoretical framework used here is relatively close to Arellano et al. (2012), who set up a model where
heterogeneous firms choose between debt and equity to finance investment. Financial development,
represented by a cost of access to credit, is at the center of their work, while mine focuses on the
presence of alternative financing sources alleviating credit constraints. Further papers investigate
firms’ financing constraints and choices: Cabral and Mata (2003) explain the size distribution of
firms by the presence of financial constraints; Cooley and Quadrini (2001) use financial frictions in
a firm dynamics model to explain stylized facts about the link between firm age, size and growth.
While related to these studies in terms of firms’ modelling and credit constraints, my paper includes
additional financing mechanisms and focuses on reforms’ impact rather than on the general age
and size distribution of firms.
Second, from a more qualitative viewpoint, the finance-growth nexus and more generally the im-
portance of institutions’ quality has been studied among others by Allen et al. (2010), who compare
China and India’s institutional frameworks. In a similar direction, Allen et al. (2012) examine the
role of informal finance in the economic development of China. The latter support the view that
the alternative financing sector, which they define as every non-bank source of funds, plays an
essential role in explaining the high growth observed in China for more than a decade. Drawing on
the qualitative evidence provided by these studies, I suggest a theoretical model to quantify more
precisely the impact of alternative financing sources on firms’ development.
The third strand of literature regards empirical estimations of the extent of financial constraints
in China. For instance, Ayyagari et al. (2010) analyze the performance difference between Chinese
firms financed by banks and through informal sources. They show that the collateral required by
formal banks is an important obstacle for private firms to obtain loans and that firms using bank
loans are associated with higher sales growth. Du and Girma (2009), Girma et al. (2008) and Deme-
triades et al. (2008) conduct similar studies on the relationship between firm size, firm growth and
source of finance. They conclude that formal and alternative finance sources are complementary in
supporting different types of firms, and that the financial sources have a significant impact on firms’
growth. More recently, Degryse et al. (2013) empirically show that informal finance has a positive
impact on sales growth of small Chinese firms, and no impact for large ones. Poncet et al. (2010)
and He´ricourt and Poncet (2009) suggest methods to test if Chinese firms are credit constrained,
5
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separating between private and state-owned firms. My model, calibrated on the Chinese situation,
builds on this empirical evidence.
1.1 Data and stylized facts
1.1.1 Chinese context
With the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has gradually opened up and en-
trepreneurship has developed tremendously. The progressive loosening of regulatory constraints,
coupled with privatizations, mergers and closures of State-Owned Enterprises (hereafter, SOE), fa-
vored the growth of the private sector, consisting mainly in young, small and medium enterprises.2
Still, the current characteristics of the Chinese credit market go hand in hand with resource mis-
allocations that may impact output production and efficiency. This situation is deeply rooted in
Chinese post-World War II history. Until 1998, state-owned banks did not grant credit to private
enterprises, observing what is known as the “political pecking order”. Since then, the official stand
regarding credit distribution has changed, but credit constraints are still present. As found by Du
and Girma (2009), the “big four” State-owned Chinese banks tend to grant more credit to large
firms than to Small and Medium Enterprises (hereafter, SME), discriminating not only against
private firms, but also against smaller firms in general.
The size of a firm is indeed crucial to obtain formal financial credit for many reasons. First, Chinese
banks usually require collateral when granting a loan, and generally accept only land or buildings.
Given the specific features of the Chinese land ownership system, in particular that the land is
mainly owned by the state, private SME are unlikely to be able to provide land as collateral.
Second, interest rates charged by the banks and the amount of credit available in the Chinese
economy are mainly set by the monetary authorities until 2004.3 Hence, banks are not able to
2The number of State-owned and State-holding industrial enterprises in China Mainland has decreased by 72%
within 15 years, from 64737 in 1998 to 34280 in 2003 and 18197 in 2013. Over the same period, the number
of private industrial enterprises has been multiplied by 18, increasing from 10667 in 1998 to 67607 in 2003 and
194945 in 2013. However, with average total assets per enterprise amounting to 276 million yuan in 2003 (up
from 116 millions yuan in 1998), state-owned enterprises remain much larger than private enterprises, that reach
an average level of total assets per enterprise equal to 21 million yuan (up from 14 million yuan in 1998). Source:
Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2014.
3Until 2004, the People’s Bank of China imposed to domestic banks a ceiling and a floor rates for loans (and
deposits): lending rates were allowed to move between 0.9 and 1.1 times the benchmark rate for loans to large
enterprises, and between 0.9 and 1.3 times the benchmark rate for loans to SME. In 2004, the ceiling rate for loans
(and the floor rate for deposits) were suppressed, allowing banks to better price the riskiness of the borrowers by
adjusting lending rates upwards. Furthermore, Chinese monetary policy is also implemented through “window
guidance”, guiding credit allocation in terms of credit volumes and sectoral distribution. For more details, see,
for instance, Laurens and Maino (2007).
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match their interest rates with the risk profile of the borrower and are instead forced to modify
their credit supply by adjusting quantity or selecting their borrowers. Since large enterprises, and
even more SOE, often beneficiate from an implicit government guaranty, banks tend to favor them
when distributing loans.
To bypass these credit constraints, SME may want to turn to financial markets. Indeed, SME are
often viewed as more productive than large ones – which are often SOE – and should therefore
attract more investment, and be able to raise more funds through bank credit and financial markets.
However, access to financial markets remains insufficiently developed to offer enough capital to
Chinese enterprises, and those that cannot obtain bank loans either resort to retained earnings to
finance themselves, or need to find funding through alternative non-market sources.
Besides retained earnings, SME use more informal funding sources to finance their investment:
family and friends, non-listed outside equity, or informal banking institutions, from trust companies
to pawnshops, via clan organizations (e.g. entrepreneurs from the coastal city Wenzhou4). These
alternative sources are key for the growth of enterprises in China, and are at the center of this
paper. Obtaining funding from family or friends has the advantage that it generally requires neither
collateral nor very high interest payments. Similarly, informal lenders usually do not require the
same kind of collateral as banks, though they often use other means to insure repayment, like
reputation, trust or violence. They further require higher interest rates, close to 100% per year
in some extreme cases, which limits the amount and loan duration the borrower can get. The
data presented in the next section give us more details regarding these alternative ways to finance
investment.
1.1.2 Data presentation
Firm-level data come from the Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World Bank5 in many countries
in the 2000s. These surveys mainly focus on SME, although they include some large enterprises
too. In China, surveys were conducted over 1548 enterprises in 2002 and 2400 enterprises in 2003.
Since the liberalization of retail banks interest rates was initiated in 2004, it is relevant to use data
obtained just before the start of the reforms and I decided to focus on the situation of firms at
the start of the 21st century.6 The samples used by the World Bank in 2002 and 2003 correspond
broadly to the overall distribution of Chinese enterprises. They provide firm-level data on many
aspects of the firms’ situation, including the ownership structure, production, labor, investment and
4See for instance Liu (1992) and more recently Wei et al. (2007) for more details.
5These data are available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
6A new survey (data from 2012) has been released recently; however the variables included in it are not easily
comparable with previous surveys.
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financing. Not all variables are filled in for both years. Consequently, I will be using data from 2002
to estimate the production function and data from 2003 regarding investment’s financing. Both
samples (2002 and 2003) are very similar regarding their composition (see Table 3.1 in Appendix
1.A for a comparison), so I can use both of them without inconsistency.
Detailed data on sources of financing are available only in the 2003 survey, and are presented
across firm size in Table 1.1. I define firm size categories as follows: small firms have less than 50
employees, medium ones between 50 and 250, large ones between 250 and 1000, and very large ones
above 1000 employees. Since SOE and collective enterprises may have objectives that differ from
the usual dividend maximization, I focus here on private firms only, in order to keep consistency
between my theoretical model and the stylized facts observed in the data.7,8 Similar statistics are
presented in Appendix 1.A in Table 1.A.3, using total sales to determine the size of a firm.
Table 1.1: Sources of funding for new investment, by firm size (% of total new investment), across
private firms
All Small Medium Large Very large
Internal/retained earnings 24.21 20.37 26.01 26.98 21.41 Local banksForeign-owned banks
Special development financing
28.83 17.65 25.86 39.53 45.11
Bank 0.23 0.06 0.47 0.13 0.00
0.51 1.02 0.36 0.40 0.00
Family, friends
Equity, sale of stock to employees
Equity, sale of stock to legal-persons
Informal sources
Trade credit
11.69 18.16 13.55 5.30 1.64
5.65 6.87 6.19 4.31 3.39
Alternative 13.41 20.69 12.98 10.48 2.02
3.02 3.27 3.18 2.99 1.77
1.66 2.08 1.17 1.21 3.61
Equity, public issue of marketable
share to outside investors
2.12 0.76 1.42 2.18 8.74
Others 8.66 9.07 8.82 6.48 12.31
Observations 630 172 247 149 61
In the raw data, the highest contribution to investment funding is attributed to “others”, which
accounts for about 40%. This high share is mainly driven by enterprises that declare obtaining 100%
of their funding from other sources than the ones enumerated in the survey. Since it is not possible
to obtain any further detail on the content of these other sources, I consider firms declaring 100%
funding from “others” as missing values9. Table 1.1 presents statistics including only the enterprises
7For the ownership status, I consider the owner of the largest share of the firm and distinguish between state-owned,
private, collective and foreign enterprises in the following way: a firm is classified in a category when 50% or
more are owned by this category of owners. For collective firms, I refer to the share of the firm that is collectively
owned. For almost all the firms present in the sample, this rule is sufficient to determine their ownership status.
The unsettled cases are classified one by one.
8Very similar patterns are obtained when keeping all firms in the sample. Table 1.A.2 in Appendix 1.A shows
financing patterns across ownership status.
9I loose 314 observations from this manipulation. The firms dropped have similar characteristics to the firms kept
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getting less than 100% of their financing from “other” sources. The highest source of funds is bank
loans, with 29% of investment funds coming from local banks. The share of investment financed
through bank loans is clearly increasing with size. Smaller firms compensate this fact by a more
intensive use of retained earnings and alternative sources of funding, notably funds provided by
family and friends, and non-listed outside equity. Retained earnings are relatively low compared to
other developed countries where similar surveys have been conducted.10 However, this pattern is
consistent across developing countries, where enterprises are younger, were not able to accumulate
wealth yet and hence cannot use retained earnings intensively.11 Note that the shares financed by
foreign banks or investment funds are very small, which confirms the limited presence of foreign
banks in the country in 2003, and the slow introduction of financial innovations.
To define some stylized facts able to drive the model set-up, I regroup these various sources of
funding into 3 categories as summarized in Table 1.2:
- retained earnings: this corresponds to the retained earnings defined in the data;
- bank loans: it contains loans from local banks, foreign banks and investment funds;
- alternative sources: this regroups family and friends, non-listed outside equity, trade credit
and informal sources.
In the remainder of the paper, I will use these three categories to study more in detail investment
financing across firms.
Table 1.2: Sources of funding for new investment, by firm size (% of total new investment), across
private firms
All Small Medium Large Very large
Internal/retained earnings 26.64 22.23 28.63 28.72 26.43
Bank 34.34 21.50 30.80 45.06 57.59
Alternative 39.03 56.27 40.58 26.22 15.98
Observations 624 171 244 147 61
in the data in terms of size, total sales and age. In this regards, the statistics shown here can be considered as a
lower bound for the use of retained earnings and alternative finance.
10See Table 1.A.4 in Appendix 1.A for the break down of funding sources in Germany in 2005. Using similar size
categories as for China, retained earnings are more heavily used by firms of all sizes, and leasing (nonexistent
in China in 2003) is also used. On the opposite, family and friends are almost nonexistent as source of funding
in Germany and informal sources disappear. Note that equity in the German case mostly corresponds to listed
equity and is therefore only used by very large firms.
11Tables 1.A.5 and 1.A.6 show similar statistics for India in 2005 and Colombia in 2006, where retained earnings
finance respectively 52% and 33% of investment. Vietnam also has a similar share of retained earnings in 2005
(results available upon request).
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1.1.3 Distribution of firms across uses of finance sources
The average shares of financing sources presented in Table 1.1 hide large discrepancies across firms:
most of them tend to use only a subset of the available sources, with a non-negligible proportion
financing their investment using only one source of funds. Table 1.3 reports, by size for each
financing possibility, the share of enterprises not using it at all (declaring 0% of their investment
funds coming from it), and the share of enterprises using only one of the sources to finance their
investment. Similar results are presented in Tables 1.A.7 and 1.A.8 in Appendix 1.A, using total
sales to define firms’ size and separating firms across ownership status.
Table 1.3: Sources of financing: share (%) of private enterprises declaring not using one financing
source, or using only one finance source, by size
All Small Medium Large Very large
not using (0%)
internal/retained earnings 60.19 69.59 59.02 53.06 55.74
bank loans 56.02 71.35 60.25 41.50 31.15
alternative 51.36 34.50 51.64 61.22 73.77
using only (100%)
internal/retained earnings 19.26 18.13 22.54 16.33 16.39
bank loans 22.63 14.04 21.72 28.57 36.07
alternative 29.21 45.61 29.92 15.65 13.11
observations 623 171 244 147 61
More than half of the firms do not use all the financing sources available. This share is the highest
for funds coming from retained earnings, which 60% of the enterprises do not use, followed by
bank loans and alternative financing, which are not used by respectively 56% and 51% of the firms.
Combining this with the fact that 29% of the firms use only alternative funding to finance their
investment, only 20% of firms partially use alternative sources to finance their investment.
In section 1.2, I will set up a theoretical model that is flexible enough to reproduce for the various
financing patterns observed in the data. The model’s flexbility should both allow for variety of
potential financing sources for investment, and for a limited mix across these sources for some of
the firms.
1.1.4 Bank loans and collateral
Bank loan applications and accessibility are addressed in the Enterprise Survey through many
questions. Table 1.4 provides the average answers to a subset of these questions, focusing on the
collateral requirements. Clearly, providing collateral seems to be a bigger obstacle for smaller firms.
80% of the loan applications of small firms were turned down because of lack of collateral, whereas
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this was the case for only 40% of very large firms. Furthermore, 29% of small firms that did not
apply for a loan were discouraged because some collateral was required. Among firms currently
having a loan, collateral was less often required for smaller firms: this can be explained by the
fact that smaller firms did not obtain loans when collateral was required. The impact of the firm
status on the loan application (cf. Table 1.A.9 in Appendix 1.A) is slightly weaker than that of
size. Similar results, separating firms by total sales, are provided in Table 1.A.10 in Appendix 1.A.
Table 1.4: Bank loans requirements and applications, by size (% of private firms)
Small Medium Large Very large
if having a loan, was collateral needed? Yes 39.62 60.40 68.83 68.18
if did not apply for a loan, is it because of collateral requirements? Yes 28.54 27.84 23.68 23.08
if application rejected, was it because of lack of collateral? Yes 80.00 68.83 70.00 40.00
The mean of the interest rate charged on bank loans, as well as the average collateral pledged as
a share of granted loan, are presented in Table 1.5. The interest rate charged varies only slightly
across firm size. This confirms that, interest rates being set by the government, banks have little
leeway to adjust them with respect to the risk profile of the borrower. Banks tend therefore to
adjust the quantity, by providing less credit to SME, considered as riskier. The pattern of interest
rates varies also little across status, sales and amount invested (see Tables 1.A.11 to 1.A.13 in
Appendix 1.A).
Table 1.5: Average interest rate and collateral required for bank loans, by firm’s size
All Small Medium Large Very large
mean mean mean mean mean
interest rate 5.29 5.35 5.37 5.06 5.53
collateral (% of loan) 84.58 90.28 85.62 82.38 79.00
Observations 456 65 201 136 53
Smaller firms tend to provide more collateral as a share of their loan (see Table 1.5). This is
related to the size of the loan provided: if the amount lent is smaller, it is more easily covered by
collateral. However, this can also reflect the constraints faced by SME: if they face higher collateral
requirements, they may have to reduce the total amount of the loan to satisfy them. Looking at
Table 1.A.13 gives similar results: enterprises investing smaller amounts (note that those firms are
also smaller in size) provide a collateral covering 90% of their loan, whereas those investing higher
amounts cover only 77% of their loan with collateral.
The information gathered in this section comfirms that collateral availability is crucial in China to
obtain a loan from the formal banking sector, and that smaller firms are more credit constrained
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due to their lack of collateral. For these reasons, as will be detailed in the next section, I will model
the credit constraint faced by enterprises as a collateral constraint.
1.2 The firm side: investment decision and financing choice
I set up here the program of the heterogeneous firms, focused on their investment decision and
its financing at the firm level. The objective of each firm is to maximize its discounted stream of
dividends. At each period, each firm produces using capital and labor, pays wages and reimburses
its debt. It also decides how much to invest to build up tomorrow’s capital, and how to finance
it. To achieve this goal, it plans its investment and has three different ways of financing it: it
can (i) use retained earnings (which are thus subtracted from its dividends), (ii) borrow from the
formal banking sector at a fixed interest rate, or (iii) obtain funding from an alternative source
(this regroups all external financing means that are not included in the official banking sector:
non-listed outside equity, family and friends, trade credit, informal moneylenders...) at a variable
cost. The firms may be credit constrained in the formal sector: banks require collateral and are
only willing to grant a loan equal to some share of this collateral. If a firm wants to obtain more
funds than that, it will turn to alternative providers of funds. The collateral of the firm consists in
its capital from the current period, which it can pledge to obtain a loan today. The main features
of the model are described in more details in subsections 1.2.1 to 1.2.4.
1.2.1 Firm’s current production and profit
The firms are heterogeneous with respect to their stock of capital and debt in the current period,
their ease of access to alternative funding and their current productivity shock, which are the four
state variables of the firm’s program. The firm’s production function is a usual Cobb-Douglas
function using capital k and labor l as inputs: f(A, k, l) = Akαlγ . A is the shock faced by the firm
at each period. It encompasses its productivity, as well as other non-specified inputs (intermediate
inputs for instance). α and γ are respectively the elasticities of output with respect to capital and
labor, with α+ γ ≤ 1. All firms produce the same homogenous good regardless of their type, and
this good is defined as the numeraire. w is the wage that prevails on the labor market, and is taken
as given by the firm. The current capital stock of the firm has been decided at the previous period
through investment, while the firm chooses today how much labor to employ to maximize its profit,
given its capital and technology shock. The current profits of the firm are therefore:
ΠE(A, k, d) = max
l
Akαlγ − wl − d (1.1)
Since the labor demand decision is intratemporal, I can solve for it separately and obtain an
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analytical solution function of the firm’s productivity, capital, and the wage prevailing on the labor
market.
lD(A, k) =
( γ
w
Akα
) 1
1−γ
(1.2)
ΠE(A, k, d) = Ak
α(lD(A, k))γ − wlD(A, k)− d (1.3)
= (Akα)
1
1−γ
( γ
w
) γ
1−γ
(1− γ)− d (1.4)
Profits can be either positive or negative: if the firm faces a bad productivity shock, it may not be
able to produce enough to cover its labor costs and its debt liabilities. In that case, to be able to
distribute non-negative dividends, the firm has to roll over part of its debt through new borrowing.
If it cannot borrow enough to cover its losses (negative profits), it defaults and exits the market.
1.2.2 Sources of finance for investment
The firm can finance its investment using three different sources: retained earnings from its own
profit, bank loans, and loans from alternative sources. Investment allows the firm to accumulate
capital that depreciates at a rate δ.
Retained earnings
When the firm makes positive profits, it can use these profits to distribute positive dividends or
reinvest them to finance investment and increase its capital stock tomorrow. Reinvested profits are
called retained earnings and denoted e′. If the firm is patient enough, using retained earnings is the
cheapest way to invest, since it does not bear any interest rate. However, the amount of retained
earnings the firm can use for investment cannot be larger than its current profits. Hence, the use
of retained earnings to finance investment is constrained as follows:
0 ≤ e′ ≤ max(ΠE(A, k, d), 0) (1.5)
Obviously, if the firm makes negative profits, it cannot reinvest nor distributed any of them, and
both dividends and retained earnings are forced to be zero.12
12A firm cannot use loans from the bank or from alternative sources to increase its reinvested retained earnings or
its dividends. Imposing this constraint avoids indeterminacy when solving for optimal investment and financing
sources, and prevents Ponzi schemes.
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Bank loans
A second possibility to finance investment is to borrow an amount b from the formal banking sector.
As seen in section 1.1.4, the interest rate charged by banks varies very little across firm’s size, status
and amount invested. Hence, it seems reasonable to define a unique interest rate 1+r in the model,
which is charged to all types of firms. All firms also need to pledge some collateral to be able to
borrow, and face a collateral constraint written as13:
qb′ ≤ θk
where b′ is the amount to be reimbursed tomorrow, q = 11+r the price of the loan, k the firm’s
capital today and θ an exogenous parameter determining the tightness of the collateral constraint.
Where does this collateral constraint come from? Since smaller firms are expected to be more risky
and the interest rate charged cannot be adjusted, banks tend to impose collateral requirements.
As seen in table 1.4, this collateral constraint is often binding, especially for smaller enterprises.
Hence, setting up a collateral requirement in this model reflects quite well the banks’ behavior.
Alternative funding
The last possibility for financing investment is to resort to alternative sources of funding. To be
able to access alternative funding, a firm has to pay up front a variable cost of access. It then pays
an interest rate on the loan obtained.
As seen in section 1.1.3, the use of alternative financing is quite heterogeneous across firms, not
only across firm’s size, but also within size categories. While some enterprises use only alternative
sources to finance investment, others never use them. To be able to reproduce this heterogeneity,
I consider different types of firms j ∈ J , where J is the set of all possible types. To borrow an
amount a, a firm of type j has to pay up front a quadratic access cost xj(a) = ηja2, and then
obtains a loan at the price qja =
1
1+rja
, where ηj and rja are positive constants.
Firms’ types
Each type of firms is characterized by its easiness to access the alternative financing market. This
13There are many ways to define collateral in this setting: current profit (today), expected profit (tomorrow), personal
cash invested, capital owned today, capital owned tomorrow. I choose to define the firm’s collateral constraint in
terms of the capital currently owned by the firm. Since capital is mainly constituted of seizable assets, it seems
well suited to be pledged as collateral by the firms. Furthermore, as seen in section 1.1, banks tend to favor loans
granted to larger firms, even when profit opportunities of SME are higher, so that a collateral constraint related
to expected profit would not correspond well to this situation.
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easiness of access can also be thought of as the degree of anonymity in the relationship between the
lender and the borrower. Indeed, access to alternative funding sources depends on family, friends,
networks that help firms in finding potential lenders. A “lucky” entrepreneur (say of type j1) has
investors in his close social circle – for instance a rich uncle, accesses alternative financing for a
lower cost and obtains a loan at a lower interest rate. On the opposite, an “unlucky” entrepreneur
(of type j2) has to go beyond his social circle, maybe through costly intermediaries, to find a lender,
and therefore faces both a higher access cost to alternative financing and a higher interest rate,
such that: ηj1 < ηj2 and rj1a < r
j2
a implying q
j1
a > q
j2
a .
This easiness to find a lender outside the formal banking system can be considered as some sta-
ble random ability of the entrepreneur: it is related to the social and wealth background of the
entrepreneur’s family, his relationships, and is not directly linked to his productivity as an en-
trepreneur. Since the social network of an entrepreneur is mostly related to stable external condi-
tions, I model the firms’ types as follows. At its birth, each firm draws a type realization j ∈ J
from the (exogenous) types distribution. The type j of the firm remains fixed for its entire activity
period, until it exits the market. As already mentioned, these different types also help the model
reproducing the fact that some enterprises do not use alternative financing, while others use only
alternative finance.
Access cost
The quadratic access cost reflects two facts: first, when resorting to family or friends to finance
investment, the amount you can obtain is clearly bounded, since family and friends have a limited
wealth. Second, when issuing non-listed outside equity, a firm can only reach a limited number of
potential lenders, because it does not beneficiate from the easy accessibility and guaranties provided
by public financial markets, and the issue cost increases with the amount to be issued.
While the interest rate has to be paid by the firm at the time the loan is reimbursed, the access
cost xj(a) is an upfront cost, paid at the time the firm is obtaining the loan. To pay this cost, the
firm can use part of its profits (if positive), or part of the bank loan it currently borrows. This
implies the following constraint:
xj(a′) ≤ qb′ + max[ΠE(A, k, d)− e′, 0] (1.6)
1.2.3 Default
This model can allow for two types of default. First, the firm may default if it makes negative
profit and cannot borrow enough to roll-over its debt. The firm is constrained on the total amount
of debt it can roll-over for the following reasons: (i) investment is irreversible, so that previous
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period’s capital cannot be sold to reimburse debt; (ii) the loan from the bank is limited by the
collateral constraint (at most qb′ = θk); and (iii) the amount borrowed from the alternative sources
is constrained by the cost of access: at most xj(a′) = qb′ = θk so that the highest possible loan
from alternative sources amounts to a′ =
√
θk
ηj
. If the losses to be rolled over are larger than
θk+ qja
√
θk
ηj
− xj(a′) = qja
√
θk
ηj
, the firm cannot roll over (its feasible decision set is empty) and has
to default and exit the market. This corresponds to involuntary default, since it does not result
from an arbitrage decision but comes from the firm’s borrowing constraints.
Second, the firm may also want to default if repaying or rolling over its debt is possible, but implies
capital and debt tomorrow such that its value is lower than some reservation value u. Then the
enterprise prefers to default and obtains his outside option equal to u ≥ 0.
In both cases, when the firm defaults, it exits the market forever and obtains 0. Its creditors’
debts are reimbursed up to a share κ ≥ 0 of the firm’s capital. To keep the set-up simple, I set
u = 0: given that the value of the firm is always non-negative, there is no voluntary default, only
involuntary default occurs.
1.2.4 The program of firm
Given the set-up described above, we can now write the optimization program of the firm. The value
of a firm at each period depends on its productivity shock A, its current capital k, its outstanding
debt d, and its easiness of access to alternative financing j. It can be written as the following value
function, where V D and V ND are respectively the values of defaulting and not defaulting:
V (A, k, d; j) =
{
V D(A, k, d; j) if the firm defaults
V ND(A, k, d; j) otherwise.
(1.7)
The corresponding definitions of default and non-default values are specified below in equations
(1.8) to (1.19). The firm faces an exogenous death probability denoted ξ at every period. If it dies,
the firm exits the market and obtains 0 as dividend for the death period and all successive periods.
Its creditors are partially reimbursed similarly to the case of default detailed above. As mentioned
earlier, since capital and debt tomorrow are decided today and the type j is stable across time, the
only uncertainty faced by the firm today regarding its value tomorrow comes from its productivity
tomorrow and the eventuality of death. The firm may roll-over part of its debt, which implies to
get new loans to repay old debt. New loans can be used partly to repay old debt, and partly to
invest more. To have a coherent decision set-up and avoid any Ponzi-like behavior, some additional
assumptions are needed, that may differ if the firm is making positive or negative profit today and
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are reflected in the constraints of the firm’s maximization. Given these assumptions, the program
of the firm can be written as follows (E stands for the expectation operator):
V ND(A, k, d; j) = max
e′,b′,a′
{
max
[
ΠE(A, k, d)− xj(a′)− e′, 0
]
+ β(1− ξ)EV (A′, k′, d′; j)} (1.8)
such that
ΠE(A, k, d) = max
l
Akαlγ − wl − d = (Akα) 11−γ
( γ
w
) γ
1−γ
(1− γ)− d (1.9)
k′ = (1− δ)k + e′ + qb′ + qjaa′ + min[ΠE(A, k, d)− e′ − xj(a′), 0] (1.10)
d′ = b′ + a′ (1.11)
qb′ ≤ θk (1.12)
e′ ≤ max[ΠE(A, k, d), 0] (1.13)
xj(a′) ≤ qb′ + max[ΠE(A, k, d)− e′, 0] (1.14)
−(qb′ + qjaa′) ≤ ΠE(A, k, d)− xj(a′) (1.15)
e′ ≥ 0 (1.16)
b′ ≥ 0 (1.17)
a′ ≥ 0 (1.18)
V D(A, k, d; j) = 0 (1.19)
Depending on its profit today and its investment financing decision, the firm distributes positive or
null dividends. As mentioned earlier, conditional on productivity A, capital k and the wage w, the
labor demand is an intratemporal decision, so that the optimal labor demand can be determined
analytically and plugged in the profit equation as done in equation (1.9). Equations (1.10) and
(1.11) respectively specify the laws of motion of future capital and debt. Equation (1.12) defines the
collateral constraint, imposing that the firm cannot borrow from the formal banking sector more
than a share θ of its current capital. The additional assumptions and corresponding constraints
are detailed below.
Assumption 1.1. The firm cannot use newly obtained loans to distribute higher dividends.
If the firm is making negative profits, today’s dividends should be exactly zero (otherwise that
would be close to running a Ponzi scheme). This implies that losses rolled over through debt are
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exactly equal to ΠE(A, k, d) − xj(a′), and explains the presence of max and min operators in the
current returns function in (1.8) and in the law of motion of capital in equation (1.10).
Assumption 1.2. Retained earnings e′ cannot exceed current profit, and additional debt cannot be
used to increase retained earnings beyond a firm’s positive profits. This corresponds to constraint
(1.13).
Indeed, it is equivalent for the firm to invest using retained earnings financed themselves through
additional debt, and to directly use debt b′ or a′ to finance investment. Imposing retained earnings
capped by current profit solves this indeterminacy. Consequently, a firm making negative profits
cannot use retained earnings, and e′ has to be equal to zero in that case.
Assumption 1.3. Firms can use part of their new bank loans qb′ to pay the cost of access to
alternative funding xj(a′), as is specified in constraint (1.14).
This implies that the cost of access to alternative funding sources can be covered either by today’s
(positive) profit, or by the bank loans. Without this assumption, loss making firms would not be
able borrow from alternative sources (a′ = 0) and would only use loans from the bank to roll-over
debt. With this assumption, firms can also use alternative funding to roll-over debt. Similarly,
a firm making positive profit can use its newly obtained bank loan to pay the cost of access to
alternative financing xj(a′) if its current profit is not high enough.14 Note that firms cannot use
the loan obtained from the alternative sources qjaa′ to pay the cost of access to alternative funding
xj(a′), since this access cost has to be paid beforehand.
Assumption 1.4. Investment is irreversible. Only the new loans qb′+ qjaa′ can be used to roll over
previous debt, as stated in inequality constraint (1.15).
Note that the firm can borrow more than the debt to be rolled-over and use the remainder for
investment.
1.2.5 Some intuition
As explained above, in case of default, the firm does not produce and obtains a value equal to zero
forever. Here, I focus on the case where the firm is able to reimburse or roll-over its debt. To get
a better overview of the input and funding choices we can expect from the firm, I provide some
further elements regarding its optimal decision. Separating the firm’s state in two parts, between
positive and zero dividends, the firm’s program verifies the assumptions of theorem 9.10 from
Stockey and Lucas Jr (1989) in both parts. Hence, the value function is continuously differentiable
14Extending this assumption to firms making positive profits ensures the continuity of the feasible set of investment
policies.
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with respect to capital and debt in both cases, except at the kink point between these two parts.
I set up the Lagrangian of the problem below, denoting λ, µ, ν and ζ the multipliers respectively
associated with constraints (1.12), (1.13), (1.14) and (1.15). For better readability, I describe the
Lagrangian separately for three cases: positive profits and dividends, positive profits and zero
dividends, negative profits.
Positive dividends
L = ΠE − xj(a′)− e′ + β(1− ξ)EV + λ(θk − qb′) + µ(ΠE − e′ − xj(a′)) (1.20)
Positive profit, zero dividends
L = β(1− ξ)EV + λ(θk − qb′) + ν(qb′ + ΠE − xj(a′)) (1.21)
Negative profits
L = β(1− ξ)EV + λ(θk − qb′) + ν(qb′ − xj(a′)) + ζ(ΠE − xj(a′) + qb′ + qjaa′) (1.22)
From the first order conditions of the problem and the envelop theorem, I obtain equations (1.23)
to (1.29) defining the optimal levels of retained earnings, bank loan and alternative funding. To
simplify the notations, state variables of the value functions are dropped, so that EV ND corresponds
to EV ND(A′, k′, d′; j), EV D corresponds to EV D(A′, k′, d′; j), and so on (note that all these value
functions concern the future period, hence the expectation operator E).
Positive dividends
∂EV
∂k′
=
1 + µ
β(1− ξ) (1.23)
∂EV
∂k′
=
λ
β(1− ξ) −
1
q
∂EV
∂d′
(1.24)
∂EV
∂k′
=
xj′(a′)(1 + µ)
β(1− ξ)qja
− 1
qja
∂EV
∂d′
(1.25)
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Positive profits, zero dividends
∂EV
∂k′
=
λ− ν
β(1− ξ) −
1
q
∂EV
∂d′
(1.26)
∂EV
∂k′
=
νxj′(a′)
β(1− ξ)(qja − xj′(a′))
− 1
qja − xj′(a′)
∂EV
∂d′
(1.27)
Negative profits
∂EV
∂k′
=
λ− ν − ζ
β(1− ξ) −
1
q
∂EV
∂d′
(1.28)
∂EV
∂k′
=
νxj′(a′)
β(1− ξ)(qja − xj′(a′))
− ζ
β(1− ξ) −
1
qja − xj′(a′)
∂EV
∂d′
(1.29)
Each of these equations can be interpreted easily: the left-hand side is the marginal gain obtained
from increasing slightly the amount invested today (i.e. the capital tomorrow), while the right-hand
side is the marginal cost of increasing the investment today, which depends on how the investment
is financed.
Propositions 1.1 to 1.2 give us a better understanding of the firm’s funding decisions. Proposition
1.1 considers the case of a firm, distributing positive dividends, and specifies conditions under which
we can analytically determine wich financing source s marginally preferred by the firm to finance
investment and roll-over debt. Proposition 1.2 explores similar properties int he case where the
firms’ dividends are zero.
Proposition 1.1. Provided that the firm distributes positive dividends, it marginally prefers to
finance investment:
(i) through retained earnings rather than through alternative sources, if alternative sources are
already used intensively enough (i.e., if a′ ≥ a¯, where the threshold a¯ is defined by xj′(a¯′) = qja),
provided that it does not hit the non-negative dividends constraint (1.13). It is ambiguous if
a′ ≤ a¯;
(ii) through bank loans rather than alternative sources, if the interest rate charged on bank loans
is lower than the one of alternative financing (i.e. r ≤ rja), provided that it does not hit the
collateral constraint (1.12). It is ambiguous if r ≥ rja.
Comparing analytically marginal costs and benefits of investing through retained earnings versus
bank loans is inconclusive.
See proof in Appendix 1.B.1. The intuition is the following.
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(i) On one hand, the marginal cost of increasing retained earnings is a one for one reduction of
the firms current dividends, and its benefit is a one for one increase in tomorrow’s capital.
On the other hand, increasing alternative funding marginally reduces current dividend by
xj′(a′) and marginally increases capital by less than one, because it bears some interest
rate (rja > 0). Increasing alternative funding also increases the level of debt tomorrow, while
retained earnings do not. When the access cost xj′(a′) or the interest rate rja are high enough,
the total marginal net benefit of increasing retained earnings becomes unambiguously higher
than the one of alternative financing, and the firm marginally prefers to finance investment
through retained earnings.
(ii) When the interest rate paid on bank loans is lower than the one paid on alternative financing
(r ≤ rja) and the collateral constraint on bank loans does not bind, increasing bank loans
rather than alternative sources to finance investment is relatively cheaper in terms of cost.
On the one hand, the increase in debt tomorrow due to both bank loans and alternative
sources is the same. On the other hand, an increase in bank loans raises capital tomorrow
more than a similar increase in alternative funding that also necessitates to pay the access cost
xj(a′). Since the expected value of the firm is increasing with future capital and decreasing
with future debt, the firm marginally prefers to finance investment with bank loans rather
than with alternative sources.
Note that when r > rja and the firm is distributing positive dividends, then its preference between
bank loans and alternative sources is ambiguous and depends on the parameters values. Similarly,
when qja − xj′(a′) ≥ 0, we cannot conclude analytically whether alternative funding or retained
earnings are preferred.
Proposition 1.2. For both positive and negative profit values, provided that the firm distributes
zero dividends, it marginally prefers to finance investment:
(i) through bank loans rather than through alternative sources, if the interest rate on bank loans
is low enough or alternative sources are already used intensively enough (i.e., if a′ ≥ a, where
a is defined by xj′(a) = qja − q), provided that it does not hit the collateral constraint (1.12);
(ii) through alternative sources rather than through bank loans, if the interest rates on bank loans
is high enough or alternative sources are little used (i.e., if a′ ≤ a), provided that it does not
hit the access cost constraint (1.14).
See proof in Appendix 1.B.2. The mechanism is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.1.
(i) Considering the situation of a firm distributing zero dividends, if q ≥ qja−xj′(a′), an increase
in bank loans marginally increases capital tomorrow more than alternative sources would do.
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On the debt side, both bank loans and alternative funding marginally increase debt by the
same amount. Hence, if the marginal access cost to alternative sources xj′(a′) is high enough,
the firm marginally prefers to use bank loans to finance investment, even when bank loans
bear a higher interest rate than alternative funding (q < qja).
(ii) Similarly, if q ≤ qja− xj′(a′), the marginal benefit of increasing alternative financing is higher
than the marginal benefit of increasing bank loans, and their marginal costs are equal. There-
fore, firms marginally prefer to use alternative sources, if the access cost constraint does not
bind.
Figure 1.1: Case of positive dividends, r < rja
Note: The parameter and price values for this graph are as follows: β = 0.9923 ξ = 0.082,
ω = 0.1, A = 2.7, α = 0.51, γ = 0.30, δ = 0.1, k = 11, d = 6, ηj = 0.142, r = 0.0309,
rja = 0.095, w = 0.80.
Figures 1.1 to 1.3 illustrate the various financing choices that can be generated by the model,
by presenting three different cases. In all figures, the decreasing black curve shows the marginal
benefit of investment, while the increasing thick black line is its marginal cost. The firm finances
investment until it either hits a constraint, or the marginal benefit of investment is lower than its
marginal cost. Figure 1.1 gives a representation of the funding choice when dividends are positive,
r < rja and ηj > 0. In this case, Proposition 1.1 tells us that the firm marginally prefers to finance
investment through bank loans rather than through alternative sources, provided that the collateral
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constraint does not bind. Therefore, the marginal cost for bank loans (dark blue dashed-dotted
line) is always smaller than the marginal cost for alternative funding (red solid line). In the specific
calibration shown on this graph, we consider a large firm15 with a very high productivity shock.
The decision sequence is as follows: retained earnings are initially marginally preferred to both
other sources, until the non-negative dividends constraint (1.13) binds (at investment level e¯). The
firm then switches to the second cheapest source of financing, namely bank loans (light blue dashed
line). Finally, when it hits the collateral constraint (1.12), at investment level e¯ + b¯, the firm
uses alternative sources to finance the residual investment until it cannot finance its cost of access
any more, reaching a total investment equal to i∗. This firm finances 69% of its investment with
retained earnings, 17% with bank loans and 14% with alternative sources. Comparing to the data
seen in section 1.1, this enterprise uses more retained earnings, and less bank loans and alternative
sources than the average large firm. This difference can be explained by the fact that the enterprise
considered here has a very high productivity shock,and a fairly high capital level, and therefore has
a large amount of profits to be reinvested. Given its high level of capital, it does not need to invest
massively and can finance most of its investment through retained earnings.
The example shown in Figure 1.1 is useful to understand the pecking order of enterprises facing
various financing possibilities, by showing a case where the enterprise uses the three possible funding
sources. However, as seen in the data, many enterprises do not use all financing sources. Clearly, on
Figure 1.1, if the firm had a lower productivity shock, the marginal benefit curve would shift down,
and the enterprise would probably not use alternative financing, maybe even use only retained
earnings. Figure 1.2 shows another possible case where the enterprise uses only bank loans and
alternative sources, and does not reinvest profits through retained earnings. Here again, r < rja,
ηj > 0 and we examine a medium-sized enterprise with a medium-high shock currently making
losses. Because of its negative profit, this firm needs to roll-over part of its debt and cannot use
retained earnings. From Proposition 1.2, we can conclude that this firm always marginally prefers
to use bank loans rather than alternative funding to invest. The firm first uses bank loans until
it hits the collateral constraint, financing 26% of its total investment. It then turns to alternative
sources to finance the remaining 74% of its total investment i∗. This firm is one of the 59% of
medium-sized firms that do not use retained earnings in the data.
Finally, Figure 1.3 shows the case where r > rja. For small amounts of alternative funding, alter-
native finance may be cheaper than bank loans, so that the marginal cost of alternative sources is
below the marginal cost of bank loans (dark blue dashed-dotted line). In the case represented, the
firm is large-sized and has a medium-high productivity shock. It first finances investment through
alternative sources, until it becomes more expensive than bank loans due to the quadratic cost
15In the model, as in the data, the size of a firm is determined by its labor demand.
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Figure 1.2: Case of zero dividends, r < rja
Note: The parameter and price values for this graph are as follows: β = 0.9923, ξ =
0.082, ω = 0.1, A = 1.6, α = 0.51, γ = 0.30, δ = 0.1, k = 2.50, d = 1.8276, ηj = 0.142,
r = 0.0309, rja = 0.095, w = 0.80.
of access (the two curves cross at the investment level a). The firm then uses bank loans until
it hits the collateral constraint (1.12) at investment level b¯ + a, and switches back to alternative
sources to reach the total amount invested i∗. 38% of the firm’s investment is financed through
bank loans, while 61% is financed through alternative finance. Compared to large-sized firms in
the data, this firm uses no retained earnings because it currently makes negative profits. It also
uses more alternative sources than the average large firm in the data, because it benefits from a
cheap access to alternative sources.
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Figure 1.3: Case of positive dividends, r > rja
Note: The parameter and price values for this graph are as follows: β = 0.9923, ξ =
0.082, ω = 0.1, A = 1.6, α = 0.51, γ = 0.30, δ = 0.1, k = 35, d = 14, ηj = 0.01,
r = 0.0309, rja = 0.01, w = 0.80.
1.3 General equilibrium
To insert the firm’s program described above within a general equilibrium framework, I need to
add a household and a financial intermediary. Their respective programs are detailed in sections
1.3.1 and 2.3. Throughout this section, for consistency, I keep the price notations used above for
the firm’s program, so that the household generally saves some amount qs and obtains s the next
period, and the bank takes deposits qD and repays D at the next period. To keep the general
equilibrium as simple as possible, the household side is represented by a single representative
household, which implies some shortcuts. The interested reader can find a general equilibrium
version with full-fledged heterogeneous households in Appendix 1.C.
1.3.1 Program of the household
There is one infinitely-lived representative household who supplies labor inelastically for a wage w,
and decides how much of his income to consume and save. Importantly, the household does not
face any uncertainty in terms of labor income. He is be willing to save if the interest rate he obtains
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from saving is higher than his discount factor, and willing to borrow otherwise. For a steady state
to exist in terms of wealth, consumption and savings levels, I need to assume that the interest
rate is exactly equal to the discount factor, which makes the household indifferent between saving
and consuming.16 On top of his labor income, the household owns all firms’ shares and earns the
dividends of the firms. The shares of the firms are non-transferable and the dividends are a per
period lump-sum transfer.
The household can save using different assets:
- bank deposits: he can deposit his savings at the bank, and earn a risk-free rate rd. For
notations consistency with the firm’s program, I denote the price of this asset qd =
1
1+rd
.
- NJ types of direct firms financing : he can lend his savings directly to enterprises, which
corresponds to the alternative finance obtained by the firms. To match the different types
of firm (having a more or less costly access to alternative financing), I distinguish between
NJ = dim(J) types j ∈ J of direct firms financing that differ in their rate of return and
their intermediation cost: to find a firm willing to invest, the household may have to search,
and pay some intermediation cost χj (accounted for in terms of goods). This cost is higher
when households go beyond their close social circle, since more intermediaries are involved
to reach a firm needing investment. At the same time, the household can require a higher
interest rate when lending to a firm less tightly related to his social circle. For consistency
with the notations of the firms’ program, I denote qja =
1
1+rja
the price of type j asset bought
by the household. This saving instrument is risky, since firms may default on their loan and
not fully reimburse. However, the household knows the average probability of default of a
firm, and he holds a fully diversified portfolio of loans to firms, so that from the law of large
numbers, he can perfectly anticipate the share of firms that will default and what ex-post
return he will obtain. Hence, he does not face any uncertainty on his returns. Denoting p¯ the
average default probability, a unit portfolio of direct loans to firms bought at price qja yields
a return 1 with probability 1 − p¯ and reimburses r < 1 with probability p¯. The household’s
total return is therefore 1− p¯+ p¯r per amount qja lent.
The program of the household is shown in equations (1.30) to (1.33). As mentioned before, since
the household holds a fully diversified portfolio of firms loans and bank deposits are risk-free, he
does not face any uncertainty.
V (W ) = max
c,sb,{sja}j∈J
u(c) + βV (W ′) (1.30)
16For simplicity, I assume that the households cannot borrow. Since I assume that the interest rate is equal the
discount factor, this borrowing constraint is never binding.
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s.t.
W = c+ qdsb +
∑
j∈J
qjas
j
a +
∑
j∈J
χjsja (1.31)
W ′ = De + w + sb +
∑
j∈J
sja(1− p¯+ p¯r) (1.32)
sja, sb, c ≥ 0 (1.33)
where W is the current total wealth of the household, c is consumption today, sb is the amount
deposited to the bank, sja is the capital directly supplied to the firm of type j through alternative
financing, w is the household’s wage, De is the dividends obtained from the firms’ profit, p¯ is the
aggregate default probability determined by the firms’ program, and r the average reimbursement
rate in case of default.
The first order conditions of this program imply:
qdu
′(c) = βV ′(W ′) (1.34)
qja + χj
1− p¯+ p¯ru
′(c) = βV ′(W ′) ∀j ∈ J (1.35)
All three saving instruments (bank deposits and the NJ types of direct loans to firms) are risk-free
for the household. Hence, if one of them has a higher return, the household will invest all his
savings in that asset and will not use the others. To avoid such corner equilibria, I will further
assume that all assets have equal returns and that the household is indifferent between investing
in one or the other:
qd =
qja + χj
1− p¯+ p¯r ∀j ∈ J (1.36)
This property can be easily obtained by adjusting the intermediation costs χj or the price qja, as
detailed in section 2.4. Given that the household is indifferent between the three types of saving
instruments, his decision at each period simplifies to choosing his total consumption c and his
total amount used for savings and intermediation costs q¯s¯ = qdsb +
∑
j∈J q
j
as
j
a +
∑
j∈J χ
j , where
q¯ = qd =
qja+χ
j
1−p¯+p¯r . Rewriting the household’s program after this simplification, and assuming a log
utility function, there are analytical solutions for the household’s value function and optimal policy
functions. Using a “guess and verify” procedure, it is easy to show that:
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V (W ) =
1
1− β log(1− β) +
β
(1− β)2 log
(
β
q¯
)
+
1
1− β log
(
W +
q¯
1− q¯ (De + w)
)
(1.37)
s¯∗ =
β
q¯
W − 1− β
1− q¯ (De + w) (1.38)
c∗ = (1− β)W + q¯(1− β)
1− q¯ (De + w) (1.39)
W ′∗ =
β − q¯
1− q¯ (De + w) +
β
q¯
W (1.40)
Clearly, the only values of β and q¯ that allow for a steady state with a non-negative constant
wealth W are such that β = q¯. If this is the case, then any amount W ≥ De + w is a possible
steady state with non-negative savings, and the value of total wealth W pins down the optimal
steady state levels of savings and consumption. To close the model, I finally need to add a financial
intermediary, namely one representative bank, whose program is described in the next section.
1.3.2 Program of the bank
There is a representative bank in the economy. At each period, the bank takes deposits qdD
(at price qd =
1
1+rd
) and grants loans qB (at price q = 11+r ) to meet firms’ demand given the
collateral constraint. Like the household, the bank holds a fully diversified portfolio of loans to
firms, and knows the average default and reimbursment rates, so that it does not face any aggregate
uncertainty on the outcome of its loans. On average, a fraction p¯ of the firms default on their loan
and reimburse only r on average instead of 1, so that the bank obtains an aggregate return equal
to (1− p¯+ p¯r)B on its loans.
The bank faces operating costs in proportion ζ to the total amount of deposits and loans handled
qdD+qB. To be solvent, the bank needs to receive more deposits than it grants loans, i.e. qdD ≥ qB.
The bank’s total profit to maximise is then:
max
D,B
Πb = qdD − qB −D + (1− p¯+ p¯r)B − ζ(qB + qdD) (1.41)
s.t. qdD ≥ qB (1.42)
As mentioned earlier, in the early 2000’s in China, interest rates offered by banks are heavily guided
by the People’s Bank of China. Notably, the deposit and lending rates rd and r are respectively
subject to a ceiling and a floor such that rd < r, which corresponds to qd > q. To account for
this situation in the baseline specification of the model, I force the bank to act like a “machine”,
meaning that it has no free adjustment variable and hence no proper optimisation program to
28
Chapter1
solve. The amount of deposits taken by the bank is hence equal to the aggregate deposits of the
households, while the amount of loans granted by the bank is equal to the enterprises’ aggregate
loan demand. The intermediation margin of the bank is used to cover the operating costs of the
bank (accounted for in terms of consumption good). In the baseline calibration, ζ is set to ensure
the bank makes zero profits.
Policy experiments liberalizing the interest rates setting are conducted in section 1.5.
1.3.3 Market clearing conditions
There are 4 + NJ markets to be cleared: good, labor, deposits and the 1 + NJ types of loans
(obtained from the bank and alternative sources).17 There is one single type of good used for
consumption, investment and capital for production; it is the numeraire. The wage adjusts to
reach the equilibrium on the labor market, while the interest rates adjust to balance the demand
and supply of alternative financing. The case of bank loans and deposits is slightly different: usually,
the equilibrium is reached by adjusting the deposit and lending rates. However, this project focuses
on the case of China during the early 2000’s, where both deposit and lending rates are fixed by
the People’s Bank of China and cannot freely adjust. I detail below how the equilibrium on these
markets is dealt with.
Labor market
The inelastic labor supply of the household is fixed, equal to LS . The demand side on the labor
market consists in the aggregate labor demand LD(w), computed by solving the firms’ program,
and depends on the wage w. To avoid heavy notations, I summarize the firms’ state variables by
m = {A, k, d; j} and denote the probability distribution of firms across states by µ(m). The wage
has to adjust such that at each period:
LS = LD(w) =
ˆ
lDm(w)µ(m)dm (1.43)
Alternative capital market
The alternative capital market is pooled within each type j ∈ J : there is a single separated
alternative capital market for each type j, where firms of type j meet the household. The direct
17As mentioned earlier, the firms’ shares are entirely held by the household and are not transferable.
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loan sja(q
j
a) from the household has to be equal to the aggregate demand for alternative funding
a′(qja; j) by each type of firms.
sja(q
j
a) =
ˆ
a′m(q
j
a)µ(m)dm = a
′(qja; j) ∀j ∈ J (1.44)
For each j ∈ J , the interest rate qja adjusts to clear the market.
Bank capital markets
In the baseline scenario, the bank cannot refuse the deposits supplied by the household (qdsb)
and the loan demand (qb′) it faces, and has basically no room for action. The bank accepts all
deposits supplied by the household, and grants all loans demanded by the firms up to the collateral
constraint. This implies the following equalities:
qdD = qdsb(qd) (1.45)
qB =
ˆ
qb′m(q)µ(m)dm = qb
′(q) (1.46)
The loan supply from the bank qB should be equal to the aggregate bank loan demand from the
firms qb′(q). The aggregate deposits from the household qdsb(qd) should be equal to the deposits
in the bank qdD. In section 1.5, I conduct policy experiments where constraints on interest rates
setting are relaxed and the bank maximizes its profit as is common in the literature.
Good market
The same good is used for consumption, investment, operating costs of the bank, access costs to
alternative financing from the firms’ side, and intermediation costs from the household’s side. It is
the numeraire. On the supply side, we have the aggregate production Y obtained from the firms.
On the demand side, there is the consumption of the household C, the aggregate total investment
of the firms I (retained earnings, bank loans and alternative loans net of rolled-over debt and of
access cost to alternative funding), the aggregate cost of access to alternative financing X paid by
the firms, the intermediation costs INT paid by the household, the bank’s operating costs and
the bank’s and household’s losses LO due to firms’ default. The good is the numeraire, and from
Walras’ low, if all other markets are in equilibrium, the demand and supply of the good market
should also be balanced. The equilibrium on the goods market is reached when:
Y = C + I +X + INT + ζ(qL+ qdD) + LO (1.47)
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which corresponds to:
ˆ
Ymµ(m)dm = C +
ˆ
invmµ(m)dm+
∑
j∈J
ˆ
xj(a′m)µ(m)dm+
∑
j∈J
χjsja (1.48)
+ ζ(qdD + qB) +
ˆ
lossesmµ(m)dm
We now have all the elements needed to define an equilibrium in this economy.
1.3.4 Equilibrium definition
In the remainder of this paper, I will solve for and study only stationary equilibria. To define a
stationary equilibrium in this environment, I first need to specify the stationary distribution of
firms. Equation (1.49) defines the law of motion of the firms’ distribution.
µ′(A′, k′, d′; j) =
ˆ
Prob(k′ = k′(A, k, d; j), d′ = d′(A, k, d; j)|A, k, d; j)TAA′dµ(A, k, d; j) (1.49)
where TAA′ is the transition probability from productivity shock A to productivity shock A
′.
Given the above law of motion, I can now turn to the definition of the stationary equilibrium in
this set-up.
Definition 1.1. A stationary equilibrium consists in policy functions a′(A, k, d; j), b′(A, k, d; j),
e′(A, k, d; j), c(W ), {sja(W )}j∈J , sb(W ), B and D; a probability distribution µ(A, k, d; j) for firms;
and prices {w, {qja}j∈J , q, qd} ∈ R3+NJ+ such that:
1. The policy functions a′(A, k, d; j), b′(A, k, d; j) and e′(A, k, d; j) solve the firms’ program as
defined in equations (1.8) to (1.19), given prices w, {qja}j∈J and q;
2. The policy functions c(W ), {sja(W )}j∈J , and sb(W ) solve the household’s program as defined
in equations (1.30) to (1.33), given prices w, {qja}j∈J , and qd;
3. The policy functions B and L solve the bank’s program as defined in equations (1.41) and
(1.42) given q and qd;
4. Markets clear, so that equations (1.43) to (1.48) are satisfied;
5. The stationary distribution µ(A, k, d; j) is the fixed point of equation (1.49).
1.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated according to the Enterprise Survey data presented in section 1.1, and ag-
gregate moments obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook and World Development Indicators
31
Alternative Finance and Credit Sector Reforms: the Case of China
database from the World Bank. The discount rate and the depreciation rate of capital are set
in line with the literature, while the interest rates for bank loans and bank deposits are directly
obtained from the data. The parameters defining the production function and the technology shock
are estimated using the data. The remaining parameters are defined to match aggregate moments
from the data.
1.4.1 Parameters derived from the literature and data
As presented in section 1.1.4, the data provide the interest rate charged by the formal banking
sector, denoted r. From Table 1.5, the average nominal interest rate for bank loans is equal to
5.29%. After subtracting the inflation rate for investment in fixed assets for the year 2003, the
real interest rate in the model is calibrated at r = 3.09%, corresponding to q = 0.97. The nominal
interest rate on one-year deposits set by the People’s Bank of China from February 2002 to October
2004 is equal to 1.98%. Taking into account the rate of inflation for consumer prices in 2003, the
real interest rate paid by the bank on deposits is set at rd = 0.78%, corresponding to an asset
price qd = 0.9923. To ensure that the household is indifferent between consuming and saving, I
set the value of the discount factor β to 0.9923. The share κ of capital that can be used used by
enterprises to reimburse loans in case of default or death is set to 0.25. Regarding the depreciation
rate δ, only a few of the studies using depreciation rates for China or other developing countries
actually estimate it. According to the results summarized in Table 1.A.14 in Appendix 1.A, it
seems reasonable to set δ to 10% for the calibration.
1.4.2 Calibrating the production function
To calibrate the elasticity of output with respect to capital and labor (parameters α and γ respec-
tively), I estimate the production function using data from 2002.18 There is abundant literature
on the estimation of Cobb-Douglas type production functions. As noted, among the first ones,
by Marschak and Andrews (1944), a simple OLS regression provides biased coefficients, due to the
endogeneity caused by the possible correlation between inputs and unobserved productivity shocks.
I follow here the approach suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) (hereafter OP), that takes this si-
multaneity into account by using investment as a proxy for the productivity shock. The 2002 data
give information on firms’ output, capital, labor, investment, materials and energy consumption
from 1 to 3 years before the survey, and can therefore be used as panel data.19
18Missing values for capital in 2003 do not allow me to use that year for the estimation.
19Another approach, developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (hereafter LP), uses intermediate inputs such as
energy or materials to proxy the productivity shock. One of the general advantages of this approach is to avoid
the issue of missing values due to null investment. However, in my data, there are surprisingly much more missing
values for energy than for investment. Hence, I favor investment as proxy variable, and OP’s method. Results
from LP’s approach are available upon request.
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In their approach, OP correct both for endogeneity and for sample selection issues due to firms’
exit (for instance if they stop their activity during the survey). Since the data from the Enterprise
Survey have all been collected at one time, there is no exit, and I do not apply the part of OP’s
algorithm that corrects for it. Still, it doesn’t mean that the selection issue is solved: all firms for
which I have data in 1999, 2000 or 2001 are firms that have survived at least until 2002, and I
have no information regarding firms that shut down before 2002. My sample is therefore inevitably
biased by this selection effect.
Table 1.6: Estimation of the production function coefficients with OP’s method
Olley & Pakes
(1) (2) (3)
All Manufacturing Services
labor 0.30∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.0356) (0.0397) (0.0925)
capital 0.51∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗
(0.127) (0.144) (0.208)
N (first step) 1383 1050 333
N (second step) 778 596 182
Standard errors in parentheses, specification controlling for age
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.6 presents the results of the estimation of the production function for OP’s method. Results
obtained with OLS and fixed effects are shown in Table 1.A.15 in Appendix 1.A for the whole
sample, as a reference to compare with more robust approaches. The variable used for output
here corresponds to value added (materials have been subtracted). OP’s method yields plausible
and stable coefficients estimates, with a capital coefficient ranging from 0.43 to 0.59 and a labor
coefficient between 0.28 and 0.51. I use these results to calibrate the production function, with
calibrated values of parameters α and γ respectively equal to 0.51 and 0.30, as obtained for the
whole sample.
OP’s procedure also provides estimated series for the productivity of each firm at the available dates.
I use these series to estimate the autoregressive coefficient of the productivity process and obtain
ρ = 0.91. To define the productivity shock process of my model, I use a discrete Markov-Chain
process with a transition matrix T such that the theoretical autoregressive coefficient associated
to it equal to 0.91. The levels of the productivity shocks, as well as the level of newborn firms’
initial capital, are calibrated to match the firms’ size distribution (in terms of number of employees)
obtained from the data with the size distribution obtained from the model’s stationary state. There
are 5 shocks and one level of initial capital, hence 6 parameters, that match 8 percentiles of the
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firm size distribution.20 I obtain the following values for the shocks matrix A and for the transition
matrix T .
A =
(
0.35 0.75 1 1.6 2.7
)
(1.50)
T =

0.8765 0.1235 0 0 0
0.0164 0.9146 0.0690 0 0
0 0.0352 0.9295 0.0352 0
0 0 0.0690 0.9146 0.0164
0 0 0 0.1235 0.8765
 (1.51)
1.4.3 Further Parameters: Matching moments
The remaining parameters are calibrated in order to match the moments highlighted in section
1.1. I allow for two possible types j ∈ {L,H} of firms, which helps matching the patterns of firms’
investment financing while keeping low enough the number of parameters to calibrate. Firms of type
L have an easy access to lenders in their social circles and do not need to go through intermediaries.
They face therefore a low cost of borrowing through alternative finance systems. On the opposite,
firms of type H need to go through some intermediaries to get in touch with lenders and hence face
a higher cost of borrowing through non-bank systems. This implies that ηH > ηL and rHa > r
L
a .
Similarly, the household faces a higher intermediation cost when lending to type H firms than when
lending to type L firms, so that χH > χL. The parameters to be calibrated are then:
• χj for j ∈ {L,H}: cost of accessing alternative funding for type j households;
• θ: tightness of the collateral constraint to obtain bank loans;
• ηj for j ∈ {L,H}: quadratic cost of accessing alternative funding for type j firms;
• ξ: exogenous death probability for all firms;
• p0: probability for a firm to be of type L.
To achieve this, I first solve for the policy functions of the firms with value function iterations,
and for the firms’ stationary distribution. I then compute the prices (wage and interest rate for
both types of alternative funding) to reach the equilibrium on the labor and alternative funding
markets. As mentioned before, the baseline case used to calibrate the model corresponds to the
situation of China in 2002, when the bank deposit and loan interest rates are exogenously set by
the government, so that the bank does not maximize its profit.
20These percentiles are the 1st, 5th, 10th, 25th, 75th, 90th, 95th and 99th, normalized by the median.
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Given that the household has to be indifferent between the three possible saving instruments (bank
deposits and both types of direct loans to firm), the intermediation costs χL and χH are tightly
related to the prices qLa and q
H
a according to the following formula:
qja = qd(1− p¯+ p¯r)− χj ∀j ∈ {L,H} (1.52)
Calibrating χL and χH is therefore quasi equivalent (taking into account the endogenous changes
in p¯ and r) to setting the prices qLa and q
H
a at values that allow for an equilibrium on the bank
capital and alternative financing markets. By determining the prices qLa and q
H
a faced by each type
of firms on the alternative financing markets, the household’s intermediation costs parameters have
a crucial impact on the investment financing decisions of enterprises.
The 7 remaining parameters are adjusted to match the firms’ investment financing pattern, from
which I need at least 7 moments from the data. Table 1.7 presents the moments from the data to
be matched. Note that these moments are interdependent, since the shares of financing sources for
each firm size have to sum up to 100%21, so that there are actually 8 independent moments to be
matched. I include all three sources in the targeted moments to not underweight deviations from
target of one specific source.
Table 1.7: Moments from the data: firms’ investment financing
Small firms Medium firms Large firms Very large
share of retained earnings in investment funding 22% 29% 29% 26%
share of bank loans in investment funding 22% 31% 45% 58%
share of alternative sources in investment funding 56% 41% 26% 16%
The model’s moments in terms of financing sources are computed using the firms’ stationary distri-
bution and optimal policy functions. Similarly to the data presented in section 1.1, I build four size
categories according to the quantity of labor employed by the firms. The size thresholds are set so
that the shares of each of the four categories in the firms’ stationary distribution across labor are
the same as in the data. Namely, if 23% of the enterprises are small in the data, the bottom 23% of
the firms in the stationary distribution are classified as small, and so on. Optimal investment deci-
sions and their financing are computed for each firm, and averaged within size categories. Finally,
the operating cost parameter ζ is set so that the bank makes zero profit in this baseline calibration.
Given that the bank’s surplus is very small, ζ’s value is also very small, equal to 0.0030.
The calibrated values of the parameters and the corresponding equilibrium prices are presented in
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 respectively. These values imply that, depending on firms’ type, qLa = 0.9901
21It might not exactly sum up to 100% in Table 1.7 due to rounding.
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and qHa = 0.9132, so that q
H
a < q < q
L
a . As a consequence, the results highlighted in point (ii) of
Proposition 1.1 and point (i) of Proposition 1.2 always apply for type H firms, meaning that they
always marginally prefer to finance investment through bank loans rather than alternative sources.
From point (i) of Proposition 1.1, type H firms also marginally prefer to use retained earnings when
their use of alternative financing is already relatively high, while it would apply for type L firms
only in extreme cases (which are not observed at the stationary equilibrium). Last, if type L firms
are using little alternative financing, they marginally prefer to increase it rather than increasing
bank loans (case (ii) of Proposition 1.2), whereas the opposite is true if alternative financing is
more heavily used (case (i) of Proposition 1.1).
Table 1.8: Calibrated parameter values
q β δ α γ χL χH
0.97 0.9923 0.10 0.51 0.30 -0.0143 0.0625
θ ηL ηH ξ κ p0 ζ
0.10 0.01 0.0142 0.082 0.25 0.52 0.0030
Table 1.9: Equilibrium prices
qLa q
H
a w
0.9901 0.9132 0.80
1.4.4 Baseline fit
Figure 1.4 shows the targeted moments from the data (dashed lines) and their match from the
model (solid lines) for the share of investment financed by each of the three sources of funding.
The calibration manages to reproduce the data’s patterns for small to very large firms: small firms
use indeed more alternative sources and less bank loans, while large firms use predominantly bank
loans to finance their investment.
To assess the fit of the model, I compare further non-targeted moments to the data. The share of
firms not using one source of funding and the share of firms using only one source of funding, are
shown in Figure 1.5. The model is relatively close to some stylized facts from the data, further from
some others. For instance, the share of firms not using retained earnings and the share of firms using
only bank loans are at levels similar to the data. The share of firms using only alternative sources
is decreasing with size as in the data. None of the firms use only retained earnings to finance their
investment in the model, due to their high death probability that makes them relatively impatient.
Very few enterprises do not use any bank loans to finance their investment. This is related to the
debt roll-over mechanism in the model: if a firm is making negative profits, it can roll-over its debt
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and needs to use some bank loans to finance further access to alternative sources. Hence, every firm
rolling over its debt needs to use some bank loans, at least to finance the access cost to alternative
sources.
Figure 1.4: Calibrated moments (data in dashed lines, model in solid lines)
In terms of aggregate characteristics of the economy, I obtain a consumption over GDP ratio equal
to 57%, which fits quite well the actual consumption rate in China (60% in 2002, 57% in 2003).
Similarly, the investment over GDP ratio generated by the model is 44%, while the investment rate
in China was equal to 38% in 2002 and 41% in 2003.22 The share of firms actually investing is
equal to 82%, hence slightly higher than the data where respectively 68% and 70% of the firms
invested in 2001 and 2002.23 Finally, the average leverage of enterprises, defined as the ratio of
total assets over equity, is equal to 2.10 at the stationary state, which corresponds quite well to the
data (average leverage of 2.00, from the Enterprise Survey).
22Source: World Bank WDI Database.
23Source: Enterprise Survey.
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Figure 1.5: Non-targeted moments (data in dashed lines, model in solid lines)
(a) Share of firms not using one source of funding (b) Share of firms using only one source of funding
1.5 Reforming the credit distribution
1.5.1 On-going reforms in China
The regulation of the credit distribution sector is a heated topic in China, and reforms are an
on-going process since the mid-2000s. They include liberalizing banks’ interest rates by modifying
their floors and ceilings, inciting state-owned banks to redirect loans from large state-owned firms
towards smaller private enterprises, but also tightening the regulation of the non-bank financial
institutions and informal lenders. More details on the regulatory evolution of these three aspects
are provided below.
First, while interbank and bond rates were liberalized in 1996, the first significant step towards a
liberalization of retail interest rates took place in 2004. From September 1999 until October 2004,
lending rates were allowed to move between 0.9 and 1.1 times the benchmark rate for loans to large
enterprises, and between 0.9 and 1.3 times the benchmark rate for small and medium enterprises.
For deposit rates, banks had to strictly comply with the ceiling and floor rates. On its way towards
a credit market liberalization, the Chinese government first suppressed the ceiling rates for bank
loans and the floor rates for bank deposits in 2004, allowing banks to increase their intermediation
margin by increasing lending rates or decreasing deposit rates. By maintaining the floor and ceiling
for loans and deposit rates respectively, the Chinese authorities limit competition across banks to
attract borrowers and depositors, and ensure that banks keep a sufficient profit margin. More
recently, banks have also been allowed to set deposit rates 10% higher than the benchmark rate in
June 2012, and this limit was progressively increased to 50% higher between November 2014 and
May 2015. The full liberalization of interest rates is still an open process.
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Second, “window guidance” is still an important tool for monetary policy in China. The People’s
Bank of China (PBC) meets every month with commercial banks and gives written or oral directives
in terms of amount of credit distributed as well as loans beneficiaries, depending on their character-
istics in terms of industrial sector, size, or even polluting emissions. The PBC started mentioning
SME in its quarterly reports (China Monetary Policy Report) in 2004, stating its intention to “[pro-
mote] financial institutions to increase their support for SMEs and [curb] usury”24 along with the
loosening of the retail interest rates fluctuation bands. However, we have to wait until the spread
of the financial crisis and the fourth quarter of 2008 to see some important evolution, with the
publication of the Notice on Perfecting the Management of the Rediscount Business and Increasing
Agro-linked Loans and Financing to SMEs. From 2009 on, the PBC monitors specifically the evo-
lution of the amount lent by commercial banks to SME. Defined by the PBC as an objective for
Chinese banks, loans to SME start increasing significantly, and their share across total loans raises
despite the general increase in credit in China due to the stimulus package launched in November
2008.25 From 2012 on, the focus of the PBC narrows towards small and micro-enterprises, to which
bank loans are strongly encouraged.
Third, the regulation of financial intermediation has been debated and tightened over the last
few years. As mentioned before, the monetary authorities state their intention to “curb usury”
in the China Monetary Policy Report from 2004. Furthermore, the opportunities for non-bank
financial institutions to attract funds from Chinese households are more supervised, as well as
the sale to households of more remunerating trust assets through the intermediation of banks.
The links between banks and trust companies, for instance, have been clarified either through
the repatriation of off-balance-sheet assets into the banks’ balance sheets, or through a clearer
separation between banks and trust entities. These regulatory changes render access to credit more
difficult for enterprises that do not manage to obtain bank loans.
1.5.2 Reforms’ counterpart in the model
In this context, my model allows to conduct policy experiments by modifying the functioning of
the credit distribution sector. To investigate the impact of various possible policies, I compare the
stationary equilibrium of the baseline model calibration to the stationary equilibria reached after
various reforms. The following changes can be implemented, simultaneously or separated:
(i) Interest rates: I assume perfect competition, meaning that the representative bank can max-
imize its profit by choosing the amount of deposits it demands and the amount of loans it
24China Monetary Policy Report, Quarter Three, 2004.
25Loans granted to small enterprises increased by 41% in 2009, 29% in 2010, 26% in 2011 and 17% in 2012 according
to the PBC monetary reports. Their growth was respectively 16, 14 and 8 percentage points faster than loans to
large enterprises in 2010, 2011 and 2012.
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supplies, taking the deposit and lending rates as given. Bank’s interest rates are then fully
liberalized. Instead of being exogenously set by the government, they adjust to reach the
equilibrium on the bank deposits and loans markets, given the household’s deposit supply
and the firms’ loan demand. This reflects the on-going liberalization of interest rates in the
banking sector.
(ii) Window guidance: to take into account the change in incentives given to commercial banks,
I relax the collateral constraint faced by enterprises. Thus, banks are able to channel more
funds to small enterprises. The extent to which this constraint is relaxed is determined to
match the change in the bank lending rate between 2004 and the end of 2007.
(iii) Non-bank financial intermediation: I consider experiments where the alternative financing sec-
tor is shut down, which is an extreme case of tighter regulation. Since the alternative sources
of funds in my model correspond both to family and friends (“cheap” alternative financing,
accessible to type L firms) and to external investors (“expensive” alternative financing, ac-
cessible to type H firms), I also consider shutting down only “expensive” alternative finance.
Indeed, the regulator may not wish to ban contributions to investment financing from family
and friends, but only to prevent moneylenders and further intermediaries to take advantage
of cash-starved enterprises.
Reforms scenarios
Given these reforms possibilities, four different scenarios are considered, as detailed below. Since
the bank’s operating cost parameter ζ is set to ensure that bank’s profits are zero, the baseline
scenario is already at equilibrium and simply liberalizing the interest rates would not induce any
change. I therefore always consider a global liberalization of the banking sector, that includes both
a loosening of the collateral constraint26 and a liberalization of the interest rates.
a. For comparison, I study the impact of interest rate liberalization and collateral constraint
loosening in the case where alternative financing does not exist neither before nor after the
reform;
b. Starting from the baseline case where alternative finance is fully accessible, the banking sector
is liberalized, while the regulation of alternative sector remains stable, so that the alternative
financing sector remains fully accessible;
c. The third scenario examines the effect of a liberalization the banking sector, when the entire
alternative sector is simultaneously shut down, so that enterprises can use alternative financing
before the reform but not any more after the reform.
26Given the calibration obtained in section 2.4, the parameter θ is increased from 0.1 to 0.292. This increase is
designed to reproduce the change in bank lending real rates in China between 2003 and the end of 2007, up from
3.09% to 3.58%.
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d. In this last scenario, the banking sector is liberalized, while only the expensive alternative
sector is shut down. This means that type L firms maintain their access to alternative
financing sources throughout the policy experiment, while type H firms loose the possibility
to use alternative financing after the reform. This scenario corresponds most closely to the
aim of the Chinese government to curb usury.
Bank’s profit maximization
As presented in section 2.3, the program of the bank is linear in the amount of deposits qdD taken
and loans qB granted, and the bank faces the solvency constraint qB ≤ qdD. Hence, maximizing
this program yields some equality relationships between interest rates and further parameters,
equalities that need to be verified in order to avoid a corner solutions (in terms of loans supply or
deposits demand). There are two possible solutions to the bank’s program:
(i) If both deposits and loans are costless for the bank, meaning that qd =
1
1−ζ and q =
1−p¯+p¯r
1+ζ .
In this case, the bank is indifferent regarding the amount of deposits and loans it has, and
the solvency constraint is not binding. Since qd ∈ (0, 1), this can never be the case unless
ζ = 0 and qd = 1. The calibrated value of ζ being 0.0030, this case does not occur here.
(ii) Since ζ > 0, holding deposits is always costly for the bank, and the solvency constraint
will always bind, so that qB = qdD. In this case, profit maximization brings the following
relationship between q and qd:
q =
(1− p¯+ p¯r)qd
1 + 2ζqd
(1.53)
This equality is necessary to rule out corner solutions and implies that the bank makes zero
profit at each period.
The solution that is relevant here is case (ii). Given that the bank’s profits are zero, any amount
of deposits and loans such that qdD = qB is a solution to the bank’s program, and loans and
deposits are determined by the firms’ and household’s programs respectively. From the household’s
program, the deposits price qd has to be equal to the discount rate β to ensure the existence of
a non-zero steady state wealth level. This means that the loan price q has to adjust according to
equation (1.53), given the average default rate and reimbursement of enterprises, to ensure that
the bank’s profit is zero.
1.5.3 Results
After solving for the stationary equilibrium in scenarios a. to d., I analyze the impact of the reforms
in each case by comparing the aggregate economy, equilibrium prices and the average development
path of an individual newborn firm before and after the reform. I also examine the development
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of newborn firms by simulating the path of a newborn firm with little capital and various initial
productivity levels for a very large number of firms27. The average path for production, capital
and investment is then obtained by averaging across firms.
Presence of alternative finance
Before studying in details the impact of the reforms, it is useful to have in mind the impact of
the presence of alternative finance. Comparing the baseline case (where interest rates are not
liberalized and the collateral constraint for bank loans is tight) to a similar situation without
alternative finance yields the following results. The presence of alternative finance, by relaxing
the credit constraints faced by the enterprises, increases the aggregate production, consumption
and capital by 6.6%, 6.2% and 8.0% respectively. At the level of individual enterprises, alternative
financing opportunities fasten the growth of small newborn enterprises’ capital by respectively
11 to 129 percentage points. Similarly, the growth of newborn enterprises’ production is 10 to 41
percentage points faster, depending on their initial productivity. Alternative finance has therefore a
non-negligible impact on both aggregate variables and enterprise dynamics, and strongly contributes
to alleviate credit constraints.
Impact on the aggregate economy
Turning to the impact of credit sector reforms, results for the various scenarios considered are
presented in Table 1.10. At the bottom of Table 1.10, the numbers presented correspond to the
difference in terms of the average growth paths of newborn firms for production and capital, during
the first 6 periods of their life.
Except when alternative finance is fully or partially shut down (scenarios c. and d.), the banking
sector liberalization has a clear positive effect. Overall, the impact of liberalization is influenced
by (i) the presence of alternative finance; (ii) general equilibrium effects: prices increase in most
scenarios.
Importance of alternative finance. Aggregate production, consumption, and capital increase in
all scenarios except scenario c.. As shown in scenario a., a naive view of the Chinese economy,
not taking into account the presence of alternative financing sources, would overstate the positive
impact of the liberalization in terms of consumption. When estimating the potential impact of
liberalization reforms, it is therefore useful, as in scenario b., to account for alternative financing
27The simulations presented here are done for 20000 firms for each possible initial productivity level. A sequence of
productivity shocks is drawn for each simulated firm; the optimal investment decisions and resulting production
and capital accumulation are then computed given these shocks, for each firm.
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Table 1.10: Impact of banking sector liberalization, for different scenarios
Change, with Alternative Financing Sector:
Initial level Never allowed Always allowed Shut down Partially shut down
scenario a. scenario b. scenario c. scenario d.
Aggregates
Production 8.58 5.34 % 5.47 % -0.75 % 5.61 %
Capital 20.37 9.54 % 9.91 % 2.43 % 11.11%
Consumption 4.90 4.02 % 3.10 % -1.08 % 3.05 %
Prices
Bank lending rate 3.09 +0.19 +0.50 -1.54 +0.06
Low alternative rate 1.00 - +0.50 - +0.06
High alternative rate 9.50 - +0.57 - -
Wage 0.80 5.48 % 5.41 % -0.6 % 5.62 %
Firms’ path
New-born average -
0.5 to 4.6 % pts -1.6 to 6.9 % pts -36.8 to -9.8 % pts -13.6 to 1.3 % pts
production growth
New-born average -
0.7 to 8.6 % pts -0.7 to 13.3 % pts -120.1 to -10.1 % pts -22.9 to 2.4 % pts
capital growth
sources, which allow firms to bypass credit constraints and make the impact of liberalization less
stringent. A liberalization of the banking sector increases aggregate production by 5.34% in the
absence of alternative finance, which is similar to the production increase of 5.47% when alternative
finance is taken into account. The aggregate capital increase resulting from the liberalization is also
similar whether alternative finance is included or not in the model. However, and most importantly
for a policy maker, the change in consumption decreases from 4.02% to 3.10%, strongly reducing
the welfare implications for households. Furthermore, the development implications for small young
firms are more heterogeneous when alternative finance is available.
Scenario c.’s results may seem surprising: while aggregate capital increases, production decreases
slightly. This is due to two effects: first, the strong drop in the bank loan rate and the relaxation of
the collateral constraint favors a higher level of capital – though far from the increase seen n scenario
b.. However, financial constraints are still present in this scenario, and alternative financial sources
cannot be used any more to alleviate them. Hence, aggregate capital is higher, but its allocation is
worse, as is shown by the increase in the dispersion of the marginal productivity of capital across
firms, from 0.142 to 0.157. As a consequence, the aggregate production decreases, and so does
aggregate consumption. This scenario confirms the importance of alternative finance in alleviating
resource misallocations and improving aggregate welfare.
General equilibrium effects. The impact of banking sector reforms is about half smaller than in
a partial equilibrium situation where all prices were fixed. In scenario b., aggregate production
increases by 5.5% instead of 14.8%, while aggregate capital increases by 9.9% instead of 20.7%.
This is due to a general increase in all prices following the reforms, for which I explain the intuition
below. There are two mechanisms impacting directly the bank lending rate. First, due to the relaxed
collateral constraint, firms’ demand for bank loans increases, driving up the prices. Second, in terms
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of loan riskiness, the liberalization slightly decreases the average default probability of enterprises
since firms may more easily roll-over small amounts of debt. However, since they may also borrow
higher amounts, the share of debt they are able to reimburse in case of default decreases, so that
the expected loan return slightly decreases. To compensate for these two changes, the interest rate
of bank loans increases. This second mechanism is also valid for alternative sources, and drives up
both alternative interest rates too. Last, given their higher capital level, enterprises also demand
more labor, causing a rise in the wage since the labor supply is fixed. This results in an increase
in all prices, in particular the type H alternative financing (when available), that raises by 0.57
percentage points.
Impact on the demand for bank loans
Having a closer look at the change in firm borrowing behavior in terms of bank loans helps us
understand the mechanisms behind reforms’ impact. Focusing on scenario b., the liberalization,
through the loosening of the collateral constraint, causes a strong increase in the total amount of
bank loans distributed (multiplied by 2.2). In terms of extensive margin, the quantitative impact
on bank borrowing is relatively small and, if anything, tends to decrease the total amount borrowed
from banks. Only 5.5% of the firms that were not using bank loans before start using it after the
reforms – most of them being small and medium-sized firms – and they account for only a negligible
part of total bank borrowing. A similarly low impact is due to enterprises that would have defaulted
without the liberalization, and are now able to roll over their debt: they account for less than 1%
of total bank borrowing after the reform, most of it coming from medium or larger enterprises.
Finally, due to the increase in the bank lending rate, some firms actually stop borrowing from
banks, relying only on retained earnings and alternative finance. These firms were responsible for
more than 2% of borrowing before the liberalization. The large majority of the increase in bank
borrowing is at the intensive margin. Indeed, firms that were already borrowing before and keep
on borrowing account for 99% of total borrowing after the reform. Many of them were constrained
by the collateral requirement and increase the size of their bank loan despite the interest rate rise.
This intensive margin effect strongly overcomes the extensive margin slight decrease.
Impact on small, new-born enterprises
In scenarios a. and b., newborn firms with a low level of capital and a high enough productivity are
strongly benefitting from liberalization. Indeed, it increases their average production growth over
the first 6 years by up to 7 percentage points in scenario b.. By alleviating the credit constraints
before the liberalization, alternative financing reduces the reforms’ impact on production for less
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Figure 1.6: Average production path of a new-born firm starting with low capital
(a) Low initial productivity (b) Medium initial productivity
(c) High initial productivity
productive firms. For more productive firms, the availability of alternative finance combines with
the liberalization to produce a stronger impact.
The importance of alternative finance for small firms is also emphasized in scenarios c. and d.:
liberalizing the banking sector cannot compensate for a tight regulation of the alternative financing
sector, and newborn enterprises grow much slower, both in terms of production and capital, when
their access to alternative finance is shut down. The speed of development of newborn firms
decreases by up to 37% and 120% for production and capital respectively in scenario c.. This is
also true for aggregate production and consumption. This result implies that the regulation of the
non-bank financial sector should be accompanied by making the banking sector function on a more
45
Alternative Finance and Credit Sector Reforms: the Case of China
competitive basis, but should also be mild enough not to penalize small firms too strongly.
In scenario d., only type H enterprises do not have access to alternative finance. Depending on
their initial productivity, newborn firms are differently affected by the reform: enterprises with a
high initial productivity level are more penalized by the tighter regulation of alternative finance,
because they optimally would want to invest more. On the opposite, enterprises with a low initial
productivity gain from the reform of scenario d., since they are able to invest enough using bank
loans.
This analysis is further illustrated by Figures 1.6 and 1.7. The blue dashed lines in both figures
show, in the baseline calibration, the average production and investment of newborn firms starting
with various initial levels of productivity. The red dashed-dotted line corresponds to scenario b.
(liberalization of the banking sector, no change in alternative finance), while the yellow solid line
represents scenario c. (liberalization of the banking sector and closing of the alternative sector)
and the purple dotted line shows scenario d. (liberalization of the banking sector and closing on
the expensive alternative sector only). The overshooting of production observed in Figure 1.7c
is related to the very high initial productivity level of enterprises: their initially high production
decreases after about 10 years, when their productivity shock goes back to its steady state average
level. In scenarios b. and d., the liberalization allows newborn firms’ production to grow somewhat
faster towards their steady state level, especially for firms starting with a medium productivity.
Similarly, firms starting with a high productivity reach both their peak of production and their
long-term average production level earlier in scenario b..
A ban of the alternative financing sector is more detrimental to firms with a high initial productivity,
since their suboptimal level of investment implies a larger loss in terms of production during the
first 10 periods. (see Figure 1.7c). In scenario c., firms clearly have a lower level of production
for the first periods. We can notice that allowing access to L type alternative finance (scenario
d.) almost restaures the production curve to the level of scenario b. (with all alternative sources
allowed), meaning that most of the impact of alternative financing is coming from the “cheap”
alternative.
As shown in Figure 1.7, for firms with a low or medium initial productivity, investment is lower in
the baseline calibration and in scenario c. compared to scenario b.. This is the case both in the very
first years, and later on, when the steady state is reached. Similarly to production, investment in
scenario d. is almost equal to scenario b., confirming the importance of cheap alternative financing
options, even if only half of enterprises have access to it given the calibration.28 We can also
28The share of L type firms is 0.52, see Table 1.8.
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Figure 1.7: Average investment path of a new-born firm starting with low capital
(a) Low initial productivity (b) Medium initial productivity
(c) High initial productivity
observe that high productivity firms delay their investment in scenario c. because of financial
constraints, thus having a lower level of investment over the first 10 periods. After around 15 to 20
periods periods, all liberalization scenarios show a higher level of investment, which is consistent
with their higher level of aggregate capital. We can also observe on Figure 1.8c that the peak of
investment is delayed by about one year in the baseline scenario: the firms have to comply with the
bank’s collateral constraint and to pay alternative finance’s access cost, which forces them to delay
investment. However, given that the productivity progressively decreases back to its steady state
level, delayed investment does not fully take place later on. Therefore the level of the investment
peak in the baseline case is lower, as firms’ investment plans adjust to their new productivity shock.
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Impact on capital allocation
Despite the increase in capital, production and consumption, the average value of firms slightly
decreases in scenario b.. Indeed, the discounted stream of dividends is lowered by the increase in all
prices. It is less so for type H enterprises and smaller-sized enterprises as they benefit more from
the reform in terms of access to finance, and see a smaller decrease in their value. The changes in
marginal productivity of capital (MPK) can help evaluating the evolution of capital misallocations.
All enterprises see their MPK decrease, which is logical since they invest more. The changes in MPK
are fairly similar across firm size, whereas H type firms tend to see their MPK decrease relatively
more than L type firms. This confirms that type H enterprises benefit more from banking sector
reforms. In terms of dispersion, the standard error of MPK slightly decreases with the reforms,
from 0.1420 to 0.1369, which shows once again that capital is better allocated after the reforms.
Conclusion
This paper studies the access to investment funding for Small and Medium Enterprises and the
importance of alternative financing sources – namely non-bank, non-retained earnings sources – in
a context of banking sector liberalization. These alternative sources include family and friends,
non-listed equity and various types of informal lending institutions. The model set-up focuses
on the choice of investment financing by heterogeneous enterprises facing a collateral constraint,
idiosyncratic productivity shocks and different costs of access to alternative sources of funding.
Embedding the firm’s side into a general equilibrium model, I quantify the impact of a reform
of the credit distribution sector in China, including the liberalization of bank interest rates, the
modification of banks’ incentives to lend and the regulation of alternative finance.
The model is more specifically tailored to the situation in China at the start of the 21st century
where, as shown by firm-level surveys, smaller firms are facing tighter credit constraints than large
ones and resort to retained earnings or further alternative sources to finance their investment. I
solve for the stationary equilibrium and calibrate the parameters so as to reproduce stylized facts
from Chinese data. Using this calibrated model as a benchmark, I show that a liberalization of
the banking sector towards more competition among banks for loans and deposits is beneficial to
the economy. It indeed increases both the aggregate production and consumption, and improves
the development speed of newborn enterprises. By alleviating the credit constraints faced by
enterprises, alternative finance also reduces the impact of the liberalizing reforms compared to a
“naive” view where alternative finance would not be accounted for. A liberalization of the banking
sector increases aggregate production and consumption respectively by 5.5% and 3.1%. It also
speeds up the growth of newborn enterprises by up to 7 percentage points in terms of production
and 13 percentage points in terms of capital accumulation.
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Simultaneously tightening the regulation of alternative finance, on the opposite, would diminish
—but not cancel —the benefits of the liberalization in terms of aggregate consumption. It would
however be strongly detrimental to younger, smaller firms, reducing their access to credit and
their investment, and slowing down their growth by up to 14 and 23 percentage points in terms of
production and capital respectively.
From this exercise, we can conclude that the availability of alternative funding allowed Chinese firms
to partially bypass credit constraints, and to develop faster in terms of capital size and production,
hence favoring a higher long-run aggregate level of capital and production. A liberalization of
the banking sector, by easing access to credit and favoring investment, would beneficiate to all
enterprises, especially small, high productive ones. Results also show that non-banking credit
institutions should be regulated carefully. If not conducted in parallel to a reform of the Chinese
banking system, tightening the regulation of alternative funding institutions could undermine the
dynamism of younger firms unable to obtain formal bank loans. China has been progressively
liberalizing retail bank interest rates since 2004, and the final steps of this liberalization process are
still an open debate. This paper shows that such a liberalization is beneficial and necessary before
regulating too tightly the alternative financing sector.
49

Appendix
1.A Tables
Table 1.A.1: Descriptive statistics comparing the composition of 2002 and 2003’s samples of the
Enterprise Survey - China
Statistics 2002 2003
Number of observations 1548 2400
Year starting operations in China (average) 1987 1987
Year starting operations in China (median) 1993 1993
Publicly listed companies (% of firms) 1.74 2.48
Private held, limited companies (% of firms) 23.43 30.95
Cooperative (% of firms) 15.73 17.77
Other (% of firms) 59.10 48.81
SOE (% of firms) 22.91 23.30
Manufacturing sector (% of firms) 65.89 67.04
Services sector (% of firms) 34.11 32.96
Number of workers one year ago (average) 541 542
Number of workers two years ago (average) 639 504
Number of workers three years ago (average) 511 NA
Total sales one year ago (thousand RMB) 207309 202616
Total sales two years ago (thousand RMB) 175525 189135
Total sales three years ago (thousand RMB) 148582 147502
Capital one year ago (thousand RMB) 19800 NA
Capital two years ago (thousand RMB) 17500 NA
Capital three years ago (thousand RMB) 16200 NA
Energy consumption one year ago (thousand RMB) 6167095 NA
Energy consumption two years ago (thousand RMB) 5437916 NA
Energy consumption three years ago (thousand RMB) 3218342 NA
Data issued from the 2002 and 2003 Enterprise Survey conducted by the Workd Bank, available
at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
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Table 1.A.2: Sources of funding for new investment (% of total new investment), by firm ownership
status
foreign private collective soe
Internal/retained earnings 31.52 24.21 33.67 19.83 Local banksForeign-owned banks
Special development financing
22.64 28.83 41.85 52.89
Banks 0.34 0.23 0.00 0.00
2.41 0.51 0.00 2.19
Family, friends
Equity, sale of stock to employees
Equity, sale of stock to legal-persons
Informal sources
Trade credit
3.62 11.69 6.67 1.19
5.17 5.65 0.00 1.27
Alternative 17.98 13.41 15.70 8.17
2.59 3.02 0.00 3.41
5.74 1.66 0.00 0.04
Equity, public issue of marketable
share to outside investors
1.72 2.12 0.00 1.91
Others 6.26 8.66 2.11 9.11
Observations 58 630 27 124
The firm size categories across annual total sales are defined as follows:
- Very Small: annual total sales in 2002 below 2500 000 Yuan
- Small: annual total sales in 2002 between 2500 000 and 10 000 000 Yuan
- Medium: annual total sales in 2002 between 10 000 000 and 50 000 000 Yuan
- Large: annual total sales in 2002 above 50 000 000 Yuan
Table 1.A.3: Sources of funding for new investment (% of total new investment), by firm sales ,
across private firms
Very Small Small Medium Large
Internal/retained earnings 19.23 21.31 28.77 26.34 Local banksForeign-owned banks
Special development financing
19.38 25.35 30.15 39.25
Bank 0.06 0.00 0.76 0.00
0.79 0.62 0.56 0.11
Family, friends
Equity, sale of stock to employees
Equity, sale of stock to legal-persons
Informal sources
Trade credit
22.43 15.34 9.01 1.34
6.88 8.66 4.43 3.57
Alternative 17.49 12.88 12.95 10.29
4.26 2.20 3.98 1.38
1.33 2.23 0.39 2.92
Equity, public issue of marketable
share to outside investors
0.18 0.83 1.40 5.74
Others 7.96 10.59 7.60 9.08
Observations 164 121 178 167
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Table 1.A.4: Sources of funding for new investment for Germany in 2005, by firm size (in terms of
employment)
All Small Medium Large Very large
Internal/retained earnings 50.73 53.81 43.52 35.01 24.55
Local banks
Foreign-owned banks
Investment funds
21.13 19.01 25.08 32.72 42.73
Banks 1.51 0.98 2.87 4.04 6.36
0.50 0.43 0.33 1.38 0.00
Family, friends
Informal sources
Trade credit
Credit card
0.83 0.99 0.16 0.32 0.00
Alternative
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4.17 4.25 5.53 2.39 0.00
0.89 0.96 0.90 0.37 0.00
Equity, sale of stock 9.33 9.01 8.98 11.29 20.91
Leasing 10.85 10.49 12.62 12.50 5.45
Others 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 1177 935 122 109 11
Table 1.A.5: Sources of funding for new investment for India in 2005, by firm size (in terms of
employment)
All Small Medium Large Very large
Internal/retained earnings 52.30 51.73 56.89 48.89 38.87
Bank
{
Local banks
Foreign-owned banks
31.46 27.49 36.86 39.46 55.04
0.87 0.75 0.92 1.69 3.75
Family, friends
Informal sources
Trade credit
Credit card
6.97 9.17 2.33 2.89 0.00
Alternative
0.60 0.75 0.09 0.28 0.00
4.53 6.35 1.16 2.57 1.67
0.87 1.30 0.11 0.32 0.00
Equity, sale of stock 1.10 1.00 1.13 2.36 0.67
Leasing 0.93 1.19 0.48 0.18 0.00
Others 0.36 0.26 0.03 1.38 0.00
Observations 1468 918 320 109 24
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Table 1.A.6: Sources of funding for new investment for Colombia in 2006, by firm size (in terms of
employment)
All Small Medium Large Very large
Internal/retained earnings 33.01 31.52 39.96 74.85 52.67
Bank
{
Private banks
State-owned banks
35.93 35.87 40.32 11.14 47.33
7.15 7.77 2.41 0.42 0.00
Family, friends
Debt
Informal sources
Trade credit
Non-bank financial institutions
9.88 11.09 0.11 0.00 0.00
0.19 0.13 0.48 1.76 0.00
Alternative 0.63 0.64 0.49 0.84 0.00
9.78 10.67 3.10 0.08 0.00
1.38 0.72 6.16 10.92 0.00
Equity, sale of stock 0.36 0.03 3.58 0.00 0.00
Others 1.70 1.56 3.37 0.00 0.00
Observations 559 404 122 25 8
Table 1.A.7: Sources of financing: share (%) of enterprises declaring not using one financing source,
or using only one finance source, by ownership status
All Foreign Private Collective SOE
not using (0%)
internal/retained earnings 61.61 56.14 60.26 59.26 71.54
bank loans 52.47 63.16 55.93 48.15 30.89
alternative 56.80 57.89 51.44 70.37 80.49
using only (100%)
internal/retained earnings 20.10 33.33 19.23 25.93 17.07
bank loans 27.56 19.30 22.76 37.04 53.66
alternative 26.35 28.07 29.17 18.52 13.01
observations 831 57 624 27 123
Table 1.A.8: Sources of financing: share (%) of private enterprises declaring not using one finance
source, or using only one finance source, by sales
Very Small Small Medium Large
not using (0%)
internal/retained earnings 73.17 64.17 51.70 53.66
bank loans 71.95 62.50 52.27 39.02
alternative 34.15 43.33 56.82 68.90
using only (100%)
internal/retained earnings 16.46 19.17 21.02 20.12
bank loans 15.24 21.67 23.30 30.49
alternative 48.17 32.50 21.59 15.85
observations 164 120 176 164
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Table 1.A.9: Bank loans requirements and applications, by ownership status (% of firms)
Foreign Private Collective SOE
if having a loan, was collateral needed? Yes 53.10 58.55 64.41 61.89
if did not apply for a loan, is it because of collateral requirements? Yes 23.91 27.57 15.09 22.42
if application rejected, was it because of lack of collateral? Yes 66.67 71.71 56.25 66.67
Table 1.A.10: Bank loans requirements and applications, by sales (% of private firms)
Very Small Small Medium Large
if having a loan, was collateral needed? Yes 43.72 49.28 63.84 74.27
if did not apply for a loan, is it because of collateral requirements? Yes 25.86 32.43 26.80 24.72
if application rejected, was it because of lack of collateral? Yes 71.15 71.70 77.42 62.50
Table 1.A.11: Average interest rate and collateral required for bank loans, by firm’s status
Foreign Private Collective SOE
mean mean mean mean
interest rate 5.01 5.29 5.65 5.58
collateral (% of loan) 80.03 84.58 71.30 85.38
Observations 49 456 30 129
Table 1.A.12: Average interest rate charged on bank loans, by sales
Very Small Small Medium Large
mean mean mean mean
interest rate 5.74 5.42 5.14 5.17
collateral (% of loan) 96.30 79.20 84.85 82.04
Observations 70 86 144 156
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Table 1.A.13: Average interest rate and collateral required for bank loans, by amount invested (in
thousand yuan)
0-100 100-1000 1000-10000 >10000
mean mean mean mean
interest rate 5.35 5.50 5.13 5.18
collateral (% of loan) 90.72 88.18 83.65 77.61
Observations 59 122 115 60
Table 1.A.14: Depreciation rates estimated or assumed by various studies
Source Depreciation rate Country
Bai et al. (2006)
8% for structures
China24% for machinery
avg 10.52% for 1997-2003
Raychaudhuri (1996) 6.7% India, industry
OECD (2000) 4% China
Wang and Yao (2003) 5% China
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) 5% China and India
Schu¨ndeln (2012) from 8% to 14% Indonesia
Sun and Ren (2008)
17% for equipment
China8% for structure
26% for auto
Wu (2009)
from 3.6% to 17%
Chinaavg 5.2 % for manufacturing
avg 4.0 % for services
total avg 4.6%
Although a depreciation rate close to 5% is often used (for instance by Hsieh and Klenow, 2009),
many studies that estimate the depreciation rate in China find higher results (see Table 1.A.14 in
Appendix 1.A). Bai et al. (2006) obtain an average depreciation rate of about 10% for the period
ranging from 1997 to 2003, Sun and Ren (2008)’s rates range between 8% and 26%, while Wu
(2009) obtains estimates between 3.6% and 17%. Furthermore, Udry and Anagol (2006) show
theoretically that financially constrained firms tend to hold assets that depreciate faster, which is
confirmed empirically by Schu¨ndeln (2012). The latter also shows that younger firms have a higher
depreciation rate. Given that my study is mainly focused on young firms that may suffer from
financial constraints, it seems reasonable to set δ to 10% for the calibration.
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Table 1.A.15: Estimation of the production function coefficients with OLS and fixed effects
Least squares Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All All All
labor 0.33∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.0323) (0.0320) (0.0563) (0.0567)
capital 0.52∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0406) (0.0424)
age -0.019∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗
(0.00221) (0.0151)
Constant 5.99∗∗∗ 5.83∗∗∗ 7.90∗∗∗ 7.80∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.197) (0.662) (0.664)
N 1888 1885 1888 1885
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.B Proofs
1.B.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proof. First, I demonstrate the Lemma 1 below, as it will be useful for the proof.
Lemma 1. The value function V (A, k, d; j) is increasing with capital k and decreasing with debt
d: ∂V (A,k,d;j)∂k ≥ 0 and ∂V (A,k,d;j)∂d ≤ 0.
Proof of the Lemma. Using the envelop theorem, tt is easy to derive the partial derivatives of the
value function is the following three cases:
- Positive dividends:
∂V ND
∂k
= (1 + µ)αAkα−1lγ + λθ > 0 (1.54)
∂V ND
∂d
= −1− µ < 0 (1.55)
- Positive profits, zero dividends:
∂V ND
∂k
= ναAkα−1lγ + λθ ≥ 0 (1.56)
∂V ND
∂d
= −ν ≤ 0 (1.57)
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- Negative profits:
∂V ND
∂k
= ζαAkα−1lγ + λθ ≥ 0 (1.58)
∂V ND
∂d
= −ζ ≤ 0 (1.59)
Given that the value function in case of default is always equal to zero, this implies the result of
Lemma 1.
Let us now turn to the proof of Proposition 1.1. From equations (1.24) and (1.25), I define the
marginal benefit of investing (the same for all sources of funding) as:
Bm(b
′) = Bm(a′) = Bm(e′) =
∂EV
∂k′
(1.60)
Focusing on the case where the firm distributes positive dividends, I then examine the marginal
cost of investment depending on the financing source:
Cm(e
′) =
1 + µ
β(1− ξ) (1.61)
Cm(b
′) =
λ
β(1− ξ) −
1
q
∂EV
∂d′
(1.62)
Cm(a
′) =
xj′(a′)(1 + µ)
qjaβ(1− ξ)
− 1
qja
∂EV
∂d′
(1.63)
(i) Comparing retained earnings and alternative financing.
Cm(a
′)− Cm(e′) = 1 + µ
β(1− ξ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(
xj′(a′)
qja
− 1
)
− 1
qja
∂EV
∂d′︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(1.64)
qja−xj′(a′) < 0 implies that Cm(a′) ≥ Cm(b′), which gives us the result that retained earnings
are marginally preferred to alternative financing.
(ii) Comparing bank loans and alternative financing.
Cm(a
′)− Cm(b′) = x
j′(a′)(1 + µ)
qjaβ(1− ξ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
− λ
β(1− ξ) +
(
1
q
− 1
qja
)
∂EV
∂d′︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(1.65)
When the collateral constraint does not bind (λ = 0) and q ≥ qja, we clearly have Cm(a′) ≥
Cm(b
′).
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These results shows both points (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1.1.
1.B.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1.1, I define the respective marginal cost and benefits
of investment financed by various sources. Note that when the firm distributes zero dividends, it
does not want to marginally increase its retained earnings, since it has already used all its profits (if
any) to invest through retained earnings or alternative sources. Hence I only compare the marginal
costs and benefits of bank loans and alternative financing. The marginal benefit of investing is the
same for both sources:
Bm(b
′) = Bm(a′) =
∂EV
∂k′
(1.66)
To study the marginal costs, I separate across two cases depending on the sign of the firm’s profits.
(i) Case of positive profit and zero dividends. The marginal costs of bank loans and alternative
financing are respectively:
Cm(b
′) =
λ− ν
β(1− ξ) −
1
q
∂EV
∂d′
(1.67)
Cm(a
′) =
xj′(a′)
β(1− ξ)(qja − xj′(a′))
− 1
qja − xj′(a′)
∂EV
∂d′
(1.68)
Cm(a
′)− Cm(b′) = x
j′(a′)
β(1− ξ)(qja − xj′(a′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
ν − λ
β(1− ξ) +
(
1
q
− 1
qja − xj′(a′)
)
∂EV
∂d′︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(1.69)
Here I consider only the case where qja−xj′(a′) > 0. Indeed, remember that tomorrow’s capital
is given by: k′ = (1−δ)k+qb′+qjaa′+profit−xj(a′). If qja−xj′(a′) ≤ 0, tomorrow’s capital is
decreasing with alternative sources, and the firm will never find it optimal to use alternative
sources to finance investment. When the collateral constraint does not bind (λ = 0), having
q ≥ qja − xj′(a′) implies that Cm(a′) ≥ Cm(b′). Since the cost function xj(.) is convex,
assuming that q ≥ qja − xj′(a′) is equivalent to assuming that a′ ≥ a, where a is defined by
xj′(a) = qja − q.
(ii) Case of negative profits. Here again, we can compute the marginal costs of bank loans and
alternative sources.
Cm(b
′) =
λ− ν − ζ
β(1− ξ) −
1
q
∂EV
∂d′
(1.70)
Cm(a
′) =
xj′(a′)
β(1− ξ)(qja − xj′(a′))
− ζ
β(1− ξ) −
1
qja − xj′(a′)
∂EV
∂d′
(1.71)
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Cm(a
′)− Cm(b′) = x
j′(a′)
β(1− ξ)(qja − xj′(a′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
ν − λ
β(1− ξ) +
(
1
q
− 1
qja − xj′(a′)
)
∂EV
∂d′︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(1.72)
This gives us the same result as for positive profit and zero dividends, and Proposition 1.2 is
obtained by combining the two cases.
1.C General equilibrium with heterogeneous households
I detail below a version of the general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households instead of
a representative one. Using heterogeneous households with a wealth distribution allows to avoid
some shortcuts that are necessary in the representative household version, namely:
- Households do not have to be indifferent between saving and consuming, which frees the bank
deposit rate for the liberalization experiment;
- Households can hold risky assets, and bear to cost of firms’ default if lending directly to them;
- Households do not have to be indifferent between the saving instruments to avoid corner
solutions, since the bank loans are risk-free while the direct loan to the firms is risky.
The subsequent changes in the general equilibrium set-up are described in sections 1.C.1 to 1.C.3
of this appendix.
1.C.1 Program of the heterogeneous households
The households are heterogeneous and go through the life cycle as young workers and old pensioners.
The young households supply labor inelastically for a gross wage w, and decide how much of their
income to consume and save. Their wage is taxed at a rate t to finance the old households’ pension
scheme by repartition. Old households are retired and earn some pension benefit equal to w < w.
They also optimize their consumption and savings. A young household has a probability ρ to
retire, while an old household dies with probability τO. Importantly, the households do not face
any uncertainty in terms of labor or pension income. They have an incentive to save to smooth
consumption because they earn less as pensioners than as workers. To keep the size of the total
population constant, every time a household dies, a young household is born and inherits the wealth
of the old household. For simplicity, I assume that the households cannot borrow. Given the set-up
outlined above, this borrowing constraint is mostly not binding, except for poor, young (working)
households. On top of their labor or pension income, the households earn the dividends of the firms.
The shares of the firms are equally distributed and the dividends are a per period per household
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lump-sum transfer (to keep the households’ program simple enough, I assume that firms’ shares
are non-transferable).
Differently from the representative household case, each household can choose between only two
(instead of three) saving instruments: bank deposits, and one of the two types of direct loans to
firms (corresponding to the two types of alternative financing received by the firms). Indeed, beyond
wealth and age differences, I further distinguish between NJ types of households j ∈ J that pay a
different intermediation cost χj to find a firm willing to invest. This cost is higher when households
search beyond their close social circle, since the search involves more intermediaries to reach a firm
needing investment, and this is reflected in the variations in χj depending on the household’s type
j. Granting a direct loan to enterprises is risky, since the firm may default on the loan and not fully
reimburse. The households do not have precise enough information on the firm they are lending
to to know its specific probability of default, but they know the average probability of default of
a firm, and the average reimbursement rate in case of default. Denoting p¯ the default probability
and r the reimbursement rate, an asset priced qja gives a return 1 with probability 1 − p¯ and an
return r < 1 with probability p¯.
The households are hence heterogeneous with respect to their total wealth W , their age (young Y
or old O), and their type in terms of connection to enterprises. The program of the young and old
households is respectively shown in equations (1.73) to (1.80).
when young:
V (W ;Y, j) = max
c,sb,s
j
a
u(c) + β
(
(1− ρ)EV (W ′;Y, j) + ρEV (W ′;O, j)) (1.73)
s.t.
W = c+ qdsb + q
j
as
j
a + χ
jsja (1.74)
W ′ =
De + w(1− t) + sb + s
j
a with probability 1− p¯ if no default
De + w(1− t) + sb + rsja with probability p¯ if default
(1.75)
sja, sb, c ≥ 0 (1.76)
when old:
V (W ;O, j) = max
c,sb,s
j
a
u(c) + β(1− τO)EV (W ′;O, j) (1.77)
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s.t.
W = c+ qdsb + q
j
as
j
a + χ
jsja (1.78)
W ′ =
De + w + sb + s
j
a with probability 1− p¯ if no default
De + w + sb + rs
j
a with probability p¯ if default
(1.79)
sja, sb, c ≥ 0 (1.80)
where W is the current total wealth of the household, c is consumption today, sb is the amount
deposited to the bank, sja is the capital directly supplied to the firm through alternative financing, w
is the young households’wage, w is the old households’pension income, De is the dividends obtained
from the firm’s profit, j is the type of household, p is the aggregate default probability determined
by the firm’s program. The resource constraint for the pension scheme further implies that
ˆ
O
w =
ˆ
Y
tw (1.81)
The trade-off between the two saving instruments is the following: the bank deposits are risk-free,
while the alternative financing is risky and has a higher return (i.e. qd > q
j
a ∀j ∈ J). Since
there is uncertainty on the return of the alternative financing, W ′ is a random variable. New-
born households inherit firms’ shares and the left-over wealth of their predecessors (but there is no
altruistic motive for bequest).
1.C.2 Program of the bank
The program of the representative bank is similar to the one described in section 1.3.
1.C.3 Market clearing conditions
The new market clearing conditions are similar to the previous ones. The good market clearing
condition is modified to take into account the foreign asset returns. To avoid heavy notations, I
summarize the firms’ state variables by m = {A, k, d; j} and the households’ state variables by
n = {W ; o, j}. The probability distributions of firms and households are respectively denoted by
µ(m) and ν(n).
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Labor market
The inelastic labor supply of each young household is equal to 1, while old households do not work
and therefore supply zero labor. The total aggregate labor supply LS is therefore equal to the
share of young households at steady state (exogenously determined by the retirement and death
probabilities ρ and τO). The wage has to adjust such that at each period:
LS =
ˆ
lSnν(n)dn =
ˆ
lDm(w)µ(m)dm = L
D(w) (1.82)
Alternative capital market
There is an alternative capital market for each type j, where households and firms of the same type
meet. The aggregate alternative savings Sa(q
j
a; j) from each type of household have to be equal to
the aggregate demand for alternative funding a′(qja; j) by each type of firms.
Sa(q
j
a; j) =
ˆ
n∈j
sa,n(q
j
a)ν(n)dn =
ˆ
m∈j
a′m(q
j
a)µ(m)dm = a
′(qja; j) ∀j ∈ J (1.83)
For each j, the interest rate qja adjusts to clear the market.
Bank capital markets
As before, in the baseline specification, the bank has basically no room for action. The bank accepts
the totality of the deposits supplied by the households, and grants all loans demanded by the firms
up to the collateral constraint. This implies the following equalities:
qdD =
ˆ
qdsb,n(qd)ν(n)dn = qdSb(qd) (1.84)
qB =
ˆ
qb′m(q)µ(m)dm = qb
′(q) (1.85)
The loan supply from the bank qB should be equal to the aggregate bank loan demand from the
firms qb′(q). The aggregate deposits from the households qdSb(qd) should be equal to the deposits
in the bank qdD.
Good market
The equilibrium condition is similar to the representation household case.
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1.C.4 Equilibrium definition
To the law of motion of the firms’ distribution, I now add the low of motion of the households’
distribution:
ν ′(W ′; o, j) =
ˆ
Prob(W ′ = W ′(W ; o, j)|W ; o, j)pioo′dν(W ; o, j) (1.86)
where pioo′ is the transition probability from age o to age o
′, with o, o′ ∈ {Y,O}.
The definition of the stationary equilibrium in this set-up is modified into:
Definition 1.2. A stationary equilibrium consists in policy functions a′(A, k, d; j), b′(A, k, d; j),
e′(A, k, d; j), sa(W ; o, j), sb(W ; o, j), B and D; probability distributions µ(A, k, d; j) for firms and
ν(W ; o, j) for households; and prices {w, {qja}j∈J , q, qd} ∈ R3+NJ+ such that:
1. The policy functions a′(A, k, d; j), b′(A, k, d; j) and e′(A, k, d; j) solve the firm’s program as
defined in equations (1.8) to (1.19), given w, {qja}j∈J and q;
2. The policy functions sa(W ; o, j), and sb(W ; o, j) solve the household’s program as defined in
equations (1.73) to (1.80), given w, {qja}j∈J and qd;
3. The policy functions B and L solve the bank’s program as defined in equation (1.41) given q
and qd;
4. Markets clear
5. The stationary distribution µ(A, k, d; j) is the fixed point of equation (1.49);
6. The stationary distribution ν(W ; o, j) is the fixed point of equation (1.86).
1.C.5 Calibration and results
The calibration approach is the same as the one presented in section 2.4; there are a few additional
parameters to be defined. The young and old households’ death probabilities and the retirement
probability are directly obtained from the data.
The probability of a young household to retire ρ is set to 0.025, which corresponds to an average
duration of working life of 40 years. The death probability for old households is set to match the
life expectancy of 60-year old persons in China between the years 2005 and 2010, based on the
World Population Prospects database published by the United Nations. Hence, the probability of
dying when old τO is equal to 0.05156, matching the life expectancy of 19.43 years at age 60. The
pension income of the households is calibrated to match the quantity of deposits required by banks
to be solvent in the baseline specification. I set the ratio ww = 0.48.
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Finally, the intermediation cost paid by type L households is normalized to χL = 0.0089. For H
type households, I set χH = 0.08444, and both types of households are present in the economy in
equal proportions, implying p1 = 0.5.
Results from a previous calibration are qualitatively very similar to the ones obtained in the frame-
work with a representative household.
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2 Loan officers and credit distribution
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of a shock in a commercial bank’s interest rate or refinancing cost on
the way credit is distributed among enterprises. Separating between incumbent borrowers – who
have an ongoing relationship with a bank – and newcomers – who have no previous history with
any bank, I study the differentiated impact of a credit shock on loan distribution between these
two types of borrowers. To do so, I set up a 3-period microeconomic model with a representative
bank hiring a loan officer, who is responsible to evaluate and accept or reject loan applications
from enterprises. While in the first period, the loan officer only faces one applicant, in the second
period he needs to choose whether to renew the loan of the incumbent borrower or to consider a
newcomer’s application. By inducing the bank to modify the loan officer’s compensation scheme,
the financial shock may imply a change in the loan officer’s renewal strategy in the second period.
Since the loan officer has more information on incumbent borrowers than on newcomers, he may
choose, as a response to the shock, to prioritize loans to incumbents against loans to newcomers.
This model thus builds a theoretical mechanism able to explain the fluctuations in the ability of
newcomer enterprises to obtain financial resources for their investment projects and the survival of
zombie enterprises.
67
Loan officers and credit distribution
Introduction
How does a bank change its borrower selection criteria when hit by an external shock? The present
study aims at proposing a theoretical framework to answer this question. Focusing on the simple
case of a commercial bank employing a loan officer to select projects proposed by entrepreneurs,
this paper examines the differential impact of a credit supply shock on enterprises, depending on
the quality of their project and on their relationship history with the lending bank. The underlying
idea is the following: following an external shock, commercial banks may modify their credit supply
by adjusting their decisions in terms of loan approval and renewal. This adjustment may be in
favor of incumbent borrowers or newcomers a depending on the optimal loan decisions of the loan
officer, inducing differentiated effects on enterprises. This question relates to various strands of
literature, both empirical and theoretical.
A first strand of studies tackles the role of loan officers in credit granting, and the impact of their
compensation schemes on loan approval decisions. Mostly consisting in empirical papers, there is a
growing literature showing a significant impact of the design of loan officers’ compensation schemes
on lending choices, in terms of amount lent, number of loans approved and riskiness (measured
by non-performing loans ratios). Behr et al. (2013) use panel data at the loan officer level to
show that a non-linear compensation scheme implies significant adjustment by loan officers: when
facing a high non-performing loans ratio in their portfolio (which decreases their remuneration),
loan officers spend more time for loan monitoring while decreasing loan origination and selecting
more carefully new borrowers. In a similar context, Ben-David and Agarwal (2012) show that a
variable compensation causes loan officers to approve more and larger loans, take faster decisions,
and that the default rate on those loans increases. On a slightly different note, Berg et al. (2013)
show empirically that volume-incentivized loan officers are induced to manipulate hard information
in order to get more loans approved by the bank’s credit-scoring system. On the theoretical
side, Heider and Inderst (2012) theoretically study how the incentive schemes of loan officers and
competition across banks relates to the amount of loans approved and their average quality, showing
that more competition implies more loans approved, but also a higher default rate.
Another part of the literature focuses on relationship lending and the use of soft versus hard
information in the borrower’s evaluation process. Bharath et al. (2011) show empirically that
enterprises obtain more favorable loan conditions (less collateral required, larger loans) when they
have a long-term relationship with their bank. Furthermore, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) find that
housebanks, which do more relationship lending, establish longer-term relationships with their
borrowers, and are able to provide liquidity insurance if the borrower faces a shock on his credit
rating. Studying the impact of the recent financial crisis on Italian firms, D’Aurizio et al. (2014)
find that non-family firms suffered a higher credit contraction than family firms, and relate it
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to the more extended use of soft information in loan approval decisions, which plays in favor of
family firms. Bolton et al. (2013) study empirically the ties between enterprises, relationship banks
(building a long-term relationship with their customers) and transaction banks (granting one-off
loans). They show evidence that relationship banking is more effective in mitigating business cycles,
if relationship banks enter crisis times with a sufficient excess capital cushion. To reproduce this
empirical finding, the authors construct a theoretical model with firms facing relationship- and
transaction-banks, and obtain that relationship banks charge higher interest rates and specialize
in riskier firms. Their higher capital buffers allow them to roll-over loans more often and to have
a lower non-performing loans ratio.
The model suggested in this paper is related to the evidence obtained by D’Aurizio et al. (2014):
it connects the obtention of a loan in times of crisis to the type of lending relationship between the
borrower and the bank, and to the type of information collected by the bank, which is represented
here by the loan officer. While I am interested in the loan renewal decision, my model includes
one single type of bank, and the renewal decision depends not only on the bank, but also on the
loan officer’s joint effort and renewal strategy decision. The mechanism relies therefore on the loan
officer’s change in strategy rather than on the presence of different types of banks, hence differing
from Bolton et al. (2013). The set-up presented below is closest to Vicente (2011), who studies
theoretically the use of soft information and credit scoring and its link to the type of borrowers
obtaining loans.
In this study, I set up a small-scale theoretical framework to underline the differentiated trans-
mission of a shock in a bank’s financial situation – in terms of interest rate charged on loans, or
refinancing cost – on different types of enterprises, via the easiness of access to credit. The loan offi-
cer’s decision regarding loan renewal is key to the mechanism. As it is a discrete decision (renewing
or not), it can transform a marginal change in the bank’s lending condition and the loan officer’s
compensation scheme into a discrete sizable jump in access to credit for enterprises. I show that for
some parameter’s values, a marginal increase in the interest rate charged by the bank creates such
a jump: the loan officer’s compensation scheme changes, and consequently his renewal decision
too. A one percentage point hike in the interest rate can indeed induce the loan officer to move
from a renewal strategy “renew if successful” to a renewal strategy “always renew”. While the
first strategy leaves some opportunities for newcomer enterprises to obtain a loan if the incumbent
defaulted on their previous loan, the second strategy implies that a newcomer enterprise has no
chance to see its loan application successful, even if the incumbent borrower did not reimburse.
This creates a strong and differentiated modification of access to credit for the two types of enter-
prises – newcomers and incumbent. At a more general macroeconomic level, such a mechanism can
contribute to explain the variations in easiness to credit access across time and enterprises types.
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The next section presents the model’s general set-up. The model is then solved by backward
induction, first detailing the loan officer program in section 2.2, then the bank’s program in section
2.3 and showing calibrated examples in section 2.4.
2.1 Set-up
I consider here a set-up with 3 different agents: the entrepreneur (or borrower), the loan officer
and the bank. The entrepreneur has a project and a certain success probability, and needs to
borrow from the bank to implement this project. Bank loans are granted at a fixed interest rate set
exogenously, and the bank is a price-taker on the financial markets. The bank hires the loan officer
to study the entrepreneur’s loan application and to decide to grant a loan or not. In the model,
this implies that the loan officer has to exert some effort in order to obtain a signal regarding the
quality of the borrower, according to which he decides whether to grant the loan or not. The bank
chooses the compensation scheme of the loan officer in order to maximize its profit, while offering
to the loan officer high enough incentives not to shirk. More precisely, the model has 3 periods
with the following timing:
• t = 1: The loan officer meets a randomly drawn borrower, exerts some effort, obtains a signal
regarding the borrower’s type and decides to grant a loan or not.
• t = 2: The outcome of the first loan (if any) is known and the loan officer decides whether to
renew the loan, or to draw a new borrower.
• t = 3: The outcome of the second loan is known, the loan officer is paid by the bank according
to his compensation scheme and the bank’s profits or losses are realized.
Figure 2.1: Time-line of the model
Period 1
e1
decision
signal s
draw
loan
acceptance
decision
Period 2
loan 1
outcome
renewal
decision
e2 decision
if no renewal
Period 3
loan 2
outcome
pay-off
realization
This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The bank’s objective is to maximize its profit, by granting loans
only to good-type borrowers. To do so, it hires the loan officer and offers him a compensation
scheme that depends on the outcome of the loans granted. The objective of the loan officer is to
maximize his expected utility, by deciding optimally how much effort to exert in period 1, whether
to renew or not the loan to the incumbent borrower in period 2 and how much effort to exert in
period 2 if not renewing.
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The refinancing cost of the bank does not appear explicitly. However, it is more broadly contained
in the interest rate charged on loans by the bank. Indeed, what matters in the bank’s program is
the difference between the refinancing cost and the loan interest rate. Normalizing the refinancing
cost to zero, a change in the resulting loan interest rate can then be interpreted either as an interest
rate shock, or as a shock in the refinancing cost.
In this set-up, I consider a single representative bank, hiring a single loan officer who can grant one
loan per period. The bank has all negotiation power to split the surplus between the loan officer
and itself, as long as the loan officer faces only limited liability. It will therefore aim at maximizing
its profit while giving the lowest possible compensation to the loan officer, provided that he still
has incentives to work and exerts optimal effort. Given that a loan officer can only spend a limited
amount of time working per day, it does not seem unrealistic to allow him to grant only a limited
and fixed number of loans per period – here, I normalized it to one loan per period.
For tractability, I make simplifying assumptions regarding the following elements:
• the borrower’s type: The borrower’s type reflects the quality of his project and entrepreneur
skills, and corresponds to his probability of success. It is fixed across time, so that a specific
borrower remains of the same type over the three periods. I further assume that the type is
discrete, and can take two values: high and low. The project of a high type borrower has a
positive net present value (NPV) and is worth being financed, while the project of the low
type borrower has a negative NPV and should not be financed.
• asymmetric information: The borrower knows his type, but neither the loan officer nor the
bank can observe the borrower’s type. Hence the necessity for the bank to hire a loan officer,
who will exert some (costly) effort to obtain a noisy signal regarding the borrower’s type. The
bank knows whether the loan officer has granted a loan or not, and can observe the outcome
of that loan, but it observes neither the signal received by the loan officer nor the loan officer’s
renewal decision in period 2.
• the signal : the signal obtained by the loan officer is discrete too, and takes 2 values, high or
low. The precision of the signal increases when the loan officer exerts more effort.
• limited liability and the bank’s contract : if the project of a borrower fails, he obtains zero
and defaults on his loan. The borrower has no collateral to pledge. Good type projects net
present value is positive, so the bank can charge an interest rate high enough to cover the
default risk, and still give a positive expected pay-off to the borrower. Bad type projects
NPV is negative, so that if the bank charges a high enough interest rate to break even, the
expected pay-off of the bad type borrower is negative, and he prefers not to borrow. Bad type
projects are not worth being implemented from an aggregate welfare point of view, but given
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that the borrower is subject to limited liability only, his expected pay-off is always positive if
he borrows through the good type’s contract.1
• the discount factor : the discount factors of all agents are set to 1 for simplicity.
Let me now define some notations. The borrower’s type is denoted θ ∈ {θ, θ}, where 0 > θ > θ < 1,
meaning that a θ-type borrower has a higher success probability than a θ-type borrower. The signal
s the loan officer obtains takes its value from {s, s}. The effort exerted by the loan officer is e1 in
period 1, and e2 in period 2.
The distribution of the signal s and its informativeness depend on the effort exerted by the loan
officer, and consist in the probability of obtaining either a high or low signal, given the borrower’s
true type and the effort exerted. Since the signal is discrete and can take only two different values,
we only need to specify the probabilities P (s|θ; e) and P (s|θ; e) to know the complete distribution
of s given effort e. Some more assumptions are needed to guarantee that the set-up makes sense.
Assumption 2.1 ensures that the signal is informative, while Assumption 2.2 implies that effort is
rewarding for the loan officer. Assumption 2.3 is a simplifying assumption implying that low and
high signals have the same precision.
Assumption 2.1. P (s|θ; e) ≥ P (s|θ; e) with a strict inequality when e > 0, which is equivalent to
P (s|θ; e) ≤ P (s|θ; e) or to P (s|θ; e) ≥ 0.5 and P (s|θ; e) ≥ 0.5.
Assumption 2.2. ∂P (s|θ;e)∂e > 0 and
∂P (s|θ;e)
∂e > 0. This implies that if the loan officer exerts more
effort, he increases P (s|θ; e) and P (s|θ; e) and obtains a more precise signal.
Assumption 2.3. The signal’s distribution conditional on type verifies the following property:
P (s|θ; e) = P (s|θ; e) = P (e), so that a positive and a negative signal have the same informational
content if obtained by exerting the same amount of effort, and effort has the same impact on both
P (s|θ; e) and P (s|θ; e).
The effort exerted by the loan officer is costly, and the cost function is denoted c(e). Assumption
2.4 imposes that the cost function is convex and positive, while Assumption 2.5 makes sure that
the utility function is concave.
Assumption 2.4. The cost function verifies the following properties: c(e) ≥ 0, c′(e) ≥ 0 and
c′′(e) ≥ 0.
1If there were unlimited liability, or the possibility to pledge collateral, the bank would be able to design a contract
mechanism that achieves a separating equilibrium in which only good types want to borrow. With limited liability
and no collateral, there is no possibility of a separating equilibrium and the bank has to hire a loan officer to
screen applicants.
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Assumption 2.5. The utility function has the following properties: u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0.
In periods 2 and 3, the loan officer’s compensation scheme depends on the following three possible
outcomes:
• no loan is granted, the loan officer obtain y;
• a loan is granted but is not successful, the loan officer obtains b;
• a loan is granted and is successfully reimbursed, the loan officer obtains g.
It is easy to show that, for the loan officer incentives to be sensible, the bank optimally sets
b ≤ y ≤ g. Limited liability further implies that b, y, g ≥ 0. Given this general set-up, we can now
turn to the loan officer’s program.
2.2 The program of the loan officer
The loan officer chooses how much effort to exert (in order to obtain a more or less precise signal of
the borrower’s type), and whether to grant a loan or not. As mentioned above, he has the following
compensation scheme for each loan decision: {y, b, g}. The loan officer obtains y if he does not
grant a loan; when he grants a loan, he obtains b if the borrower defaults and g if the borrower
reimburses. Given this compensation scheme, the loan officer has three decisions to make:
• How much effort e1 to exert in period 1, when considering the loan application of a newcomer;
• Whether to renew the loan to the incumbent or to consider the loan application of a newcomer
in period 2, given the result of the first loan granted in period 1;
• How much effort e2 to exert in period 2, if considering the loan application of a newcomer.
This problem is best written and solved backwards. Subsections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 describe the loan
officer’s optimization step by step, before including it into the bank’s program.
2.2.1 Effort decision in period 2, when drawing a new borrower
I analyse here the situation of a loan officer who has decided to draw a new borrower in period 2 and
needs to determine how much effort e2 he wants to exert. Considering that the loan officer approves
the loan application when obtaining a good signal, and rejects the loan application otherwise, his
maximization program is as follows:
max
e2
E(UN (e2)) = u(g)P (s; e2)E(θ|s; e2) + u(b)P (s; e2)(1− E(θ|s; e2)) + u(y)P (s; e2)− c(e2)
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Given the signal received s and effort exerted e, it is easy to compute the probability to face a high
type or a low type is using Bayes’ rule:
P (θ|s; e) = P (s|θ; e)P (θ)
P (s|θ; e)P (θ) + P (s|θ; e)P (θ)
P (θ|s; e) = P (s|θ; e)P (θ)
P (s|θ; e)P (θ) + P (s|θ; e)P (θ)
The probability that the loan will be repaid, conditional on the effort exerted e and the signal
received s, is then:
P (loan repaid|s; e) = Eθ(θ|s; e)
= θP (θ|s; e) + θP (θ|s; e)
=
θP (s|θ; e)P (θ) + θP (s|θ; e)P (θ)
P (s|θ; e)P (θ) + P (s|θ; e)P (θ)
To simplify notations, I further denote:
P (s|θ; e) = P (s|θ; e) = P (e)
δ = P (θ)− P (θ)
∆ = θP (θ)− θP (θ)
∆2 = θ
2
P (θ)− θ2P (θ)
We can finally note that:
P (s; e) = P (e)(P (θ)− P (θ)) + P (θ)
= P (e)δ + P (θ)
P (s; e)Eθ(θ|s; e) = θP (s|θ; e)P (θ) + θP (s|θ; e)P (θ)
= P (e)∆ + θP (θ)
Using these additional notations, it is possible to rewrite the loan officer’s period 2 effort maxi-
mization program as:
max
e2
E(UN (e2)) = u(g)(P (e2)∆ + θP (θ)) + u(b)(P (e2)δ + P (θ)− P (e2)∆− θP (θ)) + u(y)(P (θ)− P (e2)δ)− c(e2)
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The corresponding first order condition with respect to e2 is then:
P ′(e∗2)[∆(u(g)− u(b)) + δ(u(b)− u(y))] = c′(e∗2) (2.1)
where e∗2 is defined as the optimal effort choice. Note that if the loan officer exerts zero effort, the
signal is uninformative and it comes down to randomly approving or rejecting the loan application.
If the loan officer always grants or never grants the loan independently of the signal obtained, then
he has no incentives to make any effort. In these cases, his expected utility becomes:
E(UN ) =

u(y) if never grants the loan
E(θ)u(g) + (1− E(θ))u(b) if always grants the loan
1
2(u(g)E(θ) + u(b)(1− E(θ))) + 12u(y) if randomizes
This defines the participation constraints (2.2) to (2.4) that will be part of the bank’s optimization
program:
E(UN (e∗2)) ≥ u(y) (2.2)
E(UN (e∗2)) ≥ E(θ)u(g) + (1− E(θ))u(b) (2.3)
E(UN (e∗2)) ≥
1
2
(u(g)E(θ) + u(b)(1− E(θ))) + 1
2
u(y) (2.4)
Note that constraint (2.4) is a combination of constraints (2.2) and (2.3), therefore it is redundant
can be dropped.
2.2.2 Loan officer’s renewal decision in period 2
At the beginning of period 2, the loan officer decides if he prefers to renew the loan to the incumbent
borrower (knowing the outcome of the previous loan) or to consider the loan application of a
newcomer. If taking the application of a newcomer, as we just saw in subsection 2.2.1, he obtains
a constant expected utility equal to:
E(UN (e∗2)) = u(g)(P (e∗2)∆ + θP (θ)) + u(b)(P (e∗2)δ + P (θ)− P (e∗2)∆− θP (θ)) + u(y)(P (θ)− P (e∗2)δ)− c(e∗2)
If renewing the loan to the incumbent, the loan officer does not exert any effort in period 2 and
his expected utility depends on the outcome of the first loan. The cases where the loan officer has
received a good signal in period 1 are the only cases relevant here, since after receiving a bad signal
in period 1 the loan officer does not grant any first period loan, and has no renewal opportunity in
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period 2. The loan officer’s expected utility in case of renewal is:
E(UI |l1r, s; e1) = E(θ|l1r, s; e1)u(g) + (1− E(θ|l1r, s; e1))u(b) if 1st loan reimbursed
E(UI |l1d, s; e1) = E(θ|l1d, s; e1)u(g) + (1− E(θ|l1d, s; e1))u(b) if 1st loan defaulted
which can be written as:
E(UI |l1r, s; e1) = P (e1)∆2 + θ
2P (θ)
P (e1)∆ + θP (θ)
(u(g)− u(b)) + u(b) (2.5)
E(UI |l1d, s; e1) = P (e1)(∆−∆2) + θ(1− θ)P (θ)
P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ) (u(g)− u(b)) + u(b) (2.6)
As mentioned earlier, I assume that the bank can only observe the outcome of the loan, and does
not know if the loan is given by the loan officer to a newcomer or an incumbent. Consequently,
the compensation scheme {y, b, g} is the same in both cases. To make his decision, the loan officer
compares his expected utility in both cases.
It is not possible to analytically determine which of E(UN (e∗2)), E(UI |l1r, s; e1) and E(UI |l1d, s; e1)
is larger. However, it is possible to characterize the renewal decision of the loan officer, conditioning
on his effort level in period 1. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, Proposition 2.1 specifies the loan officer’s
renewal decision in period 2, given his choice of effort in period 1. It shows the existence of two
effort thresholds e1 and e1 that determine the loan officer’s renewal decision, depending on the
effort e1 previously exerted in period 1. Proposition 2.2 defines more specifically the values of these
thresholds, depending on the parameters of the model and the compensation schemes.
Proposition 2.1. There exist two thresholds (e1, e1) ∈ R2+ such that:
• if e1 ≤ e1, the loan officer never renews the loan granted to the incumbent;
• if e1 ≤ e1 ≤ e1, the loan officer renews the loan only if the incumbent was successful, and does
not renew if the incumbent defaulted;
• if e1 ≤ e1, the loan officer always renews the loan granted to the incumbent.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
Figure 2.1: Period 1 effort and renewal decision
0
never renews
e1
renews if good outcome
e1
always renews
e1
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Depending on the values of the model’s parameters and on the compensation scheme, one or the
two thresholds e1, e1 may be equal to zero or to +∞. In this case, only one or two decision areas
in Figure 2.1 may remain feasible. This is stated in Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.2. Depending the parameter values and the loan officer’s compensation scheme
{y, b, g}, the thresholds (e1, e1) take the following values:
• when E(UN (e∗2)) > lime1→+∞ E(UI |l1r, s; e1), then e1 = e1 = +∞;
• when E(UI |l1r, s; e1 = 0) ≤ E(UN (e∗2)) ≤ lime1→+∞ E(UI |l1r, s; e1), then (e1, e1) ∈ (0,+∞)2.
The exact values of both thresholds are defined by:
P (e1) = θP (θ)
E(UN (e∗2))− u(b)− θ(u(g)− u(b))
∆2(u(g)− u(b))−∆(E(UN (e∗2))− u(b))
P (e1) = (1− θ)P (θ) E(UN (e
∗
2))− u(b)− θ(u(g)− u(b))
(∆−∆2)(u(g)− u(b))− (δ −∆)(E(UN (e∗2))− u(b))
• when E(UI |l1d, s; e1 = 0) < E(UN (e∗2)) < E(UI |l1r, s; e1 = 0), then e1 = 0 and e1 ∈ (0,+∞).
The value of the threshold e1 is defined by:
P (e1) = (1− θ)P (θ) E(UN (e
∗
2))− u(b)− θ(u(g)− u(b))
(∆−∆2)(u(g)− u(b))− (δ −∆)(E(UN (e∗2))− u(b))
• when E(UN (e∗2)) < E(UI |l1d, s; e1 = 0), then e1 = e1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
Given this characterization of the loan officer’s decision in period 2 regarding loan renewal and
optimal effort e∗2, I can go backwards and solve for the loan officer’s optimal effort decision e∗1 in
period 1.
2.2.3 Loan officer’s decision in period 1
Going further backwards, given the optimal decisions e∗2 and the corresponding thresholds e1 and
e1, the total expected utility of the loan officer at the beginning of the first period is:
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E(U(e1)) =P (s|e1)
(
u(y)− c(e1) + E(UN (e∗2))
)
+ P (s|e1)
(
E(θ|s; e1)
[
u(g)− c(e1) + 1(e1 > e1)E(UI |l1r, s; e1)
+ 1(e1 < e1)E(UN (e∗2))
]
+ (1− E(θ|s; e1))
[
u(b)− c(e1) + 1(e1 > e1)E(UI |l1d, s; e1)
+1(e1 < e1)E(UN (e∗2))
])
where 1(.) is a dummy variable. The loan officer’s objective is to maximize this expected utility
function with respect to effort e1, given his compensation scheme and the model’s parameters. It
is useful to note that the optimal effort e∗2 only depends on the compensation scheme {y, b, g}, the
success probabilities θ and θ, their distribution and the signal’s distribution. The same is true for
the thresholds e1 and e1. As a consequence, e
∗
2, e1 and e1 are constants with respect to e1, which
simplifies the optimization computation.
Because of the presence of the dummy variables, the expression for the total utility of the loan
officer is generally not differentiable with respect to e1 at the following points: e1 = e1 and e1 = e1,
where the dummy variables jump. We can however differentiate the total utility separately for the
three cases (i) e1 < e1, (ii) e1 < e1 < e1 and (iii) e1 < e1.
Case where e1 < e1: never renewing the loan to the incumbent
The total expected utility of the loan officer in that case is:
E(U(e1)) =P (s|e1)
(
u(y)− c(e1) + E(UN (e∗2))
)
+ P (s|e1)
(
E(θ|s; e1)
[
u(g)− c(e1) + E(UN (e∗2))
]
+ (1− E(θ|s; e1))
[
u(b)− c(e1) + E(UN (e∗2))
])
=E(UN (e1)) + E(UN (e∗2))
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The first order condition for e1 is then the same as for e2:
c′(e(a)1 ) = P
′(e(a)1 )[∆(u(g)− u(b)) + δ(u(b)− u(y))] (2.7)
Equation (2.7) defines the optimal choice of period 1 effort e
(a)
1 , conditional on e
(a)
1 being smaller
than e1. It is important to note that if e
(a)
1 as defined by equation (2.7) is larger than e1, then it
has to be equal to e1.
Case where e1 < e1 < e1: renewing the loan if the incumbent was successful in period 1
The total expected utility of the loan officer is then :
E(U(e1)) =P (s|e1)
(
u(y)− c(e1) + E(UN (e∗2))
)
+ P (s|e1)
(
E(θ|s; e1)
[
u(g)− c(e1) + E(UI |l1r, s; e1)
]
+ (1− E(θ|s; e1))
[
u(b)− c(e1) + E(UN (e∗2))
])
And the first order condition with respect to e1 is:
P ′(e(b)1 )
(
(∆ + ∆2)u(g) + (δ −∆2)u(b)− δu(y)−∆E(UN (e∗2))
)
= c′(e(b)1 ) (2.8)
Equation (2.8) defines the optimal choice of effort e
(b)
1 in the case where e
(b)
1 ∈ (e1, e1). Here again,
if e
(b)
1 is outside the interval (e1, e1), it has to be equal the interval’s closest bound.
Case where e1 > e1: always renewing the loan to the incumbent
In this case, the total expected utility of the loan officer is:
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E(U(e1)) =P (s|e1)
(
u(y)− c(e1) + E(UN (e∗2))
)
+ P (s|e1)
(
E(θ|s; e1)
[
u(g)− c(e1) + E(UI |l1r, s; e1)
]
+ (1− E(θ|s; e1))
[
u(b)− c(e1) + E(UI |l1d, s; e1)
])
The first order condition with respect to e1 is then:
P ′(e(c)1 )
(
2∆u(g) + (2δ − 2∆)u(b)− δu(y)− δE(UN (e∗2))
)
= c′(e(c)1 )
Similarly to the previous cases, if e
(c)
1 is smaller than e1, it has to be equal to e1. After computing the
optimal values of e
(a)
1 , e
(b)
1 , e
(c)
1 and the corresponding values E(U(e
(a)
1 ), E(U(e
(b)
1 ) and E(U(e
(c)
1 ) for
each of the three above cases, the loan officer will choose the renewing strategy and corresponding
effort e∗1 that provides him with the highest expected utility. This defines the optimal effort of
period 1 as:
e∗1 = argmaxe1∈(e(a)1 ,e(b)1 ,e(c)1 )
E(U(e1))
This completes the task of solving for the loan officer’s program and optimal decisions, given
his compensation scheme and the model’s parameters. Although it is not possible to obtain an
analytical solution, this section allows us to understand better the determinants of the loan officer’s
effort and renewal decisions. Given this decision, we can now turn to the bank’s program.
2.3 The program of the bank
As explained earlier, the objective of this work is to study how a change in the bank’s refinancing
cost impacts differently the access to credit of incumbent and newcomer enterprises. Having in
mind the main elements guiding the loan officer’s renewal decision, I can look at the bank’s profit
maximization, and analyze how a change in the bank’s refinancing condition may impact the
compensation scheme offered by the bank to the loan officer, and then may imply a change in the
renewal decision of the loan officer.
It is useful to first write the bank’s expected profit at each period. In the first period, with a
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newcomer borrower the bank’s expected profit is:
E(ΠN1) = (r − g)(P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))
+ (−1− b)(P (e1)δ + P (θ)− P (e1)∆− θP (θ))
− y(P (θ)− P (e1)δ)
In the second period, if the loan officer renews the loan to the incumbent borrower, the bank’s
expected profit is, conditional on the first loan’s outcome:
E(Π2|l1o) = E(ΠI |l1o, s; e1) = (r − g)P (l2r|l1o, s; e1) + (−1− b)P (l2d|l1o, s; e1)
where l1o stands for “first loan outcome”, l2r for “successful reimbursment of the second loan”
and l2d for “default on the second loan”. Finally, if the loan officer does not renew the loan in the
second period, the bank’s expected profit becomes:
E(Π2) = E(ΠN2) = (r − g)(P (e2)∆ + θP (θ))
+ (−1− b)(P (e2)δ + P (θ)− P (e2)∆− θP (θ))
− y(P (θ)− P (e2)δ)
Combining the above equations, I can write the total profit of the bank, and its maximization
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program is then:
max
y,g,b,e1e2
E(ΠR) = P (s|e1)
{
− y + P (s|e2)(E(θ|s; e2)(r − g) + (1− E(θ|s; e2))(−1− b)) + P (s|e2)(−y)
}
+ P (s|e1)
{
E(θ|s; e1)
[
(r − g) + 1(e1 > e1)
(
E(θ|l1r, s; e1)(r − g)
+(1− E(θ|l1r, s; e1))(−1− b)
)
+ 1(e1 < e1)
(
P (s : e2)E(θ|s; e2)(r − g)
+(1− E(θ|s; e2))(−1− b) + P (s|e2)(−y)
)]
+ (1− E(θ|s; e1))
[
−1− b
+1(e1 > e1)
(
E(θ|l1d, s; e1)(r − g) + (1− E(θ|l1d, s; e1))(−1− b)
)
+1(e1 < e1)
(
P (s|e2)E(θ|s; e2)(r − g) + (1− E(θ|s; e2))(−1− b) + P (s; e2)(−y)
)]}
s.t.
c′(e2) = P ′(e2)[∆(u(g)− u(b)) + δ(u(b)− u(y))] (IC1)
c′(e1) = P ′(e1)[∆(u(g)− u(b)) + δ(u(b)− u(y))] (IC2a)
c′(e1) = P ′(e1)
(
(∆ + ∆2)u(g) + (δ −∆2)u(b)− δu(y)−∆E(UN (e2))
)
(IC2b)
c′(e1) = P ′(e1)
(
2∆u(g) + (2δ − 2∆)u(b)− δu(y)− δE(UN (e2))
)
(IC2c)
E(U(e1)) ≥ u(y) + E(UN (e2)) (IC3)
E(UN (e2)) ≥ u(y) (IC4)
E(U(e1)) ≥ u(g)E(θ) + u(b)(1− E(θ)) + max{E(UI |l1o, e1 = 0),E(UN (e2))} (IC5)
E(UN (e2)) ≥ u(g)E(θ) + u(b)(1− E(θ)) (IC6)
The constraints can be explained as follows. Constraint (IC1) corresponds to the first order con-
dition of the loan officer’s program defining the optimal effort e∗2. Constraints (IC2a), (IC2b), and
(IC2c) respectively correspond to the first order conditions of the loan officer’s program with re-
spect to e1. Only one applies at a time, depending on the relative value of e1 and the thresholds e1,
e1: (IC2a) if e1 < e1, (IC2b) if e1 < e1 < e1 and (IC2c) if e1 > e1. Finally, the last four constraints
are participation constraints ensuring that the loan officer has an interest in exerting some effort
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and does not prefer to shirk by never or always granting the loan, or by randomizing the loan
acceptance decision. The participation constraints for randomizing in period 1 and in period 2 are
redundant and have been dropped.
Proposition 2.3 states that for all utility functions such that u(0) > −∞, b is optimally set to 0 to
maximize the profit of the bank, implying that the loan officer receives zero compensation if the
loan he granted is not reimbursed. For utility functions such that u(0) = −∞, there is no solution,
unless we add to the problem an outside option for the loan officer, with a minimum utility the
bank has to guaranty him, which sets a lower bound to the compensation the loan officer receives.
I will further assume that u(0) > −∞, which implies b∗ = 0.
Assumption 2.6. The loan officer’s utility function is such that u(0) > −∞.
Proposition 2.3. Under assumption 2.6, the component b of the compensation scheme is optimally
set to zero by the bank to maximize its profit.
Proof. See Appendix 2.C.
Proposition 2.3 simplifies substantially the bank’s problem by reducing its decision variables to the
two elements of the loan officer’s compensation scheme, y and g. Hence the bank’s program can be
written in a more parsimonious way as follows:
max
y,g
E(ΠR) = P (s|e∗1)
{
− y + P (s|e∗2)(E(θ|s; e∗2)(r − g)− (1− E(θ|s; e∗2)))− P (s|e∗2)y
}
+ P (s|e∗1)
{
E(θ|s; e∗1)
[
(r − g) + 1(e∗1 > e1)
(
E(θ|l1r, s; e∗1)(r − g)
−(1− E(θ|l1r, s; e∗1))
)
+ 1(e∗1 < e1)
(
P (s : e∗2)E(θ|s; e∗2)(r − g)
−(1− E(θ|s; e∗2))− P (s|e∗2)y
)]
+ (1− E(θ|s; e∗1))
[
−1
+1(e∗1 > e1)
(
E(θ|l1d, s; e∗1)(r − g)− (1− E(θ|l1d, s; e∗1))
)
+1(e∗1 < e1)
(
P (s|e∗2)E(θ|s; e∗2)(r − g)− (1− E(θ|s; e∗2))− P (s; e∗2)y
)]}
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s.t.
e∗1, e
∗
2 solve the loan officer’s program
E(U(e∗1)) ≥ u(y) + E(UN (e∗2)) never loan period 1
E(UN (e∗2)) ≥ u(y) never loan period 2
E(U(e∗1)) ≥ u(g)E(θ) + u(0)(1− E(θ)) + max{E(UI |l1o, e1 = 0),E(UN (e∗2))} always loan period 1
E(UN (e∗2)) ≥ u(g)E(θ) + u(0)(1− E(θ)) always loan period 2
This simplified version of the bank’s problem remains analytically untractable, and the first order
conditions with respect to y and g cannot be easily analytically computed. Obvious reasons for this
situation are the length the expression to optimize and the number of constraints. As stated for the
loan officer’s program, the expression for expected profits is not differentiable at the jumps of the
dummy variables, when e1 equals one of the two decision thresholds e1 and e1. More specifically, the
fact that y and g influence not only e∗1 and e∗2, but also the thresholds e1 and e1 renders these jumps
difficult to locate, and forbids to divide the bank’s program into smaller, differentiable problems.
To be able to study this problem further, it is useful to specify more precisely the cost and the
probability functions, and to define parameter values. This is done in the next section.
2.4 Parameterization and results
Since the aim of this paper is to illustrate the functioning of a theoretical credit distribution
mechanism, the parameterization I suggest here is simply an example of the potential effects of this
mechanism, in terms of access to credit for newcomer and incumbent enterprises. The parameter
values shown here allow us to study the effect at stake. The lack of data describing not only on
successful loan applications, but also on unsuccessful applications, renders a more precise calibration
difficult to implement2.
First, the effort cost function c(.), the loan officer utility function u(.) and the signal distribution
given effort e need to be specified. I use the following functional forms:
c(e) =
a
2
e2
u(c) = c1/8
P (e) = − 1
e+ 2
+ 1
2Such a calibration could be a path for future research, if precise enough data can be obtained.
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It is easy to check that these functions have the required properties. I further define the following
parameter values:
θ = 0.9
θ = 0.2
P (θ) = 0.8
a = 20−7
With these specified functions, for each value of the interest rate r, I can solve for the optimal effort
e∗2 using equation (IC1), and for thresholds e1, e1 as defined in Proposition 2.2 as functions of the
compensation scheme {y, b, g}. I then deduce optimal effort e∗1, given the compensation scheme.
Finally, I solve numerically for the bank’s maximization program, thus determining the optimal
compensation scheme {y∗, b∗, g∗}. Going back to the loan officer’s decision, this defines the actual
effort and renewal strategies he applies.
Given this calibration, a change in the interest rate r that the bank charges on the borrower implies
a change in the optimal compensation scheme of the loan officer, and induces a change in the loan
officer’s best renewal strategy. This is shown in Figure 2.1, which shows the expected utility of the
loan officer, given the optimal compensation scheme decided by the bank, if he never renews the
loan (dashed line), if he always renews the loan (solid line) and if he renews the loan only after a
successful first loan. On the left-hand-side of the graph, the loan officer’s preferred strategy is to
renew only if the 1st loan was successful, while on the right-hand-side (when r ≥ 12.2%), he always
renews. Figure 2.2 complements Figure 2.1 by showing the optimal amount of effort e∗1 decided by
the loan officer in period 1: given the evolution of the thresholds e1 and e1, this effort implies either
to always renew the loan (when the interest rate is above 12.2%) or to renew only for successful
borrowers (when the interest rate is below 12.2%).
There is a clear threshold effect in the optimal strategy of the bank and the loan officer. When the
interest rate r charged by the bank is equal to 12%, the bank maximizes its profit by setting the
compensation scheme of the loan officer at: {g, y} = {5.8430× 10−5, 1.2856× 10−5}. This implies
that the optimal efforts decided by the loan officer in period 1 and 2 respectively are:
e∗1 = 92.5264
e∗2 = 86.4209
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Figure 2.1: Expected utility for various renewal strategies, depending on interest rate r
Figure 2.2: Thresholds e1 and e1, and optimal choice for e
∗
1 depending on interest rate r
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The thresholds for the renewal strategies are in that case:
e1 = 0.3434
e1 = 101.1005
Hence, in period 2, the loan officer optimally chooses to renew only the borrower that successfully
reimbursed his first loan. In case of default on the first loan, the loan officer prefers to consider the
loan application of a newcomer.
If the interest rate r changes to 13%, keeping all other parameters stable, the compensation scheme
chosen by the bank becomes {g, y} = {9.0778× 10−5, 2.6711× 10−6}. The corresponding levels of
effort chosen by the loan officer and the thresholds for the renewal strategies are:
e∗1 = 117.1512
e∗2 = 100.7406
e1 = 0
e1 = 40.3432
In that situation, the loan officer optimally chooses to exert much more effort in period 1, learning
the borrower’s type with less uncertainty, and then to always renew the loan to the incumbent
borrower, regardless of the outcome of the first loan. A newcomer in period 2 has therefore no
chance to see his loan application accepted, and the entrance possibilities in period 2 are more
scarce than they were when the interest rate was set at 12%.
This decision process is illustrated graphically on Figures 2.3 to 2.6. Figure 2.3 represents the choice
of effort in period 2 when r = 12%. The blue solid line shows the period 2 expected utility of the loan
officer, when not renewing, depending on effort e2. The black dashed line shows the participation
constraint corresponding to the expected utility obtained by the loan officer in period 2 when not
exerting effort and never granting the loan (equation (IC4)). Similarly, the black dashed-dotted
line represents the level of expected utility when not exerting effort and always granting the loan
(equation (IC6)). Clearly, when exerting the optimal level of effort e∗2, the loan officer maximizes
his expected utility and obtains a higher expected utility level than when not exerting any effort.
The optimal choice of effort in period 1, e∗1, is shown on Figure 2.4. The thick black solid line
represents the loan officer’s total expected utility for both periods. For effort levels e1 ≤ e1, it
overlaps with the blue solid curve, which shows expected utility when never renewing the loan in
period 2. Since e1 is very close to zero, this is not visible on the graph. For effort levels e1 ∈ (e1, e1),
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Figure 2.3: Optimal choice for e∗2 when r = 12%
the total expected utility overlaps with the thin black curve representing expected utility when only
renewing successful borrowers. Finally, for effort levels e1 ≥ e1, the total expected utility curve
corresponds to the solid red line, which is the expected utility when always renewing the loan to
the incumbent borrower. Dotted lines represent the additional participation constraints (equations
(IC3) and (IC5)). As seen on the graph, the optimal level of effort in period 1 is in the interval
(e1, e1), and therefore the loan officer optimally applies the following renewal strategy: renew the
loan to the incumbent borrower only if period 1’s loan has been successful, otherwise consider the
application of a newly drawn potential borrower.
Similarly, Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the optimal choice of effort in both periods when r = 13%.
Given this different interest rate, the bank changes the compensation scheme it offers to the loan
officer in order to maximize its profit. Given this new compensation scheme, the choice of period 2
effort e∗2 is illustrated in Figure 2.5, and is not too far from the case where r = 12%. However, period
1’s optimal effort is higher when the interest rate r is higher, as shown on Figure 2.6. Combined to
the strong decrease of both thresholds e1 and e1, it results in a change in the loan officer’s renewal
strategy. Indeed, in this situation, the loan officer optimally decides to always renew the loan of
the incumbent borrower, regardless of the success of his previous loan.
This example illustrates well how a seemingly marginal change in the bank’s borrowing and lending
conditions (like an interest rate increase from 12% to 13%) can have an amplified impact on the
way credit is distributed across incumbent borrowers and newcomers. With the lower interest rate,
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Figure 2.4: Optimal choice for e∗1 when r = 12%
Figure 2.5: Optimal choice for e∗2 when r = 13%
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Figure 2.6: Optimal choice for e∗1 when r = 13%
newcomers may obtain a loan in period 2 if the incumbent borrower performed badly, as loan
officers prefer no to renew loans to unsuccessful incumbents. On the opposite, with the higher
interest rate, newcomers have no chance to see their loan application considered for acceptance,
since the loan officer prefers to always renew its loan to the incumbent borrower.
Although this is a very small scale model, the mechanism it contains may have important impli-
cations at the aggregate level, by influencing the easiness of creating a new enterprise, and the
distribution of enterprises across old and new businesses. The change in the bank’s interest rate
can be interpreted more broadly: for instance, in a perfect competition set-up, a modification of
the refinancing cost the bank faces on the international financial markets could cause such a change
in the interest rate, by forcing the bank to charge a higher – or lower – interest rate on loans.
Conclusion
This study suggests a small-scale theoretical set-up underlining the differentiated transmission of
a shock in a bank’s financial situation – in terms of interest rate charged on loans, or refinancing
cost – on different types of enterprises, via the easiness of access to credit. The mechanism at stake
goes through the optimal decisions of a loan officer, who is responsible for selecting, accepting
or rejecting loan applications. When facing a change in its refinancing cost, the bank adjusts its
compensation scheme for the loan officer, who in turn modifies his optimal effort and loan renewal
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strategy. At the end of the logical chain, incumbent and newcomer enterprises obtain a relaxed or
tighter access to credit, even if nothing in their idiosyncratic credit-worthiness has changed.
The model presented here is fairly stylized: a single representative bank, hiring a single loan officer
who can decide whether to grant a unique loan per period. However, the effects obtained should
be valid considering a loan officer with a fixed number of loans to grant3.
The implications of the transmission mechanism are broader than its simple microeconomic set-
up. It suggests a potential explanation for the accumulation of so-called “zombies”, enterprises
obtaining cheap loan renewals even if not viable. It can also explain the changes in the easiness
to obtain financial resources for newly created enterprises, by contrast with incumbent ones. It
thus provides some theoretical foundation for the empirical findings regarding relationship lending
and borrowing conditions. Including this set-up within a more general macroeconomic framework
would allow to estimate the quantitative implications of this mechanism.
3In this set-up, the loan officer has funds to grant only a single loan per period. This could be extended to a fixed
number of loans, granted or not to a fixed number of loan applications. This should not modify the qualitative
mechanism presented, but would reduce analytical tractability.
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Appendix
2.A Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Considering all parameters and the compensation scheme as fixed, E(UI |l1r, s; e1) and
E(UI |l1d, s; e1) are increasing functions of e1:
∂E(UI |l1r, s; e1)
∂e1
=
P ′(e1)θθP (θ)P (θ)(θ − θ)
(P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))2
(u(g)− u(b)) > 0
∂E(UI |l1d, s; e1)
∂e1
=
P ′(e1)(1− θ)(1− θ)P (θ)P (θ)(θ − θ)
(P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ))2 (u(g)− u(b)) > 0
The minimum of E(UI |l1r, s; e1) and E(UI |l1d, s; e1) is reached when e1 = 0, while their maximum
is reached when e1 = +∞, and their values are:
E(UI |l1r, s; e1 = 0) = E(θ
2)
E(θ)
(u(g)− u(b)) + u(b)
E(UI |l1d, s; e1 = 0) = E((1− θ)θ)E(1− θ) (u(g)− u(b)) + u(b)
lim
e1→+∞
E(UI |l1r, s; e1) = θ(u(g)− u(b)) + u(b)
lim
e1→+∞
E(UI |l1d, s; e1) = θ(u(g)− u(b)) + u(b)
When e1 tends to infinity, the loan officer knows with certainty the type of the borrower, and his
expected utility in case of renewal is the same regardless of the outcome of the first loan. It is easy
to show that:
E(UI |l1d, s; e1 = 0) ≤ E(UI |l1r, s; e1 = 0) ≤ E(UI |l1d, s; e1 → +∞) = E(UI |l1r, s; e1 → +∞)
Given the model’s parameters and the compensation scheme {y, b, g}, E(UN (e∗2)) ∈ R+ is constant
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with respect to e1, known with certainty from period 1 on by the loan officer. Depending on e1, the
ordering between E(UN (e∗2)), E(UI |l1r, s; e1) and E(UI |l1d, s; e1) changes, and so does the optimal
renewal decision of the loan officer. I further define the thresholds e1 and e1 as the values of e1
verifying equations (2.9) and (2.10).
E(UI |l1r, s; e1) = E(UN (e∗2)) (2.9)
E(UI |l1d, s; e1) = E(UN (e∗2)) (2.10)
Since E(UI |l1r, s; e1) and E(UI |l1d, s; e1) are strictly increasing functions of e1, the thresholds e1
and e1 are unique. It is intuitive and easy to show that E(UI |l1r, s; e1) ≥ E(UI |l1d, s; e1), with
a strict equality as long as e1 < ∞. This implies that e1 ≤ e1, with a strict equality as long as
e1 <∞ and e1 <∞.
These elements allow us to characterize the optimal renewal decision of the loan officer, depending on
his previous effort e1. When e1 < e1, we always have E(UI |l1d, s; e1) < E(UI |l1r, s; e1) < E(UN (e∗2))
and the loan officer always decides not to renew the loan to the incumbent borrower, regardless of the
outcome of the period 1 loan. When e1 < e1 < e1, we always have E(UI |l1d, s; e1) < E(UN (e∗2)) <
E(UI |l1r, s; e1) and the loan officer decides to renew the loan to the incumbent borrower only if the
period 1 loan was successful, and not to renew otherwise. Finally, when e1 < e1, this implies that
E(UN (e∗2)) < E(UI |l1d, s; e1) < E(UI |l1r, s; e1) and the loan officer always renews the loan to the
incumbent borrower, regardless of the first loan outcome.
2.B Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. From the expressions of E(UI |l1r, s; e1) and E(UI |l1d, s; e1) in equations (2.5) and (2.6), and
thresholds definitions shown in equations (2.9) and (2.10), we obtain equations (2.11) and (2.12).
P (e1) = θP (θ)
E(UN (e∗2))− u(b)− θ(u(g)− u(b))
∆2(u(g)− u(b))−∆(E(UN (e∗2))− u(b))
(2.11)
P (e1) = (1− θ)P (θ) E(UN (e
∗
2))− u(b)− θ(u(g)− u(b))
(∆−∆2)(u(g)− u(b))− (δ −∆)(E(UN (e∗2))− u(b))
(2.12)
The left-hand-side of equations (2.11) and (2.12) are probabilities, hence between 0 and 1. The
right-hand-side are not and take values in R. For the probabilities and thresholds to be well defined,
I need to take care of corner solutions. If the above equations define negative probabilities, then the
probability is set to 0, and the corresponding effort threshold is set to 0 too. On the opposite, if the
equations define probabilities larger than 1, then the probability is set to 1, and the corresponding
effort threshold is set +∞. This gives us the threshold values as specified in proposition 2.2.
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2.C Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. Constraints (IC1) and (IC2a) are already written as functions of u(g)−u(b), u(b)−u(y), e1
and e2. The same can be done for constraints (IC2b), (IC2c), (IC4) and (IC6), while constraints
(IC3) and (IC5) can be rewritten as functions of u(g)− u(b), u(b)− u(y), e1, e2 and u(y).
c′(e1) =P ′(e1)
(
(u(g)− u(b))[∆ + ∆2 −∆(P (e2)∆ + θP (θ))]
+ (u(b)− u(y))[δ + ∆−∆(P (e2)δ + P (θ))]−∆c(e2)
)
(IC2b’)
c′(e1) =P ′(e1)
(
(u(g)− u(b))[2∆− δ(P (e2)∆ + θP (θ))]
+ (u(b)− u(y))[2δ − δ(P (e2)δ + P (θ))]− δc(e2)
)
(IC2c’)
(u(g)− u(b))×K1 + (u(b)− u(y))×K2 − c(e1)− c(e2)×K3 ≥ u(y)P (s; e1) (IC3’)
0 ≥− (u(g)− u(b))(P (e2)∆ + θP (θ))− (u(b)− u(y))(P (e2)δ + P (θ)) + c(e2) (IC4’)
(u(g)− u(b))×K4 + (u(b)− u(y))×K5 − c(e1)− c(e2)×K6 ≥ u(y)P (s; e1)
+ max{u(b)− u(y) + (u(g)− u(b))E(θ|l1o, e1 = 0),
(u(b)− (uy))(P (e2)δ + P (θ)) + (u(g)− u(b))(P (e2)∆ + θP (θ))− c(e2)} (IC5’)
(u(g)− u(b))(P (e2)∆ + θP (θ)) + (u(b)− u(y))(P (e2)δ + P (θ))− c(e2)
≥ (u(g)− u(b))E(θ) + u(b)− u(y) (IC6’)
where the values K1 to K6 are constant with respect to y, b and g.
4 Assume that {e1, e2, y, b, g}
solve the maximization program of the bank, with b > 0. We can set b˜ = b−  ∈ (0, b) and then set
4The exact values of K1 to K6 are:
K1 =P (e1)∆ + θP (θ) + (P (e2)∆ + θP (θ))[−P (e1)δ − P (θ) + (P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))1(e1 < e1) + (P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 < e1)]
+ (P (e1)∆2 + θ
2P (θ))1(e1 > e1) + (P (e1)(∆−∆2) + θ(1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 > e1)
K2 =P (e1)δ + P (θ) + (P (e2)δ + P (θ))[−P (e1)δ − P (θ) + (P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))1(e1 < e1) + (P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 < e1)]
+ (P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))1(e1 > e1) + (P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 > e1)
K3 =− P (e1)δ − P (θ) + (P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))1(e1 < e1) + (P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 < e1)
K4 =P (e1)∆ + θP (θ) + (P (e2)∆ + θP (θ))[P (θ)− P (e1)δ + (P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))1(e1 < e1) + (P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 < e1)]
+ (P (e1)∆2 + θ
2P (θ))1(e1 > e1) + (P (e1)(∆−∆2) + θ(1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 > e1)− E(θ)
K5 =P (e1)δ + P (θ) + (P (e2)δ + P (θ))[P (θ)− P (e1)δ + (P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))1(e1 < e1) + (P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 < e1)]
+ (P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))1(e1 > e1) + (P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 > e1)− 1
K6 =P (θ)− P (e1)δ + (P (e1)∆ + θP (θ))1(e1 < e1) + (P (e1)(δ −∆) + (1− θ)P (θ))1(e1 < e1)
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Loan officers and credit distribution
y˜ < y and g˜ < g such that:
u(g˜)− u(b˜) = u(g)− u(b)
u(b˜)− u(y˜) = u(b)− u(y)
This is possible as long as u(b) 6= ∞, which is implied by Assumption 2.6 and the usual utility
function assumptions. Keeping e1 and e2 stable, this implies that constraints (IC1) to (IC2c),
(IC4) and (IC6) are still verified by {e1, e2, y˜, b˜, g˜}. Regarding constraints (IC3’) and (IC5’), their
left-hand side remains unchanged while their right-hand side decreases with y˜ at a rate equal
to P (s; e1). Consequently, constraints (IC3) and (IC5) also remain verified by {e1, e2, y˜, b˜, g˜}.
Therefore the allocation {e1, e2, y˜, b˜, g˜} is feasible. This allocation also provides a higher profit than
{e1, e2, y, b, g} to the bank since it decreases all payments {y, b, g} to the loan officer while keeping
constant incentives and effort {e1, e2}. Hence {e1, e2, y, b, g} was not optimal, and at the optimum
b = 0.
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3 Unveiling the Effects of Foreign Exchange
Intervention: A Panel Approach
Joint with Gustavo Adler and Rui Mano (International Monetary Fund)
Abstract
The paper studies the effect of foreign exchange intervention on the exchange rate relying on an
instrumental-variables panel approach. We find robust evidence that intervention affects the level
of the exchange rate in a meaningful way from a macroeconomic perspective. A purchase of foreign
currency of 1 percentage point of GDP causes a depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rates
in the ranges of [1.7-2.0] percent and [1.4-1.7] percent, respectively; and the effects are found to be
quite persistent. The paper also explores possible asymmetric effects, and whether the effectiveness
of foreign exchange intervention depends on the depth of domestic financial markets.
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He´le`ne Poirson, Belen Sbrancia, Viktor Tsyrennikov, Mauricio Vargas and seminar participants at the 2016 AEA
Meetings, the NYU Stern Volatility Institute, and the EUI Macroeconomics Working Group, for their feedback.
Remaining errors are ours.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their
institutions or their institutions’ policies.
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3.1 Introduction
Volatile capital flows in the context of growing financial integration have posed significant challenges
to policy makers across the world in recent years. Emerging market countries, and increasingly
advanced market economies, have resorted to a battery of policy tools, including macro-prudential
measures, capital controls and foreign exchange intervention (FXI) to cope with the effects of large
capital flows. However, the merits of these different tools remain under debate. There is some
consensus on how these instruments should impact key macroeconomic variables in theory, but
the empirical evidence on their effect and economic relevance remains elusive. The evidence has
been particularly hard to find in the case of FXI, reflecting serious endogeneity issues that hamper
the identification of its effects, especially on the exchange rate. A number of studies have found
evidence on the latter at high (intra-day) frequency but have fallen short of shedding light on the
macroeconomic relevance of these effects. In this paper, we take a different approach that allows
us to evaluate the merits of FXI as a macroeconomic policy instrument.
Large changes in central banks’ net foreign asset positions over the last two decades, primarily
driven by FXI, give testimony of the importance of FXI as a macroeconomic management tool
(Figure 3.1). Whether countries deployed FXI as a way to accumulate reserves for precautionary
reasons (e.g., Aizenman and Lee, 2008; Jeanne and Rancie`re, 2011; Ghosh et al., 2012) or seeking
to manage their exchange rates (e.g. Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008; Aizenman and Lee, 2008; Adler
and Tovar, 2014; Gagnon, 2012a) was a much discussed subject during the 2000s.1 But, with
the implementation of unconventional monetary policies in advanced economies in recent years,
countries facing large capital inflows have been more vocal and open about the primary objectives
of carrying out FXI operations, namely dampening the effects of these inflows on their exchange
rates. Indeed, a simple indicator of the degree of exchange rate management (Figure 3.2) points
to a wide range of de facto exchange rate regimes (even among de jure floaters), suggesting that
many countries have relied heavily on (sterilized) FXI to manage their exchange rates.2 However,
the effectiveness of sterilized FXI in terms of its impact on the level of the exchange rate remains
debatable.3
From a theoretical perspective, the literature has proposed two main channels through which FXI
1For studies on the motives of FXI, see also Canales-Kriljenko (2003), Moreno (2005), Neely (2008), Stone et al.
(2009).
2The indicator of exchange rate management is defined as: ρj ≡ σNFAj /(σNFAj + σSj ) where σNFAj and σSj denote
the standard deviations of a proxy of FXI and of the nominal exchange rate, respectively. ρj varies between 0
and 1, corresponding to a pure floating and a peg respectively.
3A number of studies have explored the effects of FXI on exchange rate volatility and obtained more conclusive results
than those focused on exchange rate levels. See for example, Stone et al. (2009), Mandeng (2003), Kamil (2008),
Pattanaik and Sahoo (2003), Domac¸ and Mendoza (2004), Guimara˜es Filho and Karacadag˘ (2004), Abenoja
(2003). Another related strand of the literature has studied the impact of FXI (and more generally net official
flows) on the current account. See for example, Bayoumi et al. (2014), Gagnon (2012b) and Gagnon (2013).
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can affect exchange rates: a signaling and a portfolio balance channel. The theory behind the
signaling channel posits that sterilized FXI can affect the exchange rate by providing information
about the central bank’s monetary policy intentions4. The portfolio balance theory, pioneered by
Henderson and Rogoff (1982), Kouri (1983) and Branson and Henderson (1985), and further studied
by Kumhof (2010) and Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) recently, established that in the presence
of incomplete markets FXI can affect the exchange rate when domestic and external assets are
imperfect substitutes. In this case, sterilized intervention increases the relative supply of domestic
assets, driving risk premia up and thereby exerting depreciation pressures on the exchange rate.5,6
Figure 3.1: Central Bank Net Foreign Asset Position, 1996-
2013
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; and authors’ calculations.
Green (red) bars indicate an increase (drop) in the NFA position during the
period. The lower end of the bar indicates the initial position, and the upper
end the final position, for the cases of NFA increases; and the opposite for
NFA decreases.
4This channel can be made more effective in the presence of policy coordination as argued by Sarno and Taylor
(2001) and Fratzscher (2009).
5In the case of the signaling channel, FXI serves as tool to convey information about policy intentions, and thus
cannot be thought of as an independent policy instrument. In the case of imperfect asset substitutability (portfolio
balance channel), however, FXI is an additional, independent, policy tool.
6The literature often also refers to two additional channels: A coordination channel, according to which, frictions
at a micro level can affect the extent to which information embedded in central bank operations (assuming
an informational advantage) reaches market participants and shapes their expectations–see, for example, Lyons
(2006) and Reitz and Taylor (2008)– and a noise-trading channel, whereby the central bank uses FXI to change
the trend behavior of the exchange rate in a way that leads so called “noise traders” to begin investing on the
premise of this new trend and hence further enhancing the effectiveness of the initial intervention, as in Hung
(1997).
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Figure 3.2: Degree of Exchange Rate Management, 1996-
2013
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Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; and authors’ calculations.
Bars report a measure ρj ≡ σNFAj /(σNFAj +σSj ) where σNFAj and σSj denote
the standard deviations of changes in net foreign assets and of the nominal
exchange rate, respectively. Gray bars correspond to countries with de-jure
pegs for most of the sample period (1996-2013), and blue bars otherwise.
Dots report to a similar measure of exchange rate management but based on
a proxy of FXI that includes non-spot interventions (see 3.A).
From an empirical point of view, the literature has seen two distinct waves of work. During the 1980s
and part of the 1990s, numerous studies focused on cases of FXI in advanced economies (see, for
example, the extensive work by Dominguez, 1990, 1998, Dominquez and Kenen, 1992, Dominguez
and Frankel, 1990, 1993b, 1993a; Ghosh, 1992; Kaminsky and Lewis, 1996; Kenen, 1982, and Ito,
2002).7,8 In general, these studies found limited evidence of effectiveness with regard to the level of
the exchange rate, unless interventions were coordinated across major central banks. More recently,
in an effort to study developments in emerging markets, there has been a number of studies with
more supportive, although often mixed, evidence that intervention affects the exchange rate (see
recent reviews of the literature in Menkhoff, 2010 and 2013). Most of these studies, however, are
country-specific and thus their results are difficult to generalize. In fact, robust evidence on the
effects of FXI has been hard to find beyond some specific cases, possibly reflecting the endogeneity of
FXI decisions, which tends to conceal the effect of FXI on exchange rates.9 Even when authors have
7See also other (innovative) approaches undertaken by Kearns and Rigobon (2005), Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000)
and Chen et al. (2012).
8For comprehensive reviews of the early literature, focused on advanced economies, see Sarno and Taylor (2001)
and Neely (2005).
9This is illustrated in Appendix Figure 3.C.1, which displays the bivariate relationship between a proxy of FXI
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been able to overcome endogeneity issues, the employed empirical strategies have often fallen short
of shedding light on the macroeconomic relevance of such effects. Specifically, most of the attempts
have relied on high-frequency data (including intra-day) in order to mitigate reverse causality (see,
for example, Tapia and Tokman, 2004; Guimara˜es Filho and Karacadag˘, 2004; Domac¸ and Mendoza,
2004; Humala and Rodriguez, 2010; Kamil, 2008; Rinco´n and Toro, 2011; Dominguez et al., 2013;
etc.). This approach (sometimes combined with some form of instrumentation) helped to break the
contemporaneous relationship between exchange rate movements and FXI decisions, by exploiting
the fact that FXI decisions are normally taken at a lower frequency than exchange rate movements.
In general, the ‘high-frequency’ approach has been successful in finding evidence of effects of FXI
on the exchange rate in the short-run, but doubts remain as to whether these effects are sufficiently
persistent (i.e., beyond a few days) to have relevant macroeconomic implications10.
Because our goal is to understand the relevance of FXI as a macroeconomic policy tool (i.e., beyond
intra-day effects), we take a different approach to most of the existing literature, using relatively low
frequency (monthly) data and focusing our efforts on the instrumentation–which relies mostly on
exogenous variations in FXI related to countries’ precautionary motives for accumulating reserves.
Also, unlike most of the literature, our approach focuses on panel (as opposed to country time
series) data. The reasons for this are twofold: Time-series data for each country is relatively
limited, particularly after excluding highly volatile periods in the early 1990s. We hence gain
power in our statistical tests at the expense of imposing homogeneity restrictions–which we explore
later. More importantly, the (52 country) panel setting allows for an instrumentation strategy that
exploits both within country and cross-country variation of the instrumental variables11.
We find robust evidence that intervention affects the level of the exchange rate in a macroeco-
nomically meaningful way. A positive FXI (FX purchase) of 1 percentage point of GDP leads to,
depending on the specification, a depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate in the range
of [1.7-2.0] percent and [1.4-1.5] respectively.12 Furthermore, we find these effects to be persistent,
with estimates of their half-life in the range of [12-23] months, again depending on the specification.
and changes in the nominal exchange on a monthly basis for the period 1996-2013 and a large set of countries.
As shown, if anything, there is a positive relationship indicating that positive FXI (reserve accumulation) is
accompanied by exchange rate appreciation.
10Persistent effects of FXI can be better understood under the portfolio balance approach, whereby interventions
change the risk of holding a currency and hence generate predictable exchange rate movements if investors are
risk averse. Under risk neutrality, exchange rates are martingales and thus FXI cannot have persistent effects.
11Some other papers have also relied on low frequency data, taking an instrumental-variables approach to overcome
endogeneity, with mixed results, arguably reflecting different degrees of success in finding good instruments.
Examples of this are the work in Phillips et al. (2013) —who explore determinants of exchange rates in a panel
setting, although without focusing on FXI —Daude et al. (2014) —who explore the effects of FXI on exchange
rates in a panel setting, although relying on an unconventional measure of FX intervention; and Blanchard et al.
(2015) —who study the effect of FXI in the context of capital flow shocks.
12These magnitudes seem broadly consistent with those implied by the portfolio balance approach model of Gabaix
and Maggiori (2015).
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The paper explores possible asymmetric effects, and finds no indication of different effects between
positive and negative intervention, suggesting that FXI is a useful policy tool both when facing
appreciation and depreciation pressures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the econometric methodology, the
main results and a number of robustness checks. Section 3.3 discusses extensions of the benchmark
specification, exploring dynamic and asymmetric effects. Section 3.3.2 concludes with the key
takeaways.
3.2 Econometric Analysis
3.2.1 Approach
The main challenge in evaluating the impact of FXI on exchange rates is the endogeneity of inter-
ventions to exchange rate movements. To overcome this difficulty, we use a two-stage least squares
approach with instrumental variables that relies on identifying exogenous variations in FXI (i.e.
interventions that are unrelated to contemporaneous exchange rate movements). Specifically, we
employ the following specification, which is estimated in a panel setting:
log(ERit) = α+ β log(ERit−1) + γF̂XIit + δ′Xit + ηi + it (3.1)
FXIit = a+ b log(ERit−1) + c′Zit + d′Xit + ui + vit (3.2)
Equation (3.1) is the second-stage exchange rate equation linking the exchange rate (ERit) to
exogenous (instrumented) FXI as well as to a series of regressors (Xit) that are expected to drive
exchange rate variations. Equation (3.2) is the first-stage regression relating FXI to a series of
driving factors, including those introduced in the second stage and a full set of instruments (Zit).
ERit denotes country i’s exchange rate at time t (either nominal or real bilateral, in both cases
vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, or real effective, depending on the specification). We follow the convention
that an increase represents an appreciation of the domestic currency in all cases;13 FXIit stands
for our proxy of foreign exchange intervention; Zit is the set of instrumental variables; and Xit is
a set of control variables; all of which are discussed in detail next. ui and ηi denote country fixed
effects for the first and second stage regressions, respectively.
13In the rest of the paper, results refer to real bilateral exchange rates vis-a-vis the U.S., unless otherwise indicated.
This minimizes issues related to episodes of high inflation (that would affect nominal rate more markedly); and
allows for a more parsimonious mapping between the regressors and the dependent variable.
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Our interest lies primarily on the parameter γ. A negative value of γ would indicate that a positive
intervention (buying foreign currency) depreciates the domestic currency. The benchmark specifi-
cation assumes homogeneous parameters across countries, although later we relax this assumption
to assess the robustness of the results. Next, we discuss how the measure of FXI, and the sets
instruments and controls are constructed.
Foreign Exchange Intervention
The definition of FXI is not straightforward, although this is rarely discussed in the literature. From
the perspective of the portfolio balance channel, FXI should be understood as any policy- induced
financial operation that changes the foreign exchange position of the public sector, as changes
in the net FX position would imply changes in the relative supply of domestic assets (money if
unsterilized, central bank notes or T-bills if sterilized).14 In practice, however, measuring FXI is a
difficult task, on account of several issues.
First, ideally one would measure FXI as any policy-induced changes in the FX position of the
consolidated public sector.15 However, such data is rarely available, particularly at high frequency.
We therefore focus on the central bank’s balance sheet, in line with the literature.16 Second, data
on actual purchases and sales of foreign assets are not generally reported. Thus, we conduct our
study using several different proxies for FXI, mainly following Dominguez (2012) and Dominguez
et al. (2012).17 The main concern with the use of a proxy relates to possible changes in the central
bank net foreign asset position arising from valuation effects rather than actual transactions. As
shown in Figure 3.1, however, our main proxy of intervention–the change in the (net) foreign asset
position of the central bank–correlates very closely with Net International Reserves flows data from
the Balance of Payments statistics, which is flow-based and thus not polluted by valuation effects.
Later we conduct a number of robustness checks, with other proxies, including correcting for val-
uation effects and off-balance sheet operations (i.e. swaps, forward, etc.). See details in Annex
I. We normalize FXI by (HP filtered) trend GDP in U.S. dollars, in order to prevent endogeneity
arising from movements in the U.S. dollar value of nominal GDP. This normalization facilitates
14A definition from the perspective of the signaling channel is less straightforward, as one could think of a broader
set of policies that would provide information about monetary policy intentions.
15Whether public sector agencies other than the central bank intend to affect the exchange rate or not with their FX
transactions is irrelevant for the analysis of the effects of FXI on the exchange rate, since the portfolio balance
channel would operate in either case. Intent, however, may be relevant for assessing the appropriateness of policies,
but such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
16In most cases, central bank FX transactions appear to be the major source of public sector FX transactions, except
in some countries with sizeable sovereign wealth funds.
17Alternative measures, like the one proposed by Daude et al. (2014) are also explored.
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Figure 3.1: Correlation between BOP data and our proxy for
FXI
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; Balance of Payments data; and
authors’ calculations.
the interpretation and comparability of results across countries and time; and helps to prevent unit
root problems. In section 3.2.3 we also discuss alternative normalizations. Finally, as our interest
is on the effect of sterilized interventions, we control for the monetary policy stance by including
the domestic (and foreign) interest rate in all specifications, and also check the robustness of the
results to including a measure of changes in the monetary base as a control, as discussed below.
Exchange Rate Determinants (Controls)
Guided by the vast literature on exchange rate determinants, a number of controls are included
in the specification, which are classified into two groups: a small set of controls, aimed at keeping
the specification as parsimonious as possible; and an expanded set of standard exchange rate
determinants, the inclusion of which tends to restrict the sample due to data availability.
The small set of control variables is composed of (i) the level of the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change Market Volatility Index (VIX); (ii) three indices of commodity prices (for energy, metals
and agriculture products) with country-specific coefficients; and (iii) the interest rate differential
vis-a-vis the U.S., as we focus on the bilateral exchange rate with the US Dollar in most specifica-
tions. Commodity prices are included to capture possible terms of trade shocks at high frequency
and their differentiated impacts depending on whether countries export or import different com-
modities. Introducing the interest rate in the model is key for interpreting the results as pertaining
104
Chapter3
to sterilized intervention, since it allows us to control for the effect of simultaneous changes in
the interest rate on the exchange rate (which could come from non-sterilized intervention). This
approach is superior to trying to exclude observations of unsterilized interventions, since it does
not require to define arbitrary thresholds for classifying FXI as sterilized or non-sterilized. Various
robustness checks are conducted later, including by introducing the domestic and foreign interest
rates separately. When using the nominal bilateral exchange rate, the inflation differential vis-a-vis
the US is added in order to control for movements in the exchange rate that reflect persistently
high inflation levels.18
The expanded set of controls includes other exchange rate determinants following Phillips et al.
(2013). These are slow moving series or variables for which less data is available: GDP per capita
and expected GDP growth (both relative to the U.S.), lagged trade balance, and trade openness.
Finally, we also include in the expanded set of controls an additional variable that captures global
financial conditions (in addition to the interest rate and the VIX index) as measured by the net
portfolio flows to other countries in the sample, reported by Emerging Portfolio Fund Research
(EPFR).
Instruments
Key to our methodology is finding suitable instrumental variables, i.e. variables that are strongly
correlated with FXI, but not with the exchange rate. We explore a number of potential instruments,
related to various motives for conducting FXI, primarily linked to accumulation of international
reserves for precautionary reasons and exchange rate stabilization motives related to balance sheet
effects.
In the former case (FXI for precautionary motives), we rely on exogenous variations in FXI ex-
plained by the level of international reserves, using standard metrics of reserve coverage, which
reflect the adequacy of reserve holdings relative to measures of potential sources of FX liquidity
drains.19 Intuitively, countries with low reserve coverage metrics are expected to intervene more
heavily (buying more and selling less reserves) to build up their reserve buffers, and such differences
are expected to be uncorrelated with exchange rates. The specific metrics we explore include lagged
gross (net) international reserves relative to GDP, imports, external debt or M2. All variables are
evaluated in absolute value as well as relative to the average of other countries in the sample, the
latter intending to unveil possible ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ effects.20,21
18By excluding each country at a time, we ensure the measure is exogenous from the perspective of each small open
economy. See Blanchard et al. (2015) for a similar approach.
19See, for example, Phillips et al. (2013), Daude et al. (2014), IMF (2011) and IMF (2013).
20See Cheung and Sengupta (2011), and Cheung and Qian (2009).
21The variables are also included in levels —which significance would indicate an objective to build up buffers —and
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We also explore a set of new instrumental variables related to exchange rate stabilization motives,
not used in previous studies. In particular, we focus on the interaction between a measure of the
degree of deposit dollarization in the domestic financial system, and different measures of exogenous
financial shocks (VIX, Global EMBI, EPFR flows, etc.) that would tend to exert depreciation
pressures on most EMEs. A negative statistical link between this variable and FXI would indicate
the use of intervention in response to exogenous shocks with the aim of mitigating balance sheet
effects. In this case, while variations of FXI are not fully exogenous to the exchange rate, the
variation is largely explained by cross-section differences in the degree of dollarization, which are
uncorrelated with contemporaneous exchange rate movements.
Finally, we also examine lagged trade balance as a possible instrument related to a mercantilist
motive.
Most of these variables gave intuitive results, with different degrees of significance. However, the
instruments finally included in the baseline estimations were chosen according to three specific
criteria:
i. Each individual instrumental variable delivers a coefficient sign in the first stage regression
consistent with economic theory. This is aimed at ensuring that the variable actually reflects
the intervention motive in mind.
ii. The variable helps mitigate endogeneity bias in the second stage regression. That is, the
coefficient for fitted values of FXI in the second stage regression should be lower than in the
simple OLS version. This condition is imposed because, as discussed before, the direction
of the bias is known (central banks tend to react in order to dampen movements in the
exchange rate, rather than the opposite, which implies, if any, an upward bias in an OLS
regression—where exchange rates are defined as US$/LC).22
iii. When instrumenting jointly (using all variables that satisfy the two previous criteria), the
specification is required to pass the overidentification and weak instrument tests. The first
one (known as Sargan, Hansen or J-test) examines the null hypothesis of joint validity of
the instruments, also referred to as a test of over-identifying restrictions.23 To test for weak
instruments, we follow the test developed by Stock and Yogo (2002).24
in first differences —which would indicate a desire to maintain a certain level of reserves in proportion to such
variables.
22This is different from studies that focus on the effect of FXI on the current account, where the direction of the
endogeneity bias is ambiguous. See, for example, Bayoumi et al. (2014).
23Its statistic follows a χ2 in the number of overidentifying restrictions. For instruments to pass this test, one should
fail to reject the null hypothesis.
24The test is built on the F statistic of the first stage regression, but specifically tailored to weak instruments
issues, and is therefore preferable to the often used rule of thumb of the first stage F statistic being larger than
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Data
The dataset encompasses monthly observations for 52 countries (13 advanced and 39 emerging
market economies), during the period January 1996-October 2013 (see Annex Table 3.C.1 for more
details). The sample focuses on countries with their own legal tender (i.e., excludes countries that
use other countries’ currencies as legal tender). Periods during which the de-facto exchange rate
regimes (following the classification of Ilzetzki et al., 2010) are classified as freely falling or dual
exchange rates are excluded. Some countries did not intervened in the FX market during the
period of analysis but are kept in the sample to better identify the role of controls in our speci-
fications. Data come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook
and Direction of Trade Statistics. Interest rates are obtained from Datastream, expected GDP
growth are from Consensus Forecast. The different measures of the size of the domestic financial
sector (discussed below) come from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database
(GFDD). EPFR flows are obtained from Haver Analytics. Deposits dollarization is obtained from
the database constructed by Yeyati (2006) and complemented by recent data from IMF country
desks. Capital control indices come from Schindler (2009), Chinn and Ito (2006) and Quinn and
Toyoda (2008), and are extended in some cases using the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Ar-
rangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) data. Details of variables’ construction and
sources are summarized in Appendix Table 3.C.2.
In the benchmark specification we exclude the 1% top and bottom observations25 for each variable
(except for variables bounded by definition) to avoid undue influence of possible outliers in the
results. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the main variables; and the distribution of FXI is
shown in Appendix Figure 3.C.2.26
3.2.2 Main results
Table 3.2 presents the second stage OLS and IV results for the baseline specification, using only
the set of instrumental variables that pass the criteria discussed above. In each case, results are
reported for the nominal bilateral, real bilateral, and real effective exchange rates, both using the
10. Instruments are considered weak when the maximum size of the IV coefficient’s bias relative to the OLS
coefficient’s bias exceeds a certain threshold. The null hypothesis assumes that instruments are weak, and critical
values which depend on the number of instruments used are tabulated in Stock and Yogo (2002). Given the
number of instruments included in our benchmark specification, a test statistic above 18 (11) rejects a relative
bias above 5% (10%).
25The 1st and 99th percentiles are taken over the cross-country distribution for the whole sample. For the exchange
rates, we excluded outliers based on the distribution of their month-to-month growth rate.
26Variables are tested for stationarity. Both nominal and real bilateral exchange rates are stationary; while real
effective exchange rates display non-stationarity in some cases, and under some tests. See further discussion in
the robustness section.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
log RER 9149 -3.14 2.57 -10.16 0.69
log NER 9149 -3.03 2.47 -9.96 0.73
log REER 8597 4.53 0.15 3.81 5.08
FXI/GDP 9149 0.19 0.71 -2.70 3.77
FXI/GDP (valuation adj) 9012 0.12 0.69 -2.74 3.45
FXI/GDP (valuation adj + off-BS) 9011 0.12 0.71 -3.04 3.84
FXI/GDP (∆Reserves) 9103 0.18 0.66 -2.40 3.50
FXI/M2 9053 0.53 2.20 -9.09 13.21
FXI/Financial sector size (IFS) 8741 0.39 1.44 -5.57 9.67
FXI/Financial sector size (WB) 8424 0.45 1.85 -9.15 14.13
FXI/Market size 8515 2.27 14.17 -65.66 152.99
VIX 9149 21.53 7.75 10.42 59.89
Interest rate (differential) 9149 0.39 0.51 -0.39 5.12
Inflation rate (differential) 8723 3.09 4.99 -4.71 49.75
Change in M2/GDP 9149 0.49 0.83 -1.90 4.47
Financial dollarization 9149 23.45 23.24 0.00 92.60
Import coverage 9141 0.52 0.49 -0.44 4.31
Low import coverage 9149 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Broad money coverage 9146 0.39 0.40 -1.42 2.16
GDP per capita (differential) 9046 -1.32 0.83 -3.03 0.27
Expected GDP growth (differential) 8571 1.08 2.54 -14.36 11.02
Trade Balance 9039 -0.29 1.01 -3.70 3.57
Trade Openness 9046 5.43 3.04 1.41 27.68
EPFR/GDP 9149 0.01 0.11 -0.59 0.46
EMBI spread 8421 4.78 2.54 1.51 14.19
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small and the expanded set of controls. Table 3.3 displays the results of the first stage regression
for the same specifications (for the IV specifications alone).
As discussed previously, OLS regressions (Table 3.2, columns 1-6) deliver counter-intuitive results,
due to the endogeneity of FXI, even after controlling for usual exchange rate drivers. Our instru-
mentation strategy (columns 7-12), on the other hand, delivers coefficients for FXI in the second
stage that are highly significant and with the expected sign. Moreover, the magnitude of the effects
is economically meaningful. A FXI of 1 percentage point of GDP leads to a depreciation in the
range of [1.7-1.9] percent of the nominal exchange rate, depending on the specification. The effect
is somewhat smaller on the real bilateral exchange rate, in the range of [1.4-1.5] percent, possibly
indicating some exchange rate pass-through to inflation; and more so on the real effective exchange
rate ([1.2-1.3] percent), suggesting that simultaneous FXI in trading partners tend to offset each
other. The results on the real effective exchange rate, however, should be interpreted with caution
as regressors are not measured in relative terms to trading partners. Thus, we focus on the first
two exchange rate measures, for which the mapping with the regressors is clear. Control variables
in the second stage all have expected signs and are statistically significant, except for the interest
rate differential. We conduct a series of robustness checks on the latter in the section 3.2.3. The
set of variables found to be valid instruments include:
i. Change in M2 normalized by trend nominal GDP, consistent with findings in a number of
recent papers (e.g., Phillips et al., 2013; Daude et al., 2014) and the precautionary motives
highlighted by Obstfeld et al. (2010).
ii. Broad money coverage: NFA/M2 (lagged)
iii. Imports coverage measured by NFA/imports (lagged), where we also find a non-linear rela-
tionship, with a shift for low import coverage levels.
iv. Financial dollarization interacted with VIX.
3.2.3 Main Robustness Checks
We conduct a number of robustness checks on our baseline specification. In this section, we pay
special attention to (i) the normalization of FXI (and the link between FXI and domestic financial
deepening); (ii) the instrumentation; (iii) the exchange rate regime; (iv) other simultaneous policy
responses; and (v) the proxy of FXI.
Different normalizations
While normalizing FXI by GDP seems intuitive and helps interpret the magnitudes involved, there
is no obvious economic case for using this particular measure. In fact, the theory of FXI points
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to other potentially better normalizations. From the perspective of the portfolio balance channel,
a relevant measure would be the amount of intervention relative to, for example, the supply of
domestic assets or the size of domestic financial markets.27,28 We explore four alternative norms
that go in such direction:
i. broad money (M2);
ii. a (narrow) measure of the size of the domestic financial sector, based on the total amount of
domestic assets held by domestic banks (excluding the central bank) as reported in IFS.29
iii. an alternative (broader) measure of the size of the domestic financial system based on data
from the World Bank Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). This measure en-
compasses domestic assets of domestic banks, non-bank financial institutions, pension funds,
mutual funds, and insurance companies.
27The desirable normalization from the perspective of the signaling channel is less obvious, since the effect on the
exchange rate could be driven by the mere FXI announcement by the central bank; with actual amounts arguably
playing a secondary role.
28Other studies have explored measures of FXI relative to the foreign exchange market turnover. However, this is
difficult to implement in a panel setting due to limited data on the latter.
29Non-depositary financial corporations are also excluded due to missing information for many countries.
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Table 3.3: First stage, baseline results
Dependent variable: foreign exchange intervention (% GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exchange rate definition: Nominal Real Real effective Nominal Real Real effective
Exchange rate (lagged) -0.001 -0.003∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.002 -0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
VIX -0.006∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Interest rate (differential) -0.130∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.116∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗
(0.042) (0.037) (0.046) (0.039) (0.036) (0.043)
Inflation rate (differential) 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Change in M2/GDP 0.103∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Financial dollarization × VIX -0.009∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.010 -0.010∗ -0.011∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Import coverage (lagged) -0.282∗∗ -0.252∗ -0.222 -0.271∗ -0.275∗ -0.236
(0.129) (0.142) (0.134) (0.141) (0.149) (0.147)
Low import coverage (lagged) 0.049 0.035 0.041 0.003 -0.010 0.020
(0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040)
Broad money coverage (lagged) 0.018 -0.021 -0.098 -0.051 -0.060 -0.131
(0.140) (0.145) (0.150) (0.158) (0.157) (0.151)
GDP per capita (differential) -0.672∗∗ -0.482 -0.698∗
(0.289) (0.333) (0.367)
Expected GDP growth (differential) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Trade Balance (lagged) 0.109∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.043)
Trade Openness 0.076∗∗ 0.071∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.038) (0.037) (0.039)
EPFR/GDP 0.094 0.107 0.140∗
(0.073) (0.072) (0.070)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8755 9149 9017 7950 8312 7871
Countries 55 52 55 51 51 51
R2 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10
F stat 7.32 8.18 6.94 6.25 7.14 6.13
F p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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iv. a measure of the size of the domestic financial market, also based on GFDD data, encom-
passing stock market capitalization, and the value of outstanding domestic private and public
debt securities.30
In general, the correlation across different measures is high, except for the relationship between
FXI/M2 and the other metrics (see Appendix Table 3.C.3). As shown in Table 3.4, results with
these alternative metrics have the expected sign and are statistically significant in all cases. First
stage results are presented in Appendix Table 3.C.4. The magnitude of the coefficient on FXI
cannot be directly compared across columns, because of the different scale across FXI measures.
However, the marginal effect with respect to FXI/GDP, when using norm J, can be derived as:
∂ log(ERit)
∂FXIGDPit
= γ
GDPit
NormJit
(3.3)
Table 3.4: Different normalizations, second stage
Dependent variable: real bilateral exchange rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FXI/GDP (instrumented) -1.430∗∗∗
(0.318)
FXI/M2 (instrumented) -0.468∗∗∗
(0.096)
FXI/Financial sector size (IFS, instrumented) -0.788∗∗∗
(0.165)
FXI/Financial sector size (WB, instrumented) -0.586∗∗∗
(0.117)
FXI/Market size (instrumented) -0.124∗∗∗
(0.037)
Dependent variable (lagged) 0.966∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
VIX -0.043∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Interest rate (differential) 0.014 0.087 0.006 0.003 0.102
(0.108) (0.112) (0.117) (0.116) (0.136)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9149 9053 8741 8424 8515
Countries 52 52 52 48 50
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
J p-value 0.29 0.41 0.29 0.03 0.08
Stock & Yogo stat 24.25 34.73 27.47 30.16 12.50
Implied effect of FXI/GDP coefficient -1.40 -1.44 -1.41 -1.61
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Evaluated at the mean value of GDPit/NormJit, the marginal effect of FXI
GDP is very similar to
the baseline estimation (see last row of Table 3.4). Furthermore, equation (3.3) suggests that, as
30The latter dataset contains many missing values for some countries. Long-term moving averages are computed to
mitigate the limited data.
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expected, the effect of FXIGDP on the exchange rate is smaller the larger is the domestic financial
market (any of the alternative metrics).
Table 3.5: Testing different normalizations, second stage
Dependent variable: real bilateral exchange rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FXI/GDP (instrumented) 0.226 0.004 -1.851∗ -1.131
(1.063) (1.519) (1.008) (0.857)
FXI/M2 (instrumented) -0.528∗
(0.314)
FXI/Financial sector size (IFS, instrumented) -0.790
(0.764)
FXI/Financial sector size (WB, instrumented) 0.031
(0.360)
FXI/Market size (instrumented) -0.058
(0.063)
Dependent variable (lagged) 0.964∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
VIX -0.044∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Interest rate (differential) 0.088 0.006 -0.030 0.052
(0.112) (0.117) (0.114) (0.126)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9053 8741 8424 8515
Countries 52 52 48 50
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
J p-value 0.27 0.17 0.13 0.21
Stock & Yogo stat 3.71 2.13 5.69 1.65
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
To formally test the latter hypothesis, two changes are made to the baseline specification: (i) intro-
duce FXIGDP and FXINormJ simultaneously in the second stage regression; and (ii) instrument
both measures since the particular measure of exogenous FXI might depend on the normalization
used.31 Thus, we run:
log(ERit) = α+ β log(ERit−1) + γ1 ̂FXIGDPit + γ2
̂FXINormJit + δ
′Xit + ηi + it (3.4)
FXIGDPit = a1 + b1 log(ERit−1) + c
′
1Zit + d
′
1Xit + ui + vit (3.5)
FXINormJit = a2 + b2 log(ERit−1) + c
′
2Zit + d
′
2Xit + wi + zit (3.6)
31We use the same instruments regardless of normalization, allowing first stage coefficients (on the instruments and
controls) to vary across normalizations. This approach follows from treating each normalization of FXI as a
different endogenous variable.
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In this setting, the marginal effect of FXIGDPit on the exchange rate is given by:
∂ log(ERit)
∂FXIGDPit
= γ1 + γ2
GDPit
Norm2it
(3.7)
And the coefficients γ1 and γ2 test the relevance of the normalizations
FXI
GDP and
FXI
NormJ respectively.
Results (Table 3.5) indicate that the effect of interventions on the exchange rate is not significantly
influenced by the depth of the domestic financial system32 and, as such, do not point to a preferred
normalization.
Instrumentation
We conduct two exercises to assess the robustness of our results with respect to the instrumentation
strategy. First, we test whether results are driven by any single instrument, by excluding one
instrument at a time. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that (first and second stage) results are robust to
dropping any single instrument. While the strength of the instrumentation comes in part from the
change in M2 (as indicated by the weakening of the Stock and Yogo test) the sign and magnitude
of the coefficient of FXI in the second stage remains close to the baseline, as well as statistically
significant. Results also hold even when both measures related to M2 are excluded from the
specification, indicating that the results do not depend on having a measure of broad money in the
set of instruments. The coefficient of interest varies between -1.4 and -1.8, which is very close to
the baseline specification.
Second, we employ only one instrument at a time (dropping all others). As shown in Table 3.8,
the significance of the second stage FXI coefficient falls, to different degrees—and so do the instru-
mentation tests—but the magnitude of estimated FXI coefficient remains very close to the baseline
results. Table 3.9 shows the strength of the relationship between FXI and each of the instruments.
Exchange rate pegs
The baseline estimations include all types of exchange rate regimes (except those classified as de
facto free falling or dual exchange rates by Ilzetzki et al. (2010); and countries without their own
currency). To confirm that our results are not driven by currencies under pegged regimes, we
restrict the sample excluding de-jure regimes with some form of exchange rate targeting, according
to three different criteria:
i. excluding de-jure pegs and crawling pegs;
32This result is consistent with recent evidence of FXI in countries with large financial systems (e.g. Switzerland,
Japan).
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Table 3.6: Instrumentation, second stage
Dependent variable: real bilateral exchange rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropping from instruments:
Import Broad money Dep. Dollarization Change in Change in M2 &
Baseline coverage coverage × VIX M2/GDP Broad money coverage
FXI/GDP (instrumented) -1.430∗∗∗ -1.468∗∗∗ -1.424∗∗∗ -1.395∗∗∗ -1.771∗∗∗ -1.753∗∗∗
(0.318) (0.339) (0.318) (0.321) (0.678) (0.677)
Dependent variable (lagged) 0.966∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
VIX -0.043∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Interest rate (differential) 0.014 0.011 0.015 0.018 -0.017 -0.015
(0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.122) (0.122)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9149 9149 9149 9149 9149 9149
Countries 52 52 52 52 52 52
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
J p-value 0.29 0.53 0.29 0.19 0.25 0.21
Stock & Yogo stat 24.25 34.33 30.09 28.08 7.53 9.92
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ii. excluding the latter and ‘narrow crawling band’ regimes (narrower than or equal to +/-2%);
and
iii. excluding the latter two and ‘wide crawling band’¨ı¿12regimes (narrower than or equal to +/-
5%).
Results, presented in Appendix Table 3.C.5, are very similar to those of the baseline estimation,
with FXI coefficients of somewhat larger absolute magnitude.
The case for excluding de-facto exchange rate targeting regimes is less clear, since these can be
thought of as instances where there is clear evidence of effectiveness of FXI. Still, to test the
robustness of our results, we restrict the sample in the same way as above, but by excluding cases
of de-facto peg exchange rate regimes. Results, also presented in Appendix Table 3.C.5, are broadly
similar to the baseline.
Other policy responses
Policy measures other than FXI can also influence or affect the impact of FXI on the exchange rate.
Capital control measures and changes in the monetary policy interest rate are most prominent at
high frequency. Adequately controlling for these is key to ensure our estimates on FXI are unbiased.
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Table 3.7: Instrumentation, first stage
Dependent variable: foreign exchange intervention (% GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exchange rate (lagged) -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
VIX -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Interest rate (differential) -0.095∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.097∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Change in M2/GDP 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Financial dollarization × VIX -0.011∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Import coverage (lagged) -0.252∗ -0.262∗∗ -0.243∗ -0.242∗ -0.249∗∗
(0.142) (0.113) (0.140) (0.144) (0.116)
Low import coverage (lagged) 0.035 0.037 0.041 0.038 0.039
(0.042) (0.045) (0.041) (0.044) (0.047)
Broad money coverage (lagged) -0.021 -0.219∗ -0.042 -0.015
(0.145) (0.130) (0.140) (0.143)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9149 9149 9149 9149 9149 9149
Countries 52 52 52 52 52 52
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09
F stat 8.18 12.22 10.22 8.01 3.84 5.16
F p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Capital controls. The presence of capital flow restrictions gives rise to two issues. First, contem-
poraneous changes in those restrictions could lead to omitted variable bias if not controlled for.
Ideally, the estimation should include a measure of changes in such restrictions. However, existing
capital control indices are only available (for a large set of countries) at an annual frequency, thus
preventing a proper identification of the timing of the measures at monthly frequency. To bypass
this obstacle, we exclude from the sample country/year observations for which a change in the
Quinn and Toyoda index of capital controls is identified at an annual frequency.33 The sample is
reduced by about 7 percent, and results (Appendix Table 3.C.6, columns 1 and 2) do not change
significantly. The coefficient of interest is slightly smaller in absolute value, suggesting that there
is some use of capital flow measures contemporaneously to FXI in the baseline sample. Second,
differences in capital flow restrictions across countries could give rise to heterogeneous coefficients
for the control variables and thereby affect the FXI coefficient. To allow for such heterogeneity
33This criterion should suffice to exclude between year variations. There is still the possibility that capital flow
measures are taken and reverted within the year, and so would not show in the annual values. However, countries
rarely use capital control in such high frequency basis. See, for example, Ferna´ndez et al. (2013).
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Table 3.8: Using individual instruments, second stage
Dependent variable: real bilateral exchange rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Instrumenting only with:
Change in Dep. Dollarization Import Broad money
M2/GDP × VIX coverage coverage
FXI/GDP -1.310∗∗∗ -1.995 -1.614∗∗ -2.454∗∗
(0.359) (1.355) (0.741) (1.231)
Dependent variable (lagged) 0.967∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
VIX -0.042∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
Interest rate (differential) 0.025 -0.037 -0.002 -0.079
(0.108) (0.166) (0.123) (0.158)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9149 9149 9149 9149
Countries 52 52 52 52
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
J p-value 0.08
Stock & Yogo stat 85.44 9.94 11.28 8.91
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
related to capital controls, we modify the baseline specification by including interactions of the
key external financial variables (that would normally drive capital flows) with the lagged index
of capital controls.34 We find results similar to the baseline specification (Appendix Table 3.C.6,
columns 3 and 4).35
Interest rate changes. One somewhat surprising result in the baseline specification relates to the co-
efficient of the interest rate differential in the second stage, which is quite small and non-significant.
Two main issues could affect the result. First, the interest rate may be endogenous to exchange
rate movements, if countries in our sample used the interest rate as a tool to ‘defend’ the exchange
rate. Such endogeneity would tend to hide the true effect of interest rate shocks on the exchange
rate. To explore this, we estimate an alternative model where we also instrument the interest rate
differential by adding an extra equation in the first stage for the interest rate.36 Second, domestic
and foreign interest rates may have asymmetric effects on the exchange rate. To allow for this
34As before, we employ the Quinn and Toyoda index, which varies between 0 and 100 (100 being more open).
35The possible complementarity of FXI and capital controls is also a relevant aspect, although beyond the scope of
this paper. See 3.B for a related discussion.
36Whether the set of instruments used for FXI is appropriate for the interest rate is certainly debatable, although the
instrumentation tests are passed. Arguably, instrumenting the interest rate properly with the aim of identifying
its effect on exchange rates would likely entail searching for exogenous reasons for moving the policy rate, beyond
those found for FXI. However, our interest does not lie in the interest rate coefficient. Our goal is simply to ensure
that the possible correlation between interest rate changes and FXI does not lead to a bias in the coefficient of
the latter. That is, there might be other sources of exogenous interest rate movements, but provided they do
not drive exogenous FXI movements our estimation should not suffer from collinearity between interest rates and
FXI. This justifies the use of the same set of instruments for both variables.
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Table 3.9: Using individual instruments, first stage
Dependent variable: foreign exchange intervention (% GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exchange rate (lagged) -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
VIX -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Interest rate (differential) -0.087∗∗ -0.080∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.104∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
Change in M2/GDP 0.104∗∗∗
(0.022)
Financial dollarization × VIX -0.014∗∗∗
(0.005)
Import coverage (lagged) -0.251∗∗
(0.116)
Low import coverage (lagged) 0.047
(0.046)
Broad money coverage (lagged) -0.227∗
(0.125)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9149 9149 9149 9149
Countries 52 52 52 52
R2 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
F stat 22.51 8.38 4.65 3.30
F p-value 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.08
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
possibility, we introduce these two interest rates separately in the model. These variations deliver
mixed results (Appendix Table 3.C.7) regarding the estimated effect of interest rate changes on
the exchange rate, but in all cases the coefficient of FXI in the second stage remains basically
unaltered.37
Measures of FXI
So far, we have relied on the change in the central bank NFA position as a proxy for FXI. While
this is consistent with other studies, this measure is polluted by factors other than FXI that affect
37For the instrumentation of the interest rate differential, Findol×V IX is significant and positive in the first stage,
suggesting that indeed, in dollarized economies, the interest rate is used as a tool to stabilize the value of the
domestic currency in response to external financial (VIX) shocks.
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the NFA position, like valuation effects and income flows generated by assets and liabilities. Thus,
we conduct a series of robustness checks on our proxy for FXI:
i. Excluding observations with small absolute values (10% smallest) of FXI, as these may be
particularly affected by valuation effects and income flows.
ii. Using a more refined proxy of FXI that adjusts for estimates of valuation effects and income
flows. A detailed description of the methodology is available in 3.A.
iii. Including off-balance sheet operations in our proxy of FXI in order to capture the increasing
use of non-spot instruments (i.e. FX derivatives). See also 3.A.
iv. Using changes in gross international reserves (rather than relaying on a net concept).
We find that results are very stable, reflecting the fact that the different measures of FXI are highly
correlated (see Appendix Tables 3.C.8 and 3.C.9).
3.2.4 Other robustness checks
We conduct a number of additional robustness checks (reported in Appendix Table 3.C.10), which
include:
i. Changing the treatment of outliers and the sample period. This includes dropping 2% top
and bottom outliers; winsorizing the data (1% and 2%); dropping the crisis period (from June
2008 to May 2009); dropping the Asian crisis period; and dropping the largest 5% and 10%
FXI/GDP observations.
ii. Exploring alternative measures of exogenous financial shocks, substituting the VIX by the
EMBI Global sovereign spread or our measure of EPFR flows to other countries. These
alternative variables are used both as controls and as instruments interacted with deposits
dollarization. We also simply add the EMBI to the baseline specification as an additional
control.
iii. Allowing for country-specific coefficients for VIX, interest rate, and both.
iv. Adding a measure of the real effective exchange rate gap, defined by deviations from an HP
filter.
v. Accounting for possible structural breaks related to changes in monetary policy regimes.
This includes restricting the sample period to 2003-13 (as most countries consolidated their
current regimes in the early 2000s); and restricting the sample only to inflation targeting (IT)
countries/periods.
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vi. Controlling for the change in the monetary base. The baseline specification controls for the
interest rate (differential) to ensure that the estimated effect of FXI does not reflect changes
in the monetary policy stance. To further ensure that results are not polluted by the effect
of unsterilized interventions, we add the change in the monetary base (in percent of GDP) as
a control; and find that results hold.
vii. Finally, estimating a model in first differences out of possible concerns about stationarity. The
estimated coefficient for FXI is still negative and statistically significant, although smaller
in absolute magnitude. The latter is not surprising since this specification differs from the
benchmark in its assumptions about exchange rate dynamics. In the baseline, the introduction
of lagged exchange rate level allows for a gradual mean reversion of shocks, while the first
differences specification imposes the assumption that shocks have permanent effects. In the
next section, we study the persistence of FXI effects more in depth.
Overall, results display very stable estimates for the effect of FXI on the exchange rate, with
magnitudes consistent with those of the baseline specification.
3.3 Extensions
3.3.1 Dynamic Effects
So far, we have focused on the contemporaneous impact of FXI on the exchange rate. And,
while the baseline specification allows for some persistent effects through the autoregressive term,
different shocks (including FXI) may have different degrees of persistence. In this section we extend
our analysis to study this aspect, the understanding of which is paramount to the policy maker.
Specifically, lagged values of FXI are added to our benchmark specification. We use up to three
lags as coefficients on further lags were not significant. Contemporaneous FXI is instrumented as
before, while lags of FXI are included in both the first and second stages as controls as these are
exogenous to the current exchange rate. Figure 3.1 displays the implied dynamics of a FXI (FX
purchase) of 1 percent of GDP for the different exchange rate measures (corresponding to columns
1-3 in Appendix Table 3.C.11). The immediate impact of FXI on the exchange rate remains
similar to our benchmark specification. Effects are relatively persistent, and relatively more so for
the nominal than for the real exchange rate. The coefficients of the three FXI lags are positive,
meaning that the impact of FXI on the exchange rate decreases over time and that this decay is
faster than that of an average shock (captured by the auto-regressive coefficient of the exchange
rate). The half-life of FXI shocks (bottom row of Appendix Table 3.C.11) ranges between 12 and
23 months, displaying the highest values for the nominal bilateral exchange rate, and lowest for
the real effective exchange rate. This result suggests that FXI may be more effective in affecting
nominal than real variables, as one would expect.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse response functions of nominal, real and real effective exchange rates
(a) NER (b) RER (c) REER
Dashed lines show bootstrapped confidence intervals.
These half-life estimates remain below those of a general shock to the exchange rate, which lie
between 18 and 29 months according to our baseline estimates. The latter are broadly consistent
with findings of previous studies, which ranged between 2 and 7 years, depending on the approach.38
A number of additional robustness checks (see Appendix Table 3.C.12) confirm these results.39
3.3.2 Asymmetric effects
Finally, we study whether FXI effects are asymmetric, i.e. whether positive interventions (FX
purchases) are more/less effective than negative ones (FX sales). A priori, one can think of two
different reasons for possible asymmetric effects, which go in opposite directions:
i. On the one hand, a lower bound on the amount of reserves may constrain the central bank’s
ability to defend a specific exchange rate level. As agents anticipate this, FX sales may have
limited effects on the exchange rate.
ii. On the other hand, while the central bank balance sheet can be expanded unlimitedly through
positive FXI (FX purchases), larger FX positions tend to entail a quasi fiscal cost and so FXI
may not be sustained indefinitely.40 Expectations about the latter could, again, render FXI
ineffective.
We examine possible asymmetric effects by enriching the specification to allow for a differentiated
effect. Specifically:
38Frankel and Rose (1996) find a half-life of 4 years for a panel of 150 countries; while Cheung and Lai (2000) obtain a
half-life of 2-5 years for advanced countries, and below 3 years for emerging economies. More recently, Chortareas
and Kapetanios (2013) suggest a new definition of the half-life, and obtain estimates ranging from 1 to 2 years.
39Without the outlier treatment, the effect of FXI is in general stronger, but also less persistent, reflecting a combi-
nation of smaller autoregressive coefficients and higher coefficients for the lagged FXI regressors.
40See Adler and Mano (2015) for a documentation of the quasi fiscal costs of carrying out FXI.
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log(ERit) = α+ β log(ERit−1) + γ1F̂XIit + γ2 ̂FXIPOSit + δ
′Xit + ηi + it (3.8)
FXIit = a1 + b1 log(ERit−1) + c′1Zit + e
′
1[Zit × I
(
F̂XIit > 0
)
] + d′1Xit + ui + vit (3.9)
̂FXIPOSit ≡ F̂XIit × I
(
F̂XIit > 0
)
(3.10)
Where the innovation relative to the baseline is that positive interventions (FXIPOSit ) are instru-
mented separately. Our interest lies in the sign of the coefficient γ2, which indicates whether positive
interventions are more (γ2 < 0) or less effective (γ2 > 0) than negative ones.
As is shown in Table 3.1, we find no evidence of an asymmetric effect in either direction, suggesting
that positive and negative FXI are equally effective.
Conclusions
We study the effect of FXI on the level of the exchange rate, using an instrumental-variables panel
setting in a large sample of countries and time. We find robust evidence that intervention affects
the level of the exchange rate in a meaningful way. A purchase of foreign currency of 1 percentage
point of GDP causes a depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate in the ranges of [1.7-
2.0] percent and [1.4-1.7] percent respectively. Effects are found to be quite persistent, pointing
to a half-life in the range of [12-23] months, depending on the specification. Finally, positive and
negative interventions appear to be equally effective, suggesting that FXI is a useful policy tool
both when facing appreciation and depreciation pressures. Overall, these results indicate that FXI
is an effective policy instrument for macroeconomic management.
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Appendix
3.A Proxies for FXI
Adjusting NFA for valuation and income flows
A general problem faced by the literature on foreign exchange intervention (FXI) is the lack of
comprehensive data on such operations. Only a handful of countries, mostly advanced economies,
publish actual intervention data. In absence of such data, much of the research has been conducted
using changes in reserves as a proxy for FXI, although the latter measure is polluted by valuation
effects as well as income flows (generated by the return on assets). Here, we follow an alternative
approach aiming at adjusting reserves series for such components and thus constructing a more
precise proxy for intervention.
This approach is based on Dominguez (2012), except that we focus on a net concept of reserves,
as opposed to a gross concept. Define country j’s foreign exchange intervention (i.e., purchases) at
time t as:
FXIj,t ≡ ∆NFCAj,t −∆valNFCAj,t −∆incNFCAj,t (3.11)
where ∆NFCAj,t denotes changes in net foreign currency assets; ∆
valNFCAj,t denotes valuation
changes and ∆incNFCAj,t stands for income flows on the next foreign currency position. We
estimate each of these as:
∆NFCAj,t =
∑
s∈S
∆Hsj,t (3.12)
∆valNFCAj,t =
∑
s∈S
(P st − P st−1)Hsj,t−1 (3.13)
∆incNFCAj,t =
∑
s∈S
ist−1H
s
j,t−1 (3.14)
where Hsj,t is the net position on a security s at time t; P
s
t denotes the market price of foreign
asset s at time t; and ist denotes the monthly interest rate on those securities. The price of a (zero
coupon) security maturing n months ahead is estimated by (1 + ist )
−n.
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The break-down of foreign currency assets into different securities is given by the IMF’s Data
Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity. The currency composition
of the different securities (not provided by the template) is assumed to be uniform across the
asset class, and broken down into 7 major currencies, as indicated in the Currency Composition
of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) dataset. These include: US dollar, the Australian
dollar, Canadian dollar, British pound, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc and Euro. Because the Fund’s
reserve template only focuses on assets, the data is complemented by using the series of central
bank foreign liabilities available through IMF’s International Financial Statistics. As noted by
Dominguez (2012), most central banks claim to hold primarily long-term government bonds. Thus,
we follow her in assuming that securities are mostly composed of 10-year bonds. Also along the lines
of Dominguez (2012) and Dominguez et al. (2012), 3-month interbank yields are used as proxies
for returns on holdings of foreign currency and deposits. Valuation effects are zero for the latter
assets. The IMF’s reserve position and holdings of SDR are valued at the SDR rate, and generate
income according to the SDR interest rate. Gold holdings are valued at market prices. Table 3.A.1
summarizes the information used to make this valuation and income flow adjustments.
Off Balance Sheet FX Interventions
We also construct a measure that, in addition to the adjustment for valuation effects and income
flows, accounts for off-balance sheet (non-spot) operations, as:
FXIj,t ≡ ∆NFCAj,t − (∆valNFCAj,t + ∆incNFCAj,t) +OBSi,t (3.15)
where OBSi,t include changes in aggregate short and long positions in forwards and futures in
foreign currencies vis-a-vis the domestic currency (including the forward leg of currency swaps), and
financial instruments denominated in foreign currency but settled by other means (e.g., in domestic
currency), as reported in the International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity Template.
Table 3.A.1: Valuation adjustments
Type of asset Currency Asset/Maturity Valuation Estimated
Structure Structure adjustment Income
Official Reserve Assets
Foreign currency reserves
Securities Currency
shares from
COFER
(US$, AC, £,
U, A$, C$,
and SFranc)1
10-year
sovereign
bonds2
Implicit mar-
ket value
based on
10-year rate3
10-year
coupon rate
continued
126
Chapter3
Table 3.A.1: Valuation adjustments
Type of asset Currency Asset/Maturity Valuation Estimated
Structure Structure adjustment Income
Official Reserve Assets
Foreign currency reserves
Total currency and deposits 3-month CD None 3-month
interbank
rate
IMF reserve position
SDR basket SDR basket
SDR valua-
tion changes
SDR rate
SDRs
Gold None None Gold Price
variations
None
Other reserve assets Currency
shares from
COFER
(US$, AC, £,
U, A$, C$,
and SFranc)
10-year
sovereign
bonds
Implicit mar-
ket value
based on
10-year rate
10-year
coupon rate
Source: IMF COFER and Data Template on International Reserves /Foreign Currency Liquidity.
1 Using annual aggregate statistics for the groups of emerging market economies. Weights are adjusted
proportionally to add to 1.
2 As in Dominguez (2012), assumes 10-year maturity holdings.
3 Computed from the market interest rate.
3.B Capital controls
Other recent studies have pointed to the possible complementarity between FXI and restrictions
on capital mobility.41 While this aspect is somewhat beyond the scope of the paper, we discuss
this issue briefly, using our set-up and allowing for an interaction term between FXI and different
measures of capital controls. Similarly to previous extensions, the interacted term is instrumented
separately, and the set of instrumental variables includes the baseline instruments both alone and
interacted with capital controls. Specifically:
log(ERit) = α+ β log(ERit−1) + γ3 ̂FXIGDPit + γ4
̂(FXIGDPit ×KCit−1) + δ′Xit + ηi + it
(3.16)
FXIGDPit = a3 + b3 log(ERit−1) + c
′
3Zit + e
′
3(Zit ×KCit−1) + d′3Xit + ui + vit (3.17)
FXIGDPit ×KCit−1 = a4 + b4 log(ERit−1) + c′4Zit + e′4(Zit ×KCit−1) + d′4Xit + wi + zit (3.18)
41Bayoumi et al. (2014) find that the impact of FXI on the current account is larger for economies with greater
restrictions on capital flow mobility.
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The innovation relative to the baseline is the interaction with capital controls (KCit), for which we
use three different indices: Schindler (2009), Quinn and Toyoda (2008) and Chinn and Ito (2006).
Each index is introduced in levels, or as threshold dummies for high capital controls (using different
threshold values). We explore both absolute (time-invariant) and time-varying thresholds based
on the period cross-country distribution of the index. Lagged values of capital controls are used
to mitigate endogeneity concerns, and the level of capital controls is also included as a control
variable.
Our results (not reported) do not lend support to the hypothesis of complementarity between capi-
tal controls and FXI; and in some cases they are counter-intuitive, suggesting that the effect of FXI
on the exchange rate may decrease with higher levels of capital controls. These results point to the
complexity of the relationship between FXI and restrictions on capital mobility, policy tools that
could be used as complements or as substitutes of each other. For instance, restrictions on capital
flows in the form of ‘quotas’ could increase the effectiveness of FXI, by reducing the substitutability
between domestic and foreign assets. But imposing capital controls could also render FXI unnec-
essary, if it suffices to maintain exchange rate stability. In the latter case, we would simultaneously
observe high capital controls and very low levels of intervention. Furthermore, the set of instru-
ments used in the baseline specification may not be appropriate when exploring the interaction
between capital controls and FXI, as reserve accumulation and exchange rate stabilization motives
are likely to change in the presence of significant restrictions on capital mobility.
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3.C Further results
Figure 3.C.1: Correlation between the change in log(RER) and
FXI/GDP
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; and authors’ calculations
Figure 3.C.2: Distribution of FXI/GDP
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; and authors’ calculations
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Table 3.C.1: Country list
IFS code Start date End date Obs
Argentina 213 Feb 1996 Dec 2011 173
Armenia 911 Feb 1996 Aug 2013 206
Australia 193 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 203
Bolivia 218 Feb 1996 Aug 2013 208
Brazil 223 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 191
Bulgaria 918 Aug 1997 Sep 2013 184
Canada 156 Feb 1996 Aug 2013 209
Chile 228 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 209
China 924 Jul 1999 Sep 2013 152
Colombia 233 Feb 1996 Oct 2013 210
Costa Rica 238 Feb 1996 Aug 2013 211
Croatia 960 Feb 1996 Jun 2013 206
Czech Republic 935 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 205
Denmark 128 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 201
Egypt 469 Jan 2001 Aug 2013 149
Guatemala 258 Jan 1997 May 2010 160
Honduras 268 Jan 2001 Sep 2013 153
Hong Kong 532 Jan 1997 Aug 2013 122
Hungary 944 Jan 2000 Sep 2013 152
India 534 Jan 1999 Sep 2013 177
Indonesia 536 Feb 1996 Dec 2012 173
Israel 436 Feb 1996 Jan 2010 168
Japan 158 Feb 1996 Aug 2013 135
Kazakhstan 916 Jul 2000 Dec 2012 142
Kenya 664 Mar 2002 Dec 2011 115
Korea 542 Feb 1996 Aug 2013 194
Lithuania 946 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 206
Malaysia 548 Feb 1996 Jul 2013 191
Mexico 273 Apr 1996 Sep 2013 207
Moldova 921 Mar 2000 Oct 2013 159
New Zealand 196 Feb 1996 Jun 2011 177
Nicaragua 278 Jan 2006 Dec 2012 84
Nigeria 694 Jun 2007 Dec 2012 62
Norway 142 Feb 1996 Jan 2008 141
Pakistan 564 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 207
Paraguay 288 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 205
Peru 293 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 212
Philippines 566 Feb 1996 Apr 2013 192
Poland 964 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 201
Romania 968 Apr 2001 Sep 2013 142
Russia 922 Dec 1999 Sep 2013 161
Saudi Arabia 456 Feb 1996 Mar 2013 178
South Africa 199 Jan 1999 Oct 2013 162
Sri Lanka 524 Feb 1996 Jan 2013 202
Sweden 144 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 205
Switzerland 146 Jan 1998 Sep 2013 171
Thailand 578 Feb 1996 Oct 2013 200
Turkey 186 Nov 1999 Sep 2013 130
Ukraine 926 Nov 1998 Sep 2013 166
United Kingdom 112 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 199
Uruguay 298 Feb 1996 Sep 2013 197
Vietnam 582 Feb 1996 Jul 2013 184
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Table 3.C.2: Variables list and definition
Variable Name Definition Source
NER Nominal bilateral exchange rate (increase=appreciation) IFS
RER Real bilateral exchange rate, computed from NER and CPI, in-
crease=appreciation
CPI: datastream, IFS
REER Real effective exchange rate (increase=appreciation) IFS
FXI/GDP Foreign exchange intervention (FXI) proxy, computed as the change in the
central bank’s net foreign assets, normalized by annual HP trend US dollar
GDP (in percentage points)
IFS
FXI/GDP (net of val-
uation gains and in-
come flows)
FXI proxy, computed as the change in the central bank’s net foreign assets
and adjusted for valuation gains and income flows, normalized by annual HP
trend US dollar GDP (in percentage points)
Authors’ calculations
based on IFS; IMF’s Data
Template on International
Reserves and Foreign
Currency Liquidity; and
IMF’s COFER dataset
FXI/GDP (net of val-
uation and income
flows and including
off-balance sheet op-
erations)
FXI proxy, computed as the change in the central bank’s net foreign assets,
adjusted for valuation gains and income flows, and including off-balance sheet
operations; normalized by annual HP trend US dollar GDP (in percentage
points)
FXI/GDP (gross) FXI proxy, computed as the change in the central bank’s gross foreign assets,
normalized by annual HP trend US dollar GDP (in percentage points)
IFS
FXI/M2 FXI proxy, computed as the change in the central bank’s net foreign assets,
normalized by annual smoothed broad money (% points)
IFS
FXI/FSS (narrow) FXI proxy, computed as the change in the central bank’s net foreign assets,
normalized by annual smoothed financial sector size (IFS data) (% points)
IFS
FXI/FSS (broad) FXI proxy, computed as the change in the central bank’s net foreign assets,
normalized by annual smoothed financial sector size (WB data) (% points)
IFS, World Bank GFDD
FXI/MS Foreign exchange intervention, computed as the change in the central bank’s
net foreign assets, normalized by annual smoothed market size (% points)
IFS, World Bank GFDD
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX) Haver Analytics
Interest rate differen-
tial
log(1+i)-log(1+i*), where i is the domestic interest rate and i* is the US
interest rate (% points)
IFS
Change in M2 Change in broad money over the past month, normalized by smoothed GDP
(% points)
IFS
Financial dollariza-
tion
Share of domestic deposits denominated in foreign currency (% points) Levy-Yeyati (2006), IMF
country desks
Imports coverage Central bank’s net foreign assets over yearly imports (% points) IFS, DOTS
Low imports coverage Time-varying dummy equal to 1 if imports coverage are below the cross-
country first quartile
IFS, DOTS
Broad money cover-
age
Central bank’s net foreign assets over M2 (% points) IFS
GDP per capita (dif-
ferential)
Difference bewteen domestic GDP per capita in country i and the U.S., in
logarithm.
WEO
Expected GDP
growth (differential)
Current year expected GDP growth, relative to the U.S. Consensus Forecast
Trade balance Exports minus imports of the current month (% points) DOTS
Trade openness Rratio of yearly imports plus exports over GDP, smoothed by a 3 years moving
average (% points)
DOTS, IFS
EPFR/GDP Sum of yearly flows of funds towards other countries, normalized by GDP of
other countries (% points)
EPFR Flow of Funds
EMBI EMBI global spread (basis points) Bloomberg
Inflation Yearly inflation rate over past 12 months, computed from CPI (% points) IFS, Datastream
Capital controls Quinn & Toyoda index for capital controls (the higher, the more open) Quinn & Toyoda, IMF
Commodity prices Price indexes for food, metal and energy prices IFS
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Table 3.C.3: FXI normalizations correlations
FXI/GDP FXI/M2 FXI/FSS (IFS) FXI/FSS (WB) FXI/MS
FXI/GDP 1
FXI/M2 0.819∗∗∗ 1
FXI/FSS (IFS) 0.848∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 1
FXI/FSS (WB) 0.794∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 1
FXI/MS 0.325∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 1
Table 3.C.4: Different normalizations: First stage
Dependent variable: foreign exchange intervention (% GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FXI/GDP FXI/M2 FXI/FSS(IFS) FXI/FSS(WB) FXI/MS
Exchange rate (lagged) -0.003∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005 -0.037∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018)
VIX -0.005∗∗ -0.007 -0.008∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.041
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.025)
Interest rate (differential) -0.095∗∗ -0.256 -0.195∗∗ -0.237∗∗ -0.881
(0.037) (0.153) (0.083) (0.109) (0.990)
Change in M2/GDP 0.104∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.073) (0.045) (0.078) (0.379)
Financial dollarization × VIX -0.011∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗
(0.005) (0.023) (0.010) (0.013) (0.099)
Import coverage (lagged) -0.252∗ -0.663 -0.268 -0.118 0.920
(0.142) (0.510) (0.339) (0.419) (1.345)
Low import coverage (lagged) 0.035 0.022 0.022 0.088 0.722
(0.042) (0.125) (0.091) (0.106) (0.785)
Broad money coverage (lagged) -0.021 -0.443 -0.242 -0.463 -4.733
(0.145) (0.979) (0.563) (0.756) (3.013)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9149 9053 8741 8424 8515
Countries 52 52 52 48 50
R2 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.15
F stat 8.18 7.46 7.64 7.11 2.87
F p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
132
Chapter3
T
ab
le
3.
C
.5
:
E
x
cl
u
d
in
g
d
e
ju
re
an
d
d
e
fa
ct
o
p
eg
s:
S
ec
o
n
d
st
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
:
re
a
l
b
il
a
te
ra
l
ex
ch
a
n
g
e
ra
te
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
E
x
cl
u
d
in
g
d
e
ju
re
:
E
x
cl
u
d
in
g
d
e
fa
ct
o
:
P
eg
s
C
ra
w
li
n
g
b
a
n
d
s
W
id
e
b
a
n
d
s
P
eg
s
C
ra
w
li
n
g
b
a
n
d
s
W
id
e
b
a
n
d
s
F
X
I/
G
D
P
(i
n
st
ru
m
en
te
d
)
-1
.7
1
4
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
4
7
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
5
0
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
9
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
7
8
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
6
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
8
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
8
0
∗∗
∗
-2
.1
0
3
∗∗
∗
-1
.4
7
8
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
3
6
∗∗
∗
-1
.2
5
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.4
8
5
)
(0
.5
7
6
)
(0
.4
8
3
)
(0
.5
8
2
)
(0
.4
8
6
)
(0
.5
9
1
)
(0
.4
1
4
)
(0
.4
6
6
)
(0
.5
7
6
)
(0
.5
3
3
)
(0
.5
3
6
)
(0
.4
2
5
)
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
(l
a
g
g
ed
)
0
.9
6
1
∗∗
∗
0
.9
4
6
∗∗
∗
0
.9
5
9
∗∗
∗
0
.9
4
6
∗∗
∗
0
.9
5
8
∗∗
∗
0
.9
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.9
6
6
∗∗
∗
0
.9
4
6
∗∗
∗
0
.9
5
6
∗∗
∗
0
.9
3
6
∗∗
∗
0
.9
5
2
∗∗
∗
0
.9
3
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
V
IX
-0
.0
4
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
5
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
4
5
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
5
3
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
4
5
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
5
3
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
5
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
6
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
5
9
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
6
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
5
7
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
6
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
In
te
re
st
ra
te
(d
iff
er
en
ti
a
l)
-0
.0
2
5
0
.0
6
5
-0
.0
3
8
0
.0
6
5
-0
.0
6
3
0
.0
2
9
-0
.0
1
3
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
8
9
0
.2
1
7
0
.6
1
5
∗∗
0
.6
3
2
∗∗
(0
.1
2
6
)
(0
.1
4
7
)
(0
.1
2
9
)
(0
.1
4
9
)
(0
.1
3
1
)
(0
.1
5
2
)
(0
.1
3
4
)
(0
.1
5
4
)
(0
.1
8
4
)
(0
.1
7
3
)
(0
.2
4
0
)
(0
.2
5
6
)
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
(d
iff
er
en
ti
a
l)
3
.4
8
8
∗∗
∗
3
.4
3
9
∗∗
∗
3
.3
2
6
∗∗
∗
7
.6
0
7
∗∗
∗
7
.2
2
4
∗∗
∗
4
.6
0
8
∗∗
(0
.9
8
5
)
(1
.0
0
0
)
(1
.0
0
8
)
(1
.3
7
3
)
(1
.5
8
2
)
(2
.3
1
2
)
E
x
p
ec
te
d
G
D
P
g
ro
w
th
(d
iff
er
en
ti
a
l)
0
.1
1
8
∗∗
∗
0
.1
1
9
∗∗
∗
0
.1
2
1
∗∗
∗
0
.1
0
4
∗∗
∗
0
.1
2
1
∗∗
∗
0
.1
4
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
8
)
(0
.0
3
5
)
(0
.0
4
6
)
T
ra
d
e
B
a
la
n
ce
(l
a
g
g
ed
)
-0
.0
5
4
-0
.0
5
7
-0
.0
6
6
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
7
0
.1
5
6
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
9
7
)
(0
.1
2
3
)
(0
.1
3
9
)
(0
.1
6
1
)
T
ra
d
e
O
p
en
n
es
s
0
.4
2
5
∗∗
∗
0
.4
2
8
∗∗
∗
0
.4
2
2
∗∗
∗
0
.3
3
0
∗∗
∗
0
.4
7
6
∗∗
∗
0
.4
1
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
0
2
)
(0
.1
0
4
)
(0
.1
0
6
)
(0
.1
0
7
)
(0
.1
1
8
)
(0
.1
4
2
)
E
P
F
R
/
G
D
P
2
.0
7
1
∗∗
∗
2
.0
9
8
∗∗
∗
2
.0
9
1
∗∗
∗
2
.1
5
7
∗∗
∗
2
.3
1
9
∗∗
∗
2
.5
1
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.3
2
5
)
(0
.3
2
3
)
(0
.3
2
5
)
(0
.3
6
2
)
(0
.3
9
9
)
(0
.4
6
9
)
C
o
m
m
o
d
it
y
p
ri
ce
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
o
u
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
8
0
3
2
7
3
7
1
7
8
4
1
7
2
1
4
7
7
9
8
7
1
7
1
7
0
3
0
6
3
9
2
5
5
4
8
5
2
5
3
3
8
6
2
3
6
2
9
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
4
8
4
6
4
8
4
6
4
8
4
6
4
5
4
4
4
0
3
9
3
0
3
0
R
2
0
.9
8
0
.9
7
0
.9
8
0
.9
8
0
.9
8
0
.9
7
0
.9
8
0
.9
7
0
.9
7
0
.9
7
0
.9
6
0
.9
7
J
p
-v
a
lu
e
0
.1
4
0
.2
9
0
.1
8
0
.2
8
0
.1
3
0
.2
1
0
.1
2
0
.1
2
0
.0
5
0
.0
2
0
.3
3
0
.1
3
S
to
ck
&
Y
o
g
o
st
a
t
1
4
.6
4
1
0
.3
7
1
4
.5
1
1
0
.0
1
1
4
.3
8
9
.9
2
1
6
.7
2
1
2
.2
4
9
.7
9
8
.6
5
9
.3
6
1
0
.6
2
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
ro
b
u
st
to
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.1
0
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
133
Unveiling the Effects of Foreign Exchange Intervention: A Panel Approach
Table 3.C.6: Robustness to capital controls: Second stage
Dependent variable: real bilateral exchange rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excluding change in
capital controls Full sample
FXI/GDP (instrumented) -1.231∗∗∗ -1.392∗∗∗ -1.686∗∗∗ -1.650∗∗∗ -2.004∗∗∗ -2.007∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.395) (0.439) (0.435) (0.523) (0.524)
Dependent variable (lagged) 0.967∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
VIX -0.039∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
VIX × Capital controls -0.048∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Interest rate (differential) 0.070 0.167
(0.113) (0.134)
Interest rate diff. × Capital controls -0.030 0.016 0.057 0.057
(0.176) (0.175) (0.195) (0.195)
GDP per capita (differential) 3.512∗∗∗ 4.557∗∗∗ 4.511∗∗∗
(0.908) (1.014) (1.017)
Expected GDP growth (differential) 0.123∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
Trade Balance (lagged) 0.009 -0.096 -0.095
(0.090) (0.112) (0.112)
Trade Openness 0.265∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.117) (0.117)
EPFR/GDP 1.930∗∗∗ 2.032∗∗∗ 3.229∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.332) (0.923)
EPFR × Capital controls 2.564∗∗∗ -1.574
(0.400) (1.209)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8284 7474 8020 8020 7467 7467
Countries 52 51 50 50 47 47
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97
J p-value 0.12 0.13 0.22 0.45 0.70 0.69
Stock & Yogo stat 20.54 15.43 15.13 15.21 11.90 11.84
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.C.8: FXI measure: Second stage
Dependent variable: real bilateral exchange rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Valuation & Dropping small
Valuation off-balance sheet Gross reserves FXI 10%
FXI/GDP (instrumented) -1.343∗∗∗ -1.364∗∗∗ -1.571∗∗∗ -1.288∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.303) (0.355) (0.318)
Dependent variable (lagged) 0.969∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
VIX -0.046∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Interest rate (differential) 0.070 0.046 0.035 -0.037
(0.101) (0.105) (0.107) (0.109)
Commodity prices Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9012 9011 9103 8234
Countries 52 52 52 52
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
J p-value 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.17
Stock & Yogo stat 25.06 22.57 22.51 22.42
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.C.9: FXI measures correlations
FXI FXI (val adj) FXI (val adj + off-BS) FXI (∆Reserves)
FXI 1
FXI (val adj) 0.732∗∗∗ 1
FXI (val adj + off-BS) 0.722∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 1
FXI (∆Reserves) 0.688∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 1
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Table 3.C.10: Further robustness checks
Dependent variable: real bilateral exchange rate
FXI/GDP Std Dev Obs R2 J p-value Stock & Yogo stat
Whole sample -1.674 0.364 9812 0.97 0.27 11.49
Dropping 1% outliers -1.430 0.318 9149 0.98 0.29 24.25
Dropping 2% outliers -0.958 0.334 8431 0.99 0.02 20.98
Winsorized data 1% -2.155 0.405 9812 0.97 0.10 21.90
Winsorized data 2% -2.367 0.436 9812 0.96 0.08 23.56
No financial crisis -1.493 0.354 8642 0.98 0.15 19.38
No Asian crisis -1.381 0.328 7588 0.98 0.27 21.76
Dropping largest FXI 5% -1.497 0.370 8692 0.98 0.27 19.99
Dropping largest FXI 10% -1.569 0.415 8235 0.98 0.23 18.65
Substituting VIX by EPFR -1.055 0.289 9149 0.98 0.01 24.47
Substituting VIX by EMBI -1.246 0.311 8421 0.98 0.14 22.78
Adding EMBI -1.384 0.322 8421 0.98 0.00 19.22
Country specific coeffs for VIX -1.318 0.326 9149 0.98 0.03 21.26
Country specific coeffs for IR -1.462 0.319 9149 0.98 0.28 24.16
Country specific coeffs for VIX & IR -1.284 0.318 9149 0.98 0.24 21.91
Adding REER gap -1.543 0.394 7833 0.98 0.38 16.03
Sample period 2003-2013 -1.241 0.327 5977 0.97 0.11 18.98
Only inflation-targeting countries -1.744 0.801 3772 0.97 0.00 7.72
Adding ∆(monetary base)/GDP -2.745 0.725 9028 0.97 0.18 7.87
∆ RER -0.959 0.284 9149 -0.16 0.02 26.84
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